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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the knowledge of the economics of education in post-
conflict, by proposing an economic analysis of such a setting as a hybrid socio-
economic environment, where conflict, despite having ended, has still an impact. It uses 
an applied economics approach to analyse demand for primary and secondary education 
and one of the main economic drivers of their demand, returns to education. The focus 
of study is the post-conflict country of Timor-Leste. 
In this analysis it proposes and tests economic mechanisms through which conflict may 
have impacted the returns to education observed in post-conflict Timor-Leste, finding 
evidence of two significant channels: reduction of productivity and scarcity of qualified 
human resources. In support of this analysis, it builds a dataset with a novel indicator of 
political control during conflict that applies in the empirical analysis of returns to 
education. 
In the next chapter it seeks to establish evidence of medium-run impacts of conflict on 
the demand for primary education in Timor-Leste, proposing and testing an empirical 
methodology to do so. 
Finally, it proposes and analyses an empirical model of the demand for secondary 
education in Timor-Leste that integrates the hypothesis of medium-run impacts of 
conflict. 
In the process it finds evidence suggesting that, while some of the channels negatively 
impacted by conflict significantly affect demand for education, a medium-run positive 
effect might exist, particularly in the form of higher preferences for secondary education 
among those that experienced more violence during the conflict. Less robust findings of 
equally positive medium-run effects of conflict are found in the demand for primary 
education. 
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Inconfidências 
São nossas as armas, são vossas as guerras 
São nossos os lucros, são vossas as mortes 
Fazemos dos homens uns meros bonecos 
Deixando que pensem agir como homens. 
 
As mãos que percutem gatilhos são vossas 
Razão que comanda ninguém reconhece, 
Pois uns se escudam na força dos votos 
E outros a capa de fraudes alegam. 
 
Vendendo a ambos, nos crescem os lucros. 
Riquezas, que tendes, compramos barato. 
Dos ganhos que temos nos damos ao luxo, 
 
De dar-vos esmolas que, meras migalhas, 
Não passam de restos e são um produto 
Da fome que tendes, por guerras travadas. 
 
Secrets disclosed1 
Ours are the weapons, yours the wars 
Ours the profits, yours the killings 
We turn all men into mere dummies 
While letting them think they’re acting like men 
 
Yours are the fingers that pull the triggers 
No-one acknowledges reason’s command 
For some hide behind the power of votes 
While others claim the veil of fraud 
  
By selling to both our profits swell 
What wealth you have, we'll buy on the cheap 
Our generous margins allow us the luxury 
  
Of giving donations that, being mere crumbs, 
Are no more than leftovers, and the result 
Of the hunger you feel, from the wars that you fight. 
 
Américo Goulão dos Santos 
(08-05-1944 - 13-06-2015) 
Estarás sempre comigo! 
                                                          
1 A special thanks to Alex Shankland for reviewing 
my weak attempt of a translation. 
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Introduction 
 
The importance of Education is one of the strongest areas of consensus found in the 
international debate and agenda about Human Development. Education is perceived as a 
societal investment, with effects on human capital formation and economic growth and 
also on other social common goods. The correlation of higher schooling with higher 
performance in indicators relating to human development is well established and 
emphasized by many studies, from Lucas (1988), Mankiw et al. (1992) and Barro and 
Lee (1994) to Gregorio and Lee (2002), from Breierova and Duflo (2004) to Cutler et 
al. (2006), as reviewed by Barro and Lee (2013). The contribution of education to 
growth is heterogeneous and each level of school attainment contributes differently to 
the path of economic growth in each country. Papageorgiou (2003) found that primary 
education contributes substantially to a higher output production but, particularly in 
developing countries, has a very limited contribution to research and development 
(R&D) adoption. Conversely, post-primary education, including attainment at the 
secondary level, contributes less to production directly but is decisive as a contributor to 
R&D. Finally, the contribution goes beyond economic growth. Curry and Brand (2014), 
reviewing the literature on the effects of education, found evidence of the importance of 
schooling attainment on labour market outcomes; social status; physical and mental 
health; marriage and fertility; civic participation; and social attitudes. 
These studies allowed for a strong worldwide agreement that has contributed to include 
education as a main component of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
Previously, in 1990 at Jomtien, the Education for All (EFA) initiative was launched, 
establishing the goal of Universal Primary Education (UPE) that became inscribed in 
the MDGs. As with the MDGs, the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDG’s) 
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establish a set of targets for education. Beyond universal primary education, the aim is 
now to also guarantee that all children have access to free, equitable and quality 
secondary education. 
The international commitment has been strong and evolving. Following Psacharopoulos 
(2006), World Bank policies on education evolved from a focus on education as a 
source of professional training and a focus on manpower planning, from 1963  to 1999. 
Then, the priorities were turned to the promotion of basic education with a focus on 
girls and the poorest and the improvement of teaching and learning processes focusing 
on early child development. At this time there was also an emphasis on the promotion of 
ICT’s in open and distance learning; curriculum improvement; decentralization; and the 
entry of non-government providers. A new priority was added then, with an increased 
attention given to the private sector and on the need for Technical Vocational Education 
and Training (TVET). A systemic approach has been proposed, to be applied to what 
the World Bank identifies now as key areas: “working in fragile situations; involving 
the private sector in education; promoting gender equality; and linking education 
systems to labour markets.” (World Bank, 2011:42). Clearly the focus of this approach 
is on the supply side of the education economy: the provision of services. 
In his review, Psacharopoulos also shows another priority. Aid to primary education 
consistently rose in importance, from 2.7% of lending in the sector to 35.6% 
(Psacharopoulos, 2006) during the period 1960 to 1999 and has been maintained at 
around 30% in the current decade (World Bank, 2013a). Fredriksen (2008), however, 
looking at international assistance to development, argued that the focus of the 
Education For All targets needed to expand beyond primary education and also beyond 
only providing access and promoting enrolment. The report also recommended that 
higher priority should be given to post-primary education. 
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The priority given to education, as set by multilateral donors, was translated into 
policies of poorer countries’ governments. National commitments toward education 
have manifested themselves beyond the letters and words of statements, and are 
evidenced in positive achievements. Most recent statistics suggest a significant 
improvement in primary school enrolment in developing countries, reaching 90% in 
2010, up from 82% in 1999 (UNESCO, 2011). 
However, this rather positive story does not seem to resonate in conflict affected 
countries. Losses in education are among the legacies of conflict. In its Education for 
All 2011 Global Monitoring Report, especially dedicated to conflict, UNESCO (2011) 
reported the dire situation in Fragile and Conflict Afflicted States (FCAS). Although it 
only reported 35 countries as FCAS, these encompassed in 2011, 42% of all children of 
primary school age out of school, making a total that surpassed 28 million. More recent 
evidence is reported by Winthrop and Matsui (2013), finding that a child living in a low 
income “fragile state” is three times as likely to not attend school than a child living in a 
peaceful low income country. 
The challenges of fragility 
Cammack et al. (2006) looking at the United States, United Kingdom and Germany - 
key international assistance donors - reviews how state fragility is described. “Fragile 
states” demonstrate a weak functionality in the provision of the conditions for security 
and wellbeing of their citizens (including education); they generate or are inadequately 
able to cope with poverty, violent conflict and other forms of national and international 
violence and crime, refugees, disease and/or environment degradation2. In a recent 
guideline document on fragility assessment (ADB, 2014), the Asian Development Bank 
                                                          
2 Finally, Cammack et al. (2006) note that those states with whom donors find it difficult to partner can 
also be qualified by them as fragile. 
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describes the term in a fundamentally similar way as referring to failure to: provide 
basic social services (considered to be health, education and security); uphold the rule of 
law; and provide for sustainable sources of income to enable the population to move out 
of poverty. 
The fragilities of conflict afflicted countries are also manifested in the labour market, as 
was reviewed in the Jobs after War report (Date-Bah, 2003), commissioned by ILO. In 
it, Khshnamurty (2003:56) highlights how, after a conflict, the “labour force lacks 
education and skills, and the mechanisms for providing these have also broken down”. 
It also refers to the way in which vocational training centres and schools tend to be 
damaged by conflict. Downstream of education, and looking at the example of the 
Timorese labour market immediately after independence, it refers to an unemployment 
rate of around 75%. As Khshnamurty (2003:60) stressed: 
‘It cannot be emphasized strongly enough that employment is one of the 
immediate needs of a post-conflict situation and providing immediate work 
opportunities must be an integral part of the humanitarian response to the 
post-conflict situation to contribute to human security’. 
It is, however, not just the employment opportunities, or lack thereof, that characterize a 
post-conflict labour market. As Hopkins (2003:439) reminds us, a post-conflict setting 
witnesses “the use of international contracting services, expatriate labour and the 
introduction of new currencies - what could be described picturesquely as a modern-
times 'Gold Rush' ' –[that] can have a negative effect on future socio-economic 
development of the country concerned and, in particular, the labour market.” Hopkins 
also reminds us that it takes time for education to generate national human resources 
able to respond to the needs of post-conflict development: “schooling takes at least 
eleven years before even higher secondary graduates are formed” (Hopkins, 2003:429). 
Hopkins looked at Timor-Leste during the UN’s transitional administration (1999-2003) 
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describing it as one where the challenges of the post-conflict labour market were more 
striking and highlighting the need to raise human capital in the new, post-conflict, 
country. 
In a post-conflict, fragile country - as Winthrop and Matsui (2013) noticed -  the role of 
education extends beyond its contributions to growth and poverty reduction. It has a role 
in shaping individual and collective identities, the sanctioning of norms and behaviours 
and the promotion of individual agency. Chauvet and Collier (2008) state that the 
provision of social services such as education signals a more equal spreading of the 
peace dividend. Families, through the act of sending their children to school, become 
part of the peace dividend process. Those authors advocate looking at education also as 
an instrument of societal transformation, stating that poor governance and policies can 
be the consequence of poorly educated citizens. They argue that secondary education 
contributes to the countries’ capacity to engage in reforms, stating that there is a need 
for a critical mass of well-educated people in order for a reform to start, even if it does 
not influence the sustainability of reform once it is underway. 
In a post-conflict setting, however, it is also important to acknowledge that education 
and its drivers, as UNESCO (2011) points out, can also - despite their potential in the 
construction of peace - be an instrument to reinforce social divisions, intolerance and 
prejudice, and thus intensify the risks of relapse. The development of education, as Rose 
and Greeley (2006) suggest, may, therefore, be motivated by four different types of 
agendas. These are, first, a security agenda that stresses the potential positive and 
negative uses of education its role in national identity formation and social cohesion, the 
risks of disaffected youth and the role of religious schooling. Second, there is a 
humanitarian agenda that stresses the need of community engagement and of schools as 
safe spaces. Third, there is the EFA agenda that, as a rights-based approach, seeks to 
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address exclusion and to build citizenship, tolerance and peace. Finally, there is the 
MDGs agenda that focuses on growth, poverty reduction and the primary schooling 
targets. Irrespective of the agenda, there is a clear need to address education in post-
conflict situations as a priority, even more than in other developing settings and to 
address the specificities of the setting in which the agenda is to be put in place. 
An understanding of drivers and constraints is required in order to assure a post-conflict 
policy that fosters the potential positive effects of education, while preventing its 
potential risks. A policy that fails to do so may risk falling into the trap highlighted by 
Psacharopoulos (2006:336): 
‘Attempting to implement nice-sounding international resolutions can divert 
resources away from where the need is. (…) [I]t is high time that international 
organizations stopped using round numbers for setting their goals, e.g. 1970 
for universal primary education in Africa, 2000 for education for all, 2005 for 
gender parity, and 2015 for redefined education for all. (…) By way of 
summary, therefore, concrete, small and gradual are beautiful. Grand visions 
and targets are not.’ 
A contextualized analysis of education, focusing on the reality of post-conflict settings 
is then needed to allow for small, gradual and concrete policies to address the 
challenges faced in this arena. This is also stressed by Rose and Greeley (2006), as they 
affirm the need to look at education as a long-term project, requiring long-term 
planning.  
To support such a planning process, a deeper understanding of education in a post-
conflict setting - namely one that focuses on the economic aspects of its nature - should 
look into both supply and demand for education. However, most of the attention, so far, 
has been focused on supply. This was already clear in the review by Psacharopoulos 
(2006), but it can also be read in articles that specifically addressed education in post-
conflict settings. Chauvet and Collier (2008) proposed that in order to create the growth 
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of educational provision in fragile states there needed to be a resort to private sector 
initiatives as the government may not have enough resources and may not give enough 
priority to educational investments. They recommended, however, public investment in 
schools that would support the building industry for reconstruction and in high quality 
education for the children of diaspora. Finally they recommended the creation of a new 
bureaucratic structure, an Independent Service Authority. Their proposal may miss, 
however, the financial and capacity constraints of governments in conflict afflicted 
settings and the lack of depth of the post-conflict economies as highlighted by 
Khshnamurty (2003). Rose and Greeley (2006) suggested a focus on both non-formal 
livelihood education for out-of-school youth, and on secondary and higher education. 
Winthrop and Matsui (2013) proposed a greater degree of coordination and eventual 
integration between both humanitarian and disaster risk reduction aid and development 
aid on education. These proposals, however, can only be supported and analysed against 
the backdrop of a deeper knowledge of demand for education in a post-conflict setting 
and the drivers behind that demand. Yet, that side of the economy of education in post-
conflict settings appears under-researched. 
Understanding the drivers of demand for education in post-conflict 
A wide body of research has been consolidated on demand for education. Starting from 
the works of Mincer (1958), Schultz (1961), Becker, (1962) and Ben-Porath (1967), the 
economic problem of demand for education has been constructed by considering the 
household as facing an investment decision, an investment in human capital. Education 
also has a consumption dimension, as it requires a reduction in consumption of other 
goods, to support the acquisition of books, school material, school uniforms and other 
education related materials, but also payment of tuition where and when education is not 
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free. The financial burden can, of course, be supported by external assistance, reducing 
the contemporaneous net spending on education. A thorough review of the seminal 
literature in demand for education can be found in Freeman (1987). Over the years, 
literature on demand for education has expanded, with a focus, mostly, on higher 
education3. Research has also expanded on education in developing countries focusing 
mostly on primary education4.  
Of all these countries, only Rwanda, Uganda and Malawi are classified as “fragile” by 
the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), Colombia is 
still a country facing an internal conflict and Northern Ireland is a post-conflict country. 
However, none of the studies concerned with these settings purposefully sought to 
analyse the demand for education in a framework that acknowledged the role of the 
experience of conflict. The linking of empirical and theoretical knowledge on education 
- and the drivers of educational demand and its application to the challenging arena of 
post-conflict settings - is thus clearly under-researched. There is a clear lack of 
acknowledgment of the particular nature that post-conflict settings present, a reality that 
                                                          
3 Important examples are Wilkinson (1966), Heckman (1976), Lazear (1977), Mattila (1982), Willis and 
Rosen (1978), Fuller et al., (1982), Manski and Wise (1983), Altonji (1991), Manski (1993), Duchesne 
and Nonneman, (1998), Cameron and Heckman (2001), Canton and de Jong (2005), Saiti and 
Prokopiadou (2008), Brand and Xie (2010), Flannery and O’Donoghue, (2013), Delavande and Zafar 
(2014) and Prada and Urzúa (2014). A review of econometric studies on higher education can be found in 
Ehrenberg (2004). 
4 King (1993) on higher education in Puerto Rico; Kingdon and Theopold (2008) on India; Lloyd et al., 
(2009) on Pakistan; Nerman and Owens, (2010) on Tanzania; Oketch and Ngware (2010), Oketch et al. 
(2012) and Bold et al. (2014) on primary education in Kenya; Weir (2011) on Ethiopia; Chow and Shen 
(2006), Qian and Smyth (2011) and Deng et al. (2014) on China; Jensen (2010) on the Dominican 
Republic; Stephen (2012) on Nigeria, Glewwe and Kassouf, (2012) on Brazil; Albert and David (2012) 
on primary education in the Philippines; Biltagy (2012) on Egypt; Lincove (2012) on school enrolment in 
Uganda; Verdú et al. (2013) on higher education in Colombia; Benhassine et al. (2013) on Morocco; 
Bader (2014) on higher education in Jordan; and Attanasio and Kaufmann (2014) on higher education in 
Mexico. Examples of studies that also start looking into secondary education include Appleton et al. 
(1996) looking at the links between primary and post-primary education in Côte d’Ivoire and Uganda; 
Palmer (2005) on Ghana; Wedgwood (2005) on Tanzania; Hayman (2005) on the contribution of post-
primary education to poverty reduction in Rwanda; Tilak (2007) examined India; Atchoaréna et al. (2008) 
considered Cabo Verde; Chimombo (2009) looked at private provision of education in Malawi; and 
Borooah and Knox (2014) investigated education performance in Northern Ireland. A recent empirical 
application in secondary education in developing countries can also be found in Ohba (2011) concerned 
with Kenya. 
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is affected by the conflict from which the country or region is transitioning from. This 
requires the contribution of an already existing body of knowledge which discusses the 
effects of conflict. 
A review of the literature of impacts conflict can have on education suggests that it has 
a hindering effect5. FitzGerald, Stewart and Wang (2001) and Stewart and FitzGerald 
(2001) point out that school enrolments either decrease in conflict-afflicted countries or 
increase less in those settings than in others6.  
The literature on impacts of conflict on education has focused, mostly, on the effects it 
may have had while it was still taking place or in the immediate, short-run, emergency 
post-conflict stage. These works also mostly focus on impacts over outcomes, namely, 
the number of years of education attained. Only very few studies focused on school 
attendance (which is a more exact measure of demand) while most focus on enrolment, 
a measure that over-estimates demand by missing the events of school drop-outs during 
the school year. There is, therefore, much still to be understood about what drives 
demand for education in a post-conflict country, particularly when it starts transitioning 
out of the emergency stage. 
Although a very significant proportion of out-of-school children live in conflict- 
-afflicted countries, the understanding of the demand for education in post-conflict 
countries and the drivers behind this is still weakly understood. As the review above 
indicates, there are still important gaps in knowledge. While there is already some focus 
of research and policy on factors of supply of education in conflict-affected countries, 
                                                          
5 Carlton-Ford and Boop (2010), Kondylis (2010) and de Groot and Göksel (2011) review some of these 
results. 
6 Equivalent results had been found by Skonhoft (2000) on Burundi; Blattman and Annan (2010) on 
Uganda; Shemyakina (2011) on Tajiskistan, Akresh and de Walque (2008), Agüero and Farhan Majid 
(2014) and Guariso and Verpoorten (2014) on Rwanda, Swee (2009) on Bosnia, and, finally in the 
immediate aftermath of the Timorese conflict, by Justino et al. (2013). 
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the same does not occur on the demand side. Likewise, while the body of research on 
demand for education in developing countries is significant, including studies on 
primary education, there is a lack of analysis of post-conflict settings. This is 
particularly the case of the analysis of demand for education and its drivers beyond the 
short-run stage of post-conflict emergency. By the same token, when looking at 
education in post-conflict countries at later stages of transition from conflict, in the 
medium-run, there is a lack of acknowledgment of possible legacies the conflict may 
have left. 
The gap is even clearer with regards to the demand for secondary education, where, as 
Lewin (2005) highlights very little research as yet been conducted on developing 
countries. In this particular case, the analysis of demand for secondary education in 
Timor-Leste is one of the first contributions to an analysis of demand, at this level of 
education, in a post-conflict setting. 
A gap is also perceived in the conflict literature, where there is a clear need of a 
merging with the literatures relating to demand for education and its structural drivers. 
Here, this research goes a step further, beyond the contribution of Shemyakina (2011), 
by allowing a contrast between the demand for primary and secondary education. It also 
deepens the analysis of the impacts of conflict within an empirical model of demand for 
education, as Shemyakina already had proposed in her study. 
This thesis particularly addresses a gap of knowledge on the effects of conflict on one 
important driver of demand for education, namely, the returns to education. It offers and 
empirically tests a theoretical hypothesis on the processes through which conflict 
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impacts upon returns to education when previous literature only presumed these effects 
existed7. 
By setting the analysis in the country of Timor-Leste, this thesis seeks to add a small 
contribution to the understanding of post-conflict challenges, in one of the many sectors 
that face them. It is, nonetheless, an arena where policy planning and intervention 
clearly require a deeper understanding, as results take time to come to fruition and early 
weaknesses can turn into serious fragilities, which only become apparent in the future 
development of these countries and their people. 
The context of this study: Timor-Leste 
The context of this analysis is Timor-Leste, a relatively small country of 14,919 km2. It 
is a young nation, having only been independent since 2002. With an estimated 
population of 1.2 million in 2012, Timor-Leste is also young in the sense that a 
significant proportion of its population is youthful, with 50% below 20 years old and 
41% below 15 years old, according to its 2010 Census. Timor-Leste is also a founder of 
the g7+ group of countries, ‘a voluntary association of conflict and post conflict 
countries that are now in transition to the next stage of development‘, which has as its  
main objective to share ‘experiences and learn from one another, and to advocate for 
reforms to the way development partners engage in conflict affected states’(g7+ 
Secretariat, 2014). 
This former Portuguese colony was invaded by Indonesia in December 1975, only a 
week after it had proclaimed unilaterally its independence from Portugal. For the 
following 25 years, Timor-Leste lived under a military occupation and the Timorese had 
to endure continuous violent oppression ranging at different scales of impact across the 
                                                          
7 As per Rodriguez and Sanchez (2009),Shemyakina (2011) and Chamarbagwala and Morán (2011). 
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small country. At times, and in some districts, the levels of violence reached extreme 
heights, in relation to the number of killings and disappearances and also the amount of 
deaths by hunger and illness induced by military tactics of the occupier. The history of 
incidences of violence in each district during the conflict was driven, as documented by 
CAVR (2005) but also Taylor (1990, 1999), by the logistics of the fight between the 
Indonesian military and the Resistance, and was heterogeneous in its nature. The 
dynamics of the conflict also entailed the dispute of control over the territory, 
conditioned by the actions of the opposite forces. The experiences of violence and 
conflict, felt by each Timorese were themselves heterogeneous depending on the district 
of birth, year of birth and school life. These characteristics allow an econometric 
analysis of impacts of conflict on education to be adopted. 
After many years of international pressure and being itself in a transitional process from 
a dictatorial regime to democracy, Indonesia eventually conceded that it would hold a 
referendum on autonomy for Timor-Leste. Under the international agreement that 
framed it, if autonomy were to be refused Indonesia would have to accept Timorese 
independence. The stated expectations of the occupiers were that the people would vote 
for autonomy. In August 1999, with a massive turnout (98.6%) and a significant 
majority of the voters (78.5%) the Timorese, however, clearly stated the opposite: they 
chose to be independent. What immediately followed was one of the most violent 
periods faced by the Timorese since the invasion had occurred. Finally, the military 
intervention of United Nations forces, led by Australia and with the support of friendly 
nations (United Kingdom, United States, Canada, France, Italy, Malaysia, Brazil, 
Argentina, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal) the violence was quelled. From 1999 to 2003, 
Timor-Leste was administered by a United Nations transitional authority in one of the 
first experiences of “nation-building” put in place (together with the experiences of 
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Bosnia, Kosovo or South Sudan). On the 20th of May 2002, Timor-Leste’s Parliament 
approved its Constitution and restored its independence, now with international 
recognition. 
This study looks at Timor-Leste a few years after the brutal end of Indonesian 
occupation of 1999. The country was, and it still is, in a post-conflict transitional stage. 
Free from the violence that had afflicted it for 25 years, but still with sequels that cannot 
be overlooked as the words of the Timorese Prime Minister clearly remind us: 
“Post-conflict mentality is a collective reality that cannot be ignored when a 
nation has endured the severity of losses, faced the realities of past injustices, 
and experienced generations of conflict. This painful legacy is not often 
included when considering strategic planning.” 
(Office of the Prime Minister, 2010:6)  
Timor-Leste is still mostly a rural country with a large proportion of its economy 
depending on agriculture. Timor-Leste also displays the dual nature of a country in 
(re)construction, with barely any industry of its own, where construction is still the most 
important industrial sector, behind agriculture, trade, social services or trade. 
Table 1: Economic Structure - % of workers per sector 
Economic Sector 1990 2010 
Agriculture 83.6% 51.2% 
Extractive Industries 0.1% 0.4% 
Manufacturing and Utilities 2.6% 3.2% 
Construction 1.0% 5.2% 
Trade 2.9% 17.6% 
Transports and Communications 0.4% 1.6% 
Banks and Finacial Institutions 0.2% 0.0% 
Social Services 9.1% 7.6% 
Other 0.1% 13.2% 
Source: World Bank (2013b) 
The lack of weight of manufacturing is very significant. The heritage of colonization 
and occupation left a clear gap in the internal capacity for producing most of the goods 
the country consumes, other than food. The sequential food crises since independence8 
                                                          
8 In its Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis report of Timor-Leste (WFP, 2006), 
only 36% of the Timorese population in 2005-06 was considered food secure. 
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highlight the fact that, even within the agricultural sector, a dependency continues to 
exist. 
Against this backdrop, the Timorese Government put forward the Timorese 2011-2030 
Development Strategy that proposes as strategic sectors those of Agriculture, Petroleum 
(upstream – Extractive Industries - and downstream – Manufacturing), and Tourism. It 
is clear that the challenge faced by Timor-Leste to build up its economy will require a 
qualified labour force and one matched to its strategic challenges. 
Table 2: Qualification decomposition of employment per sector 
Economic Sector 
None or Pre-
Primary 
Primary or Pre-
Secondary 
Secondary, technical or 
vocational 
Polytechnic or 
University 
Agriculture 66.4% 25.8% 7.8% 0.0% 
Extractive Industries 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Manufacturing and 
Utilities 50.0% 37.5% 12.5% 0.0% 
Construction 35.7% 42.9% 21.4% 0.0% 
Trade 54.5% 29.5% 15.9% 0.0% 
Transport and 
Communications 0.0% 33.3% 66.7% 0.0% 
Banks and Financial 
Institutions - - - - 
Social Services 0.0% 17.6% 58.8% 23.5% 
Other 12.9% 38.7% 45.2% 3.2% 
Source: DNE (2010) 
The decomposition of current qualifications held per sector highlights, however, and not 
surprisingly, the very poor value added in those strategic sectors. In fact, higher-
qualified workers are seemingly employed in social services (where one would expect 
to see public administration but also non-governmental organizations and international 
development agencies) or in the transport and communication sectors9. 
  
                                                          
9 It should be noted that these statistics lack information about the financial sector, where one would also 
expect a significantly high proportion of workers with tertiary education. 
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The need for qualified workers, already stressed by Hopkins, (2003) was also affirmed 
by the Timorese Government: 
‘Timor-Leste also needs an aggressive program to develop jobs skills. 
Currently there is considerable unemployment among high-school graduates. 
Soon, however, there will be intense skill shortages, as government programs 
and investments expand in health, education, petroleum, agriculture, and other 
sectors’ 
Office of the Prime Minister (2010:14) 
However, in the school year 2004/05 the indication of school attendance in the country 
suggests a significant challenge also needs to be met there. The young Timorese 
population does not seem to find the same drive to be part of the proposed effort 
towards the attainment of higher qualifications.  
Table 3: School attendance in 2004/05 per age (6 to 18 year olds) and gender (%) 
Age 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Female              
Prim. 6.6 25.8 49.7 72.4 81.4 80.3 81.8 73.4 59.4 47.2 32.6 15.8 15.4 
Sec. - - - - - - 2.9 10.5 25.3 35.4 46.9 57.7 51.4 
Male              
Prim. 8.0 24.0 49.4 71.6 76.8 83.3 81.4 78.6 68.6 51.3 44.6 24.2 20.9 
Sec. - - - - - - 2.7 8.4 18.2 28.1 37.3 50.0 48.9 
All              
Prim. 7.3 24.9 49.6 72.0 79.1 81.8 81.6 76.1 63.9 49.3 39.0 20.3 18.1 
Sec. - - - - - - 2.8 9.4 21.8 31.7 41.7 53.6 50.2 
Source: author’s calculations using TLSLS (2007) 
This has happened despite of a significant effort to increase the number of schools and 
teachers, from the period of UN Transitional Administration (Nicolai, 2004), to the 
current Timorese Ministry of Education’s Strategic Programme (Ministry of Education, 
2011). 
It is likely that Timor needs an increase in the qualification of its population in order to 
meet the post-conflict challenges of reconstruction and development. However, this 
quest faces conflict legacies that may be affecting the incentives for the Timorese 
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themselves to take part in, and seek more education. This thesis seeks to contribute to a 
better understanding of these important dimensions. 
Data used 
This research uses the dataset of the Timor-Leste Survey of Living Standards of 2007 
(TLSLS), conducted by the Timorese National Directorate of Statistics (DNE), with the 
support of the World Bank and UNICEF. A representative set of 4,470 households was 
interviewed, with 25,000 people surveyed, from all districts of Timor-Leste.10 
A second dataset used is the Human Rights Violations Database (CAVR, 2006), 
containing 11,315 observations of human rights abuses. The observations are compiled 
from the collected narrative statements of the deponents to the Timorese Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (CAVR), qualitative reports from Amnesty International 
and data collected by the Timorese NGO FOKUPERS. Under the CAVR mandate, 
Benetech-HRDAG produced and presented calculations of human rights violations in 
Timor-Leste in support of the commission’s final report entitled “Chega!” (CAVR, 
2005).11 
The historical data documented in CAVR (2005) and also in Taylor (1999, 1990) allows 
for a comparison of the experience of different contexts of political control during the 
conflict, following the concepts of Kalyvas (2006). To make use of this possibility a 
novel dataset was constructed, as presented in the appendix to this thesis. 
Finally, the empirical analysis was informed by qualitative data collected during 
fieldwork that took place in Timor-Leste from July 2012 to April 2013. During this 
                                                          
10 The enumeration process (which started in March 2006) was suspended due to the 2006 crisis and all 
the households interviewed before suspension were re-interviewed after the process restarted, in 2007. 
11 Translation into English: “Enough!”  
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period a total of 24 life stories interviews were conducted in three sites: Bazartete in the 
district of Liquiça, in the West; Laclubar in the district of Manatuto, in the Centre; 
Lautem in the district of the same name, in the East. In those interviews, a population 
that had been of school age during the Indonesian occupation was targeted. The aim was 
to collect coherent narratives of the experience of living during that period, whether this 
concerned going to school or being denied that opportunity. The interviewees were also 
questioned about their aspirations regarding the education of their children if they were 
parents at the time of the interview. The qualitative data collected was used to allow for 
a triangulation of the econometric inference results, namely through representative 
citations of some of the interviewees, and it was also used to provide information on 
relevant household characteristics that needed be considered in the empirical models of 
demand for education12 
Structure of the study  
Chapter 1 looks into one of the most theoretically established drivers of education as an 
investment, namely, returns to education. It seeks to test the assumption that expected 
post-conflict returns to education are reduced as a consequence of the conflict, as 
presumed in the conflict literature. It also looks into the links between conflict and 
returns to education. The chapter addresses both these questions, by analysing the 
returns to education in Timor-Leste. Section 2 of the chapter reviews the process of 
Indonesian occupation highlighting the fact that it was not uniform and that the history 
of incidence of violence in each of the Timorese districts during the conflict was 
heterogeneous in its nature. 
                                                          
12 Some of the variables that were introduced based on the qualitative interviews were the family status 
(as niece or nephew of the head of household), the status as adopted child, or the status as a migrant, as 
these were all indicated as relevant correlates of school attendance (or lack of it). 
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The analysis conducted and presented in this chapter explores the microeconomic 
theory supporting the estimations of returns to education and the theory and empirical 
studies of conflict. It asks the question: in what way might conflict-related shocks affect 
earnings and wage premiums after its resolution? A theoretical hypothesis is proposed 
in section 3 of the chapter: that conflict affects post-conflict earnings and returns to 
education through two channels. The first channel is the induction of lower economic 
activity and labour productivity, with a consequent reduction in earnings and returns to 
education. The second channel is the induction of reductions in the labour supply and in 
school attainment, with a consequent scarcity of qualified human resources that could 
cause an increase in earnings and returns to education. 
Adhering to the socio-economic structure of the Timorese post-conflict labour market, 
the study presented in the chapter estimates returns to education using Ordinary Least 
Squares and Full Information Maximum Likelihood Heckman Selection Model 
regressions, clustered at the household level. It comprehensively explores different 
dimensions of the conflict that afflicted Timor, analysing different forms of violence 
(killings but also hunger and illness induced by military actions), and also the different 
nature of political control in different districts during the conflict. As seen in section 5 
of the chapter, these indicators are tested both in the direct estimation of returns to 
education and in the selection model, allowing a richer scope of analysis. Endogeneity, 
selection bias and other sources of bias are addressed, together with robustness tests that 
reinforce the empirical results. 
The evidence found in this study, presented in section 6, indicates that forms of violence 
experienced during the school life of individuals reduce the returns to education. It also 
indicates that the experience of extreme levels of violence and the disruption of 
livelihoods and access to education derived from these may create a scarcity of human 
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resources, making them more expensive. Evidence also points to an indication that the 
political conditions under which education occurred also affect the participation in the 
post-conflict labour market. Further studies in other post-conflict countries may confirm 
and validate whether the theoretical hypothesis presented holds in different settings. 
The empirical model of the Timorese post-conflict labour market provides an added 
result arising from the impacts of conflict, namely, that that some effects may come not 
from the violence generated by conflict but from the actions put in place for 
reconstruction and peace-building. Evidence presented in section 6 indicates that the 
“aid economy” activated in support of post-conflict countries may generate distortions 
in the labour market. 
The evidence generated in this study gives, therefore, a first answer to questions that 
have previously been left unanswered. It provides an estimate of returns to education in 
post-conflict settings, comparable with those found elsewhere. It also provides a first 
insight into the processes through which conflict, but also the post-conflict labour 
market setting, affects the returns to education. Furthermore, it discusses how returns to 
education may affect the incentives for households regarding their investment in human 
capital. 
 
In support of the research conducted in this study, and with direct application to the 
empirical analysis presented in Chapter 1, a novel dataset on conflict indicators was 
constructed. This dataset seeks to allow the study to account for different levels of 
political control over the districts of Timor-Leste in each year of the conflict and the 
provision of services it may allow. This follows the typology discussed and proposed by 
Statys Kalyvas in his “Logic of Violence in a Civil War” (Kalyvas, 2006). Contrary to 
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early assertions, it is not always the case that violence is the main driver of behaviour 
change of economic agents and, particularly of interest in this study, regarding 
behaviour in relation to the uptake of education, participation in the labour market and 
returns to education. It may be the case that the access to, and quality of provision of, 
education in a particular area results from who controls an area and the depth of that 
control. It may be the case that it is the rebels that control the area and they make 
choices regarding the provision of public services, as discussed by Mampilly (2011). In 
this way these forces eventually establish a social contract with the residents, as 
discussed by Arjona (2010). Conversely, the incumbent might hold the control, seeking 
to establish the regular public services. Finally, it may also be the case that a territory is 
under dispute, which may weaken the control of whoever holds it but also damage the 
provision of services it can assure. 
A chronology was constructed, following the events of violence as documented by 
Taylor (1999, 1990) and CAVR (2005) regarding the period of Indonesian Occupation 
of Timor-Leste. Following the classification of typologies of political control during the 
conflict, as constructed by Kalyvas (2006), the chronology is used in support of the 
generation of indicators of political control during the Indonesian occupation of Timor-
Leste. These indicators of conflict were tested in the analyses undertaken in the chapters 
of the thesis. They are used in the first chapter as significant covariates in the 
regressions of the first stage selection model of the Heckman regression on returns to 
education. 
In the appendix to this thesis, the dataset is presented, together with the process 
followed to undertake its construction. 
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Chapter 2 enquires whether it is possible to detect persistent impacts of conflict in 
decisions regarding primary education and in the medium-run. It looks at revealed 
demand for education, expressed in the decision to have a child attend primary school, 
in a country that overcame a conflict and five years after that conflict had ended. With 
this purpose, it looks at Timor-Leste and makes use of the nationwide living standards 
survey conducted in 2006-07 by the Timorese National Statistics Bureau and supported 
by the World Bank and UNICEF (TLSLS, 2007). In it, they enquired, among other 
topics, on the attendances at school. Within the representative set of 4,470 households 
interviewed, from all districts of Timor-Leste, 6,032 individuals, aged between 6 and 14 
years old represent the subsample of interest in this chapter. A preliminary analysis of 
the descriptive statistics of this subsample gives an indication, although not statistically 
significant, that those children that experienced extreme levels of violence may be more 
likely to have attended primary school in 2004/05. 
Building on the discussion on the drivers of demand, in section 2 of the chapter, the 
empirical enquiry applies a Probit regression, as used in studies such as Justino et al. 
(2013), Deng et al. (2014) or Attanasio and Kaufmann (2014). Two alternative proxies 
of the violence experienced during the Timorese conflict were used. The first proxy is: 
Average Killings during the life of the child (which expresses the continuum of violence 
the household witnessed in the district of birth of the child and during the conflict). The 
second proxy is: Shock of extreme violence during the life of the child (which is a 
binomial variable that indicates whether extreme levels of violence manifested 
themselves, at the district of birth of the child and during her lifetime). The empirical 
model was estimated using Probit and IV Probit regressions. 
Accounting for a likely endogeneity of conflict, the study presented in this chapter tried 
to infer effects arising from conflict. While finding evidence that income and quality of 
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education are significant channels of influence of conflict on demand for primary 
education in this post-conflict setting, the study finds no robust evidence of effects of 
conflict beyond these. 
The chapter is structured as follows. A brief description of Timor-Leste and its conflict 
will set the background in section 2. In section 3, the conceptual framework supporting 
the empirical analysis will be presented, followed by the empirical strategy in section 4. 
A brief description of the data and, finally, the results, will follow in sections 5 and 6, 
respectively. A discussion of the results will conclude the chapter, opening the debate 
for future reflections and ways forward from the research. 
 
Chapter 3 contributes to an emerging literature on demand for secondary education and 
brings this into dialogue with the microeconomics of conflict literature. It stresses the 
need to research the drivers of education demand beyond primary school and in 
countries that have endured a conflict. 
It looks at Timor-Leste in the school year 2004/05, five years after the conflict with 
Indonesia ended. In this study the impact of conflict focuses on the experience of 
extreme violence during the time of the conflict and when those that were adolescents in 
2004/05 (aged between 12 and 18) were of school age. 
Demand for secondary education will be analysed following an inter-temporal 
investment theoretical approach where attendance to school is a decision to be made by 
the household, but most decisively by the adolescent herself. As presented in section 2 
of the chapter, this decision takes account of expected returns to education (as education 
is viewed as an investment), while also considering education as a consumed good (with 
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costs that act as constraints to the household’s budget envelope) and valuing its quality. 
It finally postulates that, even five years after the end of the conflict, the household may 
still be affected by the previous experience of violence that conflict entailed, with 
effects on its choices regarding education, a hypothesis that is tested in this study. 
The empirical model, following the conceptual discussion of section 2 will be first 
estimated through a Binomial Probit with Selection regression, also known as 
Heckman-Probit (HP). It will also be estimated through an IV Probit and a simple Probit 
regression. Endogeneity of the household’s income is tested and corrected through an 
instrumental variables approach. Endogeneity of conflict is also discussed and 
accounted for through an Instrumental Variables (IV) approach. The empirical strategy 
is presented and discussed in section 3 of the chapter. 
The data used for this analysis, presented in section 4 of the chapter, comes from the 
Timor-Leste Survey of Living Standards of 2007 (TLSLS, 2007), in which, from the 
households surveyed, 4,102 individuals are aged between 12 and 18 years old. It is 
complemented by data from the Human Rights Violations Database (CAVR, 2006). 
The empirical results, in section 5 of the chapter, show that, almost in its entirety, the 
theoretically established relations of socio-economic variables with demand for 
secondary education can be observed. The variables - such as returns to education and 
quality of schooling - are, as the review in the chapter shows, negatively impacted by 
conflict. There is, hence, evidence that through these channels the experience of 
violence and conflict leads to lower demand for education. Yet the chapter shows that 
conflict also has an effect on the intrinsic preferences for education, with significantly 
important results. Most notably, there are indications that the experience of surviving 
violence and conflict may have had a positive effect on the revealed preference for 
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education. Evidence can be inferred that adolescents that experienced a shock of 
extreme violence during their school years were more likely to attend secondary school 
five years after the end of the conflict. This result is in agreement with the stated 
expectations of parents interviewed and is the object of reflection in the last section of 
the study. 
The chapter is structured as follows. A brief description of Timor-Leste and its conflict 
will set the background in section 1. In section 2, the conceptual framework will be 
presented, followed by the empirical strategy in section 3. After a brief presentation of 
the data used, the empirical results will be presented, in sections 4 and 5, respectively. A 
synthesis and discussion of the results will conclude the paper, opening the debate for 
future reflections and ways forward for the research. 
Summary of contributions and methodological caveats 
In summary, this thesis proposes to contribute to knowledge of the economics of 
education in a post-conflict setting. It does this by proposing an economic analysis of 
such a setting as a hybrid socio-economic environment where conflict, despite having 
ended, still has an impact. It proposes and tests the mechanisms through which conflict 
may have impacted economic incentives to education, namely the returns to education 
observed post-conflict. In support of this analysis, it builds a dataset with a novel 
indicator of political control during conflict, following the framework developed by 
Kalyvas (2006). It seeks to establish evidence of medium-run impacts of conflict on the 
demand for primary education in a post-conflict setting, proposing and testing an 
empirical methodology in order to achieve this. Finally, it proposes and analyses an 
empirical model of the demand for secondary education in a post-conflict setting that 
integrates the hypothesis of medium-run impacts of conflict. In the process it finds 
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evidence that suggests a peace dividend exists in the form of higher preferences for 
secondary education among those that experienced more violence during the conflict. 
The empirical analysis of demand for education proposed and put forward in this study 
had to confront relevant data limitations and empirical constraints derived from many 
incidences of endogeneity, which the questions being researched necessarily entail. 
The data limitations encountered led to a less than ideal information on: school quality; 
lack of information on parents’ educational attainment; absence of information on the 
individuals’ cognitive skills due to lack of such type of assessments conducted 
regarding the period of analysis; lack of information on district of residence in each year 
of the individual’s life - particularly of those that migrated; unreliable data on the year 
individuals entered school; and censoring of those that lived through the time of the 
conflict, in total or in part, but migrated out of Timor before the TLSL survey; and 
insufficient information on the household’s income sources, among others.  
Data limitations had an even greater effect on the dataset of conflict indicators. The 
CAVR (2006) contains a quantitative categorized collection of reported events such as 
reported human rights abuses, including causes of death, instead of official records. The 
lack of an organized police investigation in the early years of Timor-Leste as an 
independent country and the involvement of Indonesian and Resistance forces as 
perpetrators of violence precluded the possibility of a legitimate investigation being 
carried out by either side. Nevertheless, the Truth and Reconciliation process was 
indeed independent, significantly thorough and was validated at the community level 
throughout the country where formal and informal processes of reconciliation occurred 
CAVR (2005). The quantitative records may still suffer from errors of under-reporting 
of violence perpetrated by the Resistance and contain over-reporting of violence 
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perpetrated by Indonesian forces and, consequently, also of attribution of violence. The 
study tries to prevent errors of attribution by using indicators that are not sensitive to the 
side to which the violence is attributed. The attribution of violence to the individual as a 
victim also suffers from the fact that the indicators, although annual, are based on a 
district level. Attribution at the individual level required a set of assumptions as follows.  
First, all those that lived in each district at the time of the occurrence of reported 
violence, were considered on average, to have experienced the same level of violence. 
Second, it was considered that individuals lived in the same district, the district of birth, 
throughout the length of the conflict. Third, the age at which individuals started school 
was assumed to be 6 years, in order to generate indicators of the experience of conflict 
while at school age. Fourth, the threshold above which a year was to be considered 
“extremely violent” in each particular district was considered to be when the levels of 
violence reported for the district and the year exceed the average per year and district by 
two standard deviations13. These assumptions generate measurement errors, and 
robustness tests were conducted to account for these. While most of the results are 
shown to be robust, one important result - concerning the eventual medium-run impacts 
of conflict on primary education after accounting for endogeneity - could not be found 
robust. 
A second set of caveats relates to the endogeneous nature that characterizes many of the 
economic relations studied. In each of the chapters likely sources of endogeneity are 
discussed. The analysis of returns to education in Chapter 1, faces two sources of 
endogeneity: endogeneity between education and earnings, in the established form of 
ability bias; endogeneity between earnings and conflict, which may come via omitted 
variables bias. In the empirical analysis supporting the study, the sources of endogeneity 
                                                          
13 This procedure was previously adopted by Justino et al. (2013). 
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are discussed and there was an attempt to correct for them, as discussed there. However, 
again due to data limitations, the strategies adopted were not able to fully compensate 
for these. The resulting biases are discussed in the chapter. The analysis of demand for 
primary and secondary education post-conflict also faces endogeneity in structural 
covariates of demand. This requires the substitution of what would be endogenous 
indicators of use of time in work - inside and outside of the household - with proxy 
covariates that correlate with those decisions. Regarding the effect of household income 
on demand, again the endogeneity between income and the choice of education (which 
prevents the use of time in income generating activities) required a corrective approach. 
In this case, an Instrumental Variables approach was adopted, as discussed in the 
chapters. Finally, omitted variables bias may generate a possible endogeneity between 
the post-conflict choice of education and the previous experience of conflict. By 
applying the Instrumental Variables approach, evidence was found of such endogeneity 
and the empirical strategy adopted sought to correct this aspect. While the approach 
shows itself to be effective in producing robust estimates in the empirical analysis of 
secondary education, the same does not happen in the case of primary education. This 
situation is discussed in chapter 2 and possible pathways to overcome this are there 
suggested. 
Bearing in mind these limitations, and accounting for them, this study seeks to position 
itself as a contribution to a more structured knowledge of the links between conflict and 
education. In particular, it seeks to move towards a better understanding of the 
education economy in a post-conflict country. Using Timor-Leste as the case studied, it 
suggests some unexpected but empirically robust post-conflict effects and opens the 
space for deepening an understanding of the legacies of conflict. It seeks therefore, to 
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assist in the better development of policies in the crucial process of transition from 
fragility to resilience. 
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Chapter 1: 
Post-Conflict Returns to Education – the Case of Timor-Leste14 
 
1- Introduction 
What do we know about the economic incentives to invest in education in a post-
conflict country? In the peace building and reconstruction stages of post-conflict, 
education is increasingly found to be an area of concern. UNESCO in its guidelines 
considers education to be a key strategy as it ‘helps meet the psychosocial needs of 
children and adolescents affected by conflict’, ‘provides a channel for conveying health 
and survival messages and for teaching new skills and values’ and ‘is vital to 
reconstruction of the economic basis of family, local and national life and for 
sustainable development and peace building’ (Bensalah, 2002:11). But how much is 
known about what drives the demand for education in a post-conflict setting? In 
particular, what is it known about the economic incentives for an investment in 
education? What are the returns to education in a post-conflict setting? 
As the nexus between peace and development - or between conflict and “development in 
reverse” as coined by Collier et al. (2003) - have become a topic of interest for research, 
various studies have devoted attention to the impacts of conflict on the economy. 
Studies such as those by Bellows and Miguel (2009), Badiuzzaman et al. (2011), Cerra 
and Saxena (2008) or Bisogno and Chong (2002) look into the impacts of conflict on 
the post-conflict economic rebound. Others, including FitzGerald et al. (2001), Blattman 
and Annan, (2010), Shemyakina (2011), Ibáñez and Moya (2006) or Justino et al. 
                                                          
14 I would like to thank Patricia Justino, Edoardo Masset, Paola Salardi, Ricardo Sabates, Olga 
Shemyakina, Catherine Muller, Martin Greely, Alia Aghajanian, Xavier Cirrera, Elise Wach and Jenny 
Constantine for their comments, feedback and other support on this and earlier versions. I would also like 
to thank the comments of participants in the 8th Annual HiCN Workshop on Violent Conflict and 
Economic Development (Aix-en-Provence, France), the 12th UKFIET International Conference on 
Education and Development (Oxford, UK) and a seminar held at the National University of Timor-Leste 
(Dili, Timor-Leste). 
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(2013) analysed the impact of conflict on education, in most cases finding a detrimental 
effect on school enrolment and attainment. Rodriguez and Sanchez (2009) found similar 
results and their account suggested  a cause for the reduced demand for education was 
that there was a reduction in the expected school premium caused by the conflict. 
Chamarbagwala and Morán (2011), looking at Mayan communities in Guatemala, 
suggested that, among other factors, decreased expectations concerning the returns from 
education due to conflict would justify a reduction of the households’ investment in 
education. But are these expectations confirmed? What are the links between conflict 
and returns from education? The current body of knowledge still leaves these questions 
unanswered.  
This article will address both these questions, by analysing the returns to education in a 
country that arose from 25 years of conflict, Timor-Leste. Formerly a Portuguese 
colony, from 1512 until 1975, Timor-Leste was then occupied by Indonesia and ruled 
by its military regime from 1975 to 1999. In 2007, the year surveyed, Timor was still in 
a process of reconstruction, and thus represents an example of a post-conflict country. 
As this chapter shows in section 2, the process of Indonesian occupation was not 
uniform and the history of incidence of violence in each of the Timorese districts during 
the conflict is a heterogeneous one. The different experience of violence felt by each 
Timorese allows us to look into post-conflict Timor and analyse empirically the impacts 
of conflict on returns to education. 
The analysis is done by exploring the microeconomic theory supporting the estimations 
of returns to education, considering the theoretical and empirical studies of conflict and 
asking the question: in what way conflict-related shocks may affect earnings and wage 
premiums after the resolution of the dispute? A theoretical hypothesis is proposed in 
section 3: that conflict affects post-conflict earnings and returns to education through 
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two channels. The first channel is that conflict induces lower economic activity and 
labour productivity, with a consequent reduction in earnings and returns to education. 
The second channel is the induction of reductions in labour supply and in school 
attainment, with a consequent scarcity of qualified human resources that may cause an 
increase in post-conflict earnings and in returns to education. 
Adhering to the socio-economic structure of the Timorese post-conflict labour market, 
this study estimates returns to education using Ordinary Least Squares and Full 
Information Maximum Likelihood Heckman Selection Model regressions, clustered at 
the household level. It comprehensively explores different dimensions of the conflict 
that afflicted Timor, analysing different forms of violence (this includes killings but also 
the hunger and illness induced by military actions), while also the different nature of 
political control in different districts during the conflict. As seen in section 5, these 
indicators are tested both in the direct estimation of returns to education and in the 
selection model, allowing a richer scope of analysis. Endogeneity, selection bias and 
other sources of bias are addressed, together with robustness tests that reinforce the 
empirical results. 
The evidence found in this study, presented in section 6, indicates that forms of violence 
experienced during the school life of individuals reduce the returns to education. It also 
indicates that the experience of extreme levels of violence, and the disruption of 
livelihoods and access to education arising from this cause, may create a scarcity of 
human resources, making them more expensive. Evidence also points to indications that 
the political conditions under which education took place also affect the participation in 
the post-conflict labour market. Further studies in other post-conflict countries may 
confirm and validate whether the theoretical hypothesis presented here holds in different 
settings. 
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The empirical model of the Timorese post-conflict labour market gives added insights 
into the impacts of conflict, some of which may not come directly from the violence it 
generated but from the actions put in place for reconstruction and peace-building. 
Evidence presented in section 6 indicates that the “aid economy” activated in support of 
post-conflict countries may generate distortions in the labour market. 
The evidence generated in this study gives, therefore, a first answer to questions that 
have previously been unanswered. It provides an estimate of returns to education in a 
post-conflict situation, comparable with those found in other settings. It also provides a 
first insight into the ways in which processes through which the actual conflict - but also 
the post-conflict labour market - affect the returns to education. Through them, it also 
throws light on the incentives for households regarding their planned investment in 
human capital. 
2- Background 
The setting of this analysis of returns to education in post-conflict is Timor-Leste during 
2007. Timor-Leste is a young nation, which has been independent since 2002. With a 
relatively small territory, 14,919 km2 wide, Timor-Leste is a half-island. It neighbours 
Indonesia by sea in the North and East and by sea and land in the West (including the 
western half of the island); while Australia lies, by sea, to the South. With an estimated 
population of 1.2 million in 2012, Timor-Leste (hence forth designated as Timor) has 
seen its economy’s Gross National Income (GNI) per capita15 grow from 650 USD in 
2002 to 3,620 USD in 2012 (World Bank, 2013b). 
  
                                                          
15 The values of the Timorese GNI per capita reported here were calculated using the Atlas method. 
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Figure 1: Map of Timor-Leste 
 
Source: DNE (2008) 
Timor is starting to explore its significant oil and natural gas reserves but its economy 
has not evolved much since independence. Timor is mostly a rural country, with almost 
three quarters of the population living in rural areas and working in agricultural 
activities. It is also a very young country, with half of its population below 20 years old 
and 41 per cent below 15 years old, according to its 2010 Census. 
Another important characteristic of Timor, and one that is critical for our analysis here, 
is that it is a post-conflict country. Formerly a Portuguese colony, from 1512 until 1975, 
Timor-Leste was occupied by Indonesia and ruled by its military regime from 1975 to 
1999. The process of occupation was not uniform. During the first 5 years, the Timorese 
Resistance secured control of wide parts of the easternmost districts. This was a period 
of extreme violence. Even during the years that followed, these and the southernmost 
districts were disputed territories, even if mostly already under Indonesian control. 
Other districts experienced a longer period of control by Indonesia. 
Figure 2, below, summarizes the length of control by the Indonesian forces and the 
Timorese Resistance. For each district, the figure presents a circle indicating the 
proportion of the 25 years of occupation lived under 1 of 5 types of control proposed by 
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Kalyvas (2006). Kalyvas proposes a classification of territories according to levels of 
control: full control by the incumbent forces; dominant but disputed control by the 
incumbent forces; contested control; dominant but disputed control by rebel forces; full 
control by the rebel forces. 
Figure 2: Proportion of years under different types of control during the occupation 
 
Source: Map of Timor-Leste (GERTIL, 2003); graphs were calculated by the author following Kalyvas 
(2006), CAVR (2006) and Taylor (1999, 1990). 
 
Each typology of control correlates with typologies of violence and with which side is 
expected to be enacting the given type of violence. In this analysis, Indonesia is 
considered the incumbent and the Timorese Resistance the rebels. Using the chronology 
of events offered by Taylor (1999, 1990), it is possible to construct a schedule of control 
over each district and year. In the Appendix A of this thesis a description and discussion 
of the process of attribution is presented. Figure 2 illustrates this attribution. 
The Timorese Truth and Reconciliation report (CAVR, 2005) offers a thorough 
description of the violence endured by Timorese during the occupation. Three stages of 
the conflict are described: invasion and consolidation (from 1975 to 1985), stable 
military control (from 1985 to 1997) and the ending stage of occupation (1998 and 
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1999), including the referendum in 1999, its preparation phase, and the violent post-
referendum period. In Figure 3, below, it is possible to perceive five peaks in the levels 
of killings, coinciding with the periods described. The first peak corresponds to the 
moment of invasion in 1975, followed by two other peaks, corresponding to the main 
Indonesian military campaigns to acquire and consolidate control over territory, which 
was still under the control of the Timorese Resistance (the first in 1978-79 and the 
second in 1983). These three peaks indicate extreme moments of an overall violent 
period, as the median line suggests. Figure 4 reveals another dimension of the violence 
endured by Timorese in the first stage of occupation. The number of deaths due to 
hunger and illness were also direct consequences of the Indonesian military operations, 
whose tactics entailed forced displacement into new “villages”,16 burning of crops and 
forests and siege tactics on villages thought to support the Resistance (CAVR, 2005). 
This was followed by a period of five years of famine in some districts that reportedly 
killed more people than the military violence. The second stage of the occupation was 
significantly less violent. The only spike in violence was reported in the district of Dili 
in 1991, namely, the massacre in Santa Cruz Cemetery, which is signalled by the fourth 
peak in Figure 3. 
The third stage of occupation showed, again, an increase in violence and ended with a 
final bout of extreme violence. Following an impressive 78.5% vote for independence in 
the August 30th 1999 referendum, the Indonesian military (mandated by the UN to 
maintain security during the procedures) and the pro-Indonesia militia destroyed most 
of the infrastructure in the country and forced the displacement of nearly a third of the 
Timorese population, most of whom were later to return to an independent country 
under reconstruction (CAVR, 2005).  
                                                          
16 Many places in Timor are named “kampung baru” (meaning “new village” in Indonesian) 
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In-depth life story interviews conducted in Timor during the period from July 2012 to 
April 2013 revealed consistent testimonies of total destruction of schools and forced 
displacement both in the periods of invasion and the post-1999 referendum. After both 
those stages, educational infrastructure had to be reconstructed. Those that lived in areas 
targeted by the 1978-1979 and 1983 military campaigns experienced repeated events 
such as destruction of infrastructure; forced displacement; loss of relatives; hunger and 
illness (CAVR, 2006, 2005), all of which compromised the opportunities for schooling. 
 
Figure 3: Civilian killed in each district 
(maximum, median, minimum) in each year 
 
Figure 4: Deaths  due to hunger and illness in 
each district (maximum, median, minimum) in 
each year 
Source: Author’s calculations using CAVR (2006) data. 
 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 already give an indication that the violence that afflicted Timor 
during the Indonesian occupation did not affect all districts homogeneously. This was 
particularly evident in years of higher violence where the bandwidth between minimum 
and maximum violence is wider. It is also noticeable that only at the beginning and end 
of the occupation can we find all districts affected by violence. 
Table 4 and Table 5, below, make this heterogeneity among districts more apparent. 
They present gradients of violence, illustrating for each district and year the 
corresponding z-score relating to the number of killings and disappearances (Table 4) 
and the number of deaths by hunger and illness (Table 5).  
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Table 4: Gradient of the number of killings per district and year 
 
Source: Author's calculations using CAVR (2006) data 
Table 5: Gradient of the number of the number of deaths due to hunger and illness per district and 
year 
 
Source: Author's calculations using CAVR (2006) data 
The tables show that those households residing in the districts of Dili or Ainaro were 
relatively safe from violence, when compared to those residing in Aileu, Baucau, 
Ermera, Manufahi or Manatuto. It is also noticeable that those born after 1980, 
particularly those residing in districts relatively protected from the 1999 violence, may 
have experienced much lesser levels of violence than those born, or of school age, 
during the invasion. 
The history of incidence of violence in each district during the conflict, was driven - as 
documented by CAVR (2005) but also Taylor (1990, 1999) - by the logistics of the fight 
between the Indonesian military and the Resistance and presents an heterogeneous 
picture. The different experience of violence - felt by each Timorese depending on the 
district of birth, year of birth and school life - allows us to look into post-conflict Timor 
and analyse empirically the impacts of conflict on returns to education. 
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Once estimated, the returns to education in post-conflict Timor-Leste can be compared 
with values found in other developing countries. A brief review points to a range of 
values of returns to education between 3 per cent, notably for Eastern European 
countries,17 and up to 15 per cent in Thailand18 and in Brazil19. Focusing on Southeast 
Asian countries reviewed by Patrinos et al. (2008), Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, we can find returns to education that tend to lie in the 
3-12 per cent range. Notably returns to education in neighbouring Indonesia, for male 
wage earners aged 25-65 year old, were estimated to be 11.4 per cent, as suggested by 
Patrinos et al. (2008). Once estimated, it will be possible to compare the returns to 
education in post-conflict Timor-Leste against these benchmarks. 
The next section presents and explores the theoretical concept that will support our 
empirical analysis. It will be followed by the presentation of the empirical strategy and 
finally the discussion of the empirical evidence obtained. 
3- Conceptual Framework 
The seminal work on returns to education by Becker (1962) and Mincer (1974, 1958) 
established education as an investment in “human capital”.20 They sought to measure 
the returns from such an investment, defined as an education premium that more than 
compensates for the direct costs incurred in education and the opportunity costs 
resulting from a later entry into the labour market. This premium takes the form of 
higher wages accrued as a result of expected higher productivity among those with 
higher qualifications. Becker’s model makes it clear that those wages are primarily 
driven by firms’ perception of how much education contributes to higher productivity21. 
                                                          
17 As per Flabbi et al. (2008). 
18 As per Warunsiri and McNown (2010) 
19 As per Patrinos et al. (2008) 
20 The concept of education as investment in human capital was introduced by Schultz (1961). 
21 The same insight can be found in Willis (1986). 
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A different perspective, drawn by Spence (1973) provides insight into additional links 
between education and wages. In his model, education does not increase an individual’s 
human capital. Instead, it signals to labour demand agents (firms and other employers) 
that an individual with higher schooling is intrinsically a more able worker and, 
therefore, more productive. Given a supply of differently educated workers, firms’ 
perceptions of this signal are the main driver of wages and education premiums. 
Many empirical studies on returns to education seek to isolate the contribution of 
education to added productivity from the notion of intrinsic ability. The aim in those 
approaches is to estimate the net contribution of education to increased labour 
productivity using wage premiums as visible indicators of returns to education. These 
are relevant concerns when analysing the contribution of education to economic growth. 
This chapter, however, places the focus on the microeconomics of labour and education. 
It seeks to estimate if, in a post-conflict setting, a household, deciding on whether to 
invest in education, will encounter the economic incentives that will make them pursue 
such investment. For such a household, it is the compounded effects of added education 
on the consequent wage premium (increased productivity and signal of ability) that are 
of concern. 
The empirical estimates of returns to education are calculated from observations of 
several individual results derived from a matching process between the demand for 
labour, represented by different employers, from different sectors and industries and a 
labour supply represented by differently educated workers. This matching process 
happened in the post-conflict labour market. The economic actors in both the supply and 
demand side are expected to have bestowed different values on the skills being offered 
(and signalled) by workers, dependent on their level of education. The returns to 
education observed in a post-conflict labour market are, therefore, affected by shocks 
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that impact upon labour demand, labour supply and the quality of labour supply. 
Conflict theory and empirical analysis can contribute to a better knowledge of these 
shocks and their impact at different stages in a conflict. This study builds on that body 
of research to construct the first estimation of the impacts of violence on the post-
conflict returns to education. This section will provide the theoretical approach to be 
tested empirically in section 6, below. 
The impact of conflict-related violence can be constructed as the difference between the 
existing returns to education and those that might have prevailed if conflict had not 
occurred, or, if particular forms of it had not become manifest. Taking a simple generic 
example, one can consider that, were everything else to be held constant, and following 
the rationale provided by Becker (1993, 1962), a household when contemplating 
whether to invest in the education of one of its members, envisions the opportunity of 
allowing her to be hired in one of two types of employment. The labour market is, in 
this example, segmented in two, as depicted in Figure 5, below. 
Figure 5: Model with two labour markets - education premium 
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In the first segment, labour incorporates lower skills, therefore awarding lesser marginal 
productivity to the employers, which therefore remunerates her with a lower wage. In 
the second segment, labour incorporates higher skills, achieved (or signalled) through 
education. Expecting higher productivity, the employers are willing to pay a higher 
wage. Given the cost of education, one could also expect a lesser number of individuals 
would make the choice of entering this market, thus further increasing the equilibrium 
wage. In this illustration, a wage premium, 𝑊𝐻 − 𝑊𝐿, gives the value to be gained by 
the household from investing in its member’s education. 
The emergence of conflict during the years of schooling leads to a set of effects on the 
labour market and on education. A first effect is a reduction of the economic activity 
during the conflict and after it subsides. Bellows and Miguel (2009) note that this is the 
most commonly expected effect of a conflict. Although, as found by Badiuzzaman et al. 
(2011) post-conflict reconstruction programmes tend to mitigate this effect, Cerra and 
Saxena (2008) establish that what we find is but a partial rebound, a recovery of half the 
loss in four years while the remainder takes more than a decade to be recovered. Studies 
such as those undertaken by Bisogno and Chong (2002) found that the effects of 
recovery and rebound can be differentiated across a country, with zones and economic 
sectors targeted by reconstruction projects benefiting more than others. Another effect is 
a reduction in productivity, as determined by studies such as Kondylis (2010). This may 
happen due to factors such as forced inactivity, as suggested by Collier and Duponche 
(2010), inadaptability of own skills, particularly of those displaced, following Ibáñez 
and Moya (2009) or due to the deterioration of the quality of education under conflict 
conditions, as put forward by Cranna (1994). 
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The impacts of this set of effects on the education premium are depicted in Figure 6, 
below. The reduction in productivity affects both low skilled and high skilled labour 
markets. If we assume that the acquisition and reproduction of knowledge and skills is 
progressive, any destruction of skills in the form referred to above is likely to have 
effects proportional to the levels of skills required. If that is the case, labour demand and 
the level of productivity in the higher skills labour market will reduce more than that in 
the lower skills labour market. Conflict will lead to lower labour demands that will lead, 
in turn, to expected decreases in the returns to education.  
Figure 6: Model with two labour markets – reduction of productivity and economic performance 
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Justino et al. (2013). By the same token, a correlated increase in school drop-outs and 
lower quality of education are documented by Evans and Miguel (2007), Ibáñez and 
Moya (2006) and Rodriguez and Sanchez (2009). 
Figure 7: Model with two labour markets – reduction of labour supply 
 
All other effects being constant, the reduction of labour supply may even induce a 
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4- Data Description 
This research used the dataset of the Timor-Leste Survey of Living Standards of 2007 
(TLSLS), conducted by the Timorese National Directorate of Statistics (DNE), with the 
support of the World Bank and UNICEF. A representative set of 4,470 households was 
interviewed, with 25,000 people surveyed, from all districts of Timor-Leste.22 From 
these, 15,809 were above 15 years old, of working age according to Timorese law. Only 
those in a subsample of 9,010 have an occupation, of which only an even smaller 
subsample of 1,221 people have a job that earns them a wage. 
A second dataset used was the Human Rights Violations Database (CAVR, 2006) which 
contains 11,315 observations of human rights abuses. The observations referred to are 
the collected narrative statements from deponents to the Timorese Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (CAVR), qualitative reports from Amnesty International, 
and data collected by the Timorese NGO FOKUPERS. Under the CAVR mandate, 
Benetech-HRDAG produced and presented calculations of human rights violations in 
Timor-Leste in support of the commission’s final report entitled “Chega!” (CAVR, 
2005).23 
In Table 6 we can find some distinctive characteristics of the subsample of paid 
workers. The average hourly wage among paid workers was 1.16 US dollars, 
significantly above the poverty line of two US dollars a day. The proportion of women 
among paid workers is very clearly lower than in the representative TLSLS sample, 
suggesting evidence of gender segregation in the labour market. The rural/urban divide 
is also clear. Close to 80 per cent of the paid workers were urban dwellers, a much 
higher proportion than in the representative sample. The average age of the paid 
                                                          
22 The enumeration process (which started in March 2006) was suspended due to the 2006 crisis and all 
the households interviewed before suspension were re-interviewed after the process restarted, in 2007. 
23 Translation into English: “Enough!”  
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workers was 37 years old in 2007. This would mean that the average paid worker would 
have been close to school entry age at the time of the Indonesian invasion, in 1975. 
Table 6: Earnings and Education 
  Paid Workers All 
N 1,221 25,000 
Variable Mean SDev. Mean SDev. 
Has a paid job 100% - 14% - 
Hourly wage (USD) 1.16 4.11 - - 
Woman 20% - 49% - 
Age 37 10 23 19 
Household size 7 3 7 3 
Resides in an urban area 79% - 47% - 
Migrated 27% - 8% - 
Education     
Years of Education 11 5 4 5 
Completed Primary School 10% - 13% - 
Completed Pre-Secondary School 10% - 8% - 
Completed Secondary School 52% - 9% - 
Completed Vocational School 1% - 0.03% - 
Completed Graduate Education 0.1% - 0.1% - 
Completed Postgraduate Education 4% - 1% - 
Experience (years) 20 12 - - 
Source: Author’s calculations, from TLSLS (2007). 
The representative sample of the TLSLS suggests a population that does not migrate, 
with 92 per cent still living in the birth district. The paid worker subsample has a higher 
proportion of internal migrants, at 27 per cent, but this is still relatively low.24 Notably, 
there are no differences in the household size between the paid workers subsample and 
the TLSLS sample. A look at education levels reveals striking differences. Average 
years of schooling among the paid workers in the subsample were almost three times 
higher than the sample average. One can also notice that half of the paid workers 
completed secondary school. This correlates with evidence collected during qualitative 
research: most of those employed in qualified public service positions (teachers, nurses, 
policemen,…) completed their education in secondary level technical schools. 
The analysis of the subsample of paid workers in the TLSLS suggests an interesting 
disaggregation: close to 60 per cent work in public services (social services), close to 30 
                                                          
24 Unfortunately, it isn’t possible to track whether the individuals migrated or displaced themselves during 
the conflict, only whether they currently resided in a district different from that of their birth. 
46 
 
per cent work in private services, 7.2 per cent are in industrial activities and only 3.5 per 
cent are active in the primary sector, indicating that most of the employment in 
agriculture is not paid. 
Table 7: Type of Employer 
 
Percent 
 Years of Education  Hour Wage (USD) 
  Mean SDev  Mean SDev 
Private company, enterprise or cooperative 9%  8.6 5.5  1.3 3.2 
Rural public works program 11%  11.2 4.8  0.6 0.4 
Government, public sector, army 45%  11.5 4.3  1.5 5.4 
State-owned enterprise 4%  11.4 4.6  0.5 0.4 
Private individual 13%  6.9 4.5  0.9 4.0 
NGO 15%  11.4 5.1  0.9 1.9 
Other 3%  9.8 6.3  0.8 1.2 
Source: Author’s calculations, from TLSLS (2007). 
The distribution of paid employment per type of employer, in Table 7 is also telling: the 
government was the major employer, either directly (hence 45 per cent were engaged in 
government, public sector and army, added to the 11 per cent employed in rural public 
works programmes, which were mostly funded through international aid programmes) 
or indirectly in state-owned enterprises (4 per cent). NGOs were the next most 
important type of employer (at 15 per cent) followed by self-employment (13 per cent) 
and, finally there were private companies, enterprises and cooperatives (9 per cent). 
This reveals familiar traits of a post-conflict setting: a very shallow formal economy, 
which is highly dependent on public services and the “aid economy” as its main 
employers. Notably, it is not the private sector that hires, on average, the most qualified 
workers, but the government and the “aid economy”. The higher average wage is paid 
by employment in the public sector, although with a significant dispersion (high 
standard deviation), followed, at some distance, by the private sector and NGOs. 
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Table 8, below, is also telling. The district of Dili, capital of Timor-Leste, has a high 
concentration of the formal labour force, close to one third of paid employment, which 
is a much higher proportion than would be expected in terms of its importance in 
relation to the number of residents living there. This correlates with a higher proportion 
of those that have Tétum as the mother language. Notably, the most important 
ethnolinguistic group, Mambae, has a much weaker representation in the paid workers 
subsample. Tétum is the Timorese lingua franca and the only national language that has, 
alongside Portuguese, an official status. 
The knowledge of Tétum appears high among all paid workers. It is followed by the 
knowledge of Indonesian and then by Portuguese, which is only spoken by close to half 
of the paid workers. However, the difference between the proportion of paid workers in 
the TLSLS sample that know Portuguese and the proportion of those that do so in the 
full sample is strikingly high, suggesting that lack of knowledge of this language may 
be a barrier for employment. To a lesser degree, the same can be said of English and 
Indonesian. These have “working language” status according to the Timorese 
constitution and are required for some types of employment.25 
  
                                                          
25 Notably English stands as a language required for employment with many NGOs. 
48 
 
Table 8: Geography, Ethnicity and Language 
Variable Paid Workers All  Variable Paid Workers All 
Residence 
Region 1 16% 20% District of Dili 33% 15% 
Region 2 16% 19% Region 4 14% 20% 
Region 3 except Dili 4% 11% Region 5 17% 15% 
Ethnolinguistic Group 
Mambae 14% 23% Galolen 2% 2% 
Tetum 32% 18% Uaimua 1% 2% 
Baiqueno 16% 14% Naueti 1% 1% 
Macasae 7% 8% Midiki 1% 1% 
Bunak 6% 7% Macalero 1% 1% 
Kemak 3% 6% Laklei 0% 0% 
Tetum terik 4% 6% Sa ani 0% 0% 
Tokodete 3% 5% Mangilih 0% 0% 
Fataluku 5% 5% Kaklun bikeli 0% 0% 
   Other Language 3% 3% 
Language Barriers 
Speaks Tétum 100% 87% Speaks Portuguese 54% 16% 
Speaks Indonesian 94% 40% Speaks English 27% 5% 
Source: Author’s calculations from TLSLS (2007). Note: Region 1 = districts of Lautem, Baucau and Viqueque; 
Region 2 = Manatuto, Manufahi and Ainaro; Region 3, excluding Dili = Aileu and Ermera; Region 4 = Liquiça, 
Covalima and Bobonaro; Region 5 = Oecussi. 
 
The experience of conflict is also diverse, as is apparent when comparing the subsample 
of paid workers with the TLSLS representative sample, as per Table 9 below. As the 
indication of the average age of paid workers in Table 6 suggested, it is more likely that 
people who experienced the Indonesian invasion will be found in this subsample. This 
correlates with the evidence that, on average, those with paid employment witnessed 
higher levels of violence, namely civilians who were killed or disappeared and deaths 
due to hunger or illness in their birth district. Also on average, the data shows that a 
Timorese experienced in her life one year of extreme violence, i.e., a year where the 
number of killings and disappearances or deaths by hunger or illness in her birth district 
exceeded the yearly average by two standard deviations.26 However, the experience of 
violence is more heterogeneous if the analysis is narrowed to the years of schooling.  
  
                                                          
26This definition follows Justino et al. (2013).  
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Table 9: Experience of Conflict at the birth district 
 During Life Time During School Life 
  
Paid Workers All 
Paid 
Workers 
All 
Variable Mean SDev. Mean SDev.  Mean SDev. Mean SDev. 
Yearly average number of civilian killed or disappeared 10 5 7 6  12 14 8 14 
Yearly average number of deaths due to hunger or illness 11 8 7 7  16 22 9 18 
Years under extreme killings 1 1 1 1  0.5 1 0.1 0.4 
Years under extreme hunger and illness 1 2 1 1  1 1 0 1 
Years in a disputed territory 13 8 7 8  5 5 1 3 
Years in a territory controlled by Resistance 5 7 3 6  2 4 1 2 
Source: Author’s calculations, from TLSLS (2007). 
While an analysis of conflict experienced during a lifetime is relevant, it mitigates the 
evidence of violence experienced during the key period for our analysis: the school life 
of individuals. As discussed above, conflict not only impacts upon the economic activity 
in its aftermath but hinders school attainment and school quality during it. It would 
therefore be advisable in an investigation to test the impacts of conflict using indicators 
of violence experienced during school years. 
The historical data, presented in section 2, also allows for a comparison of the 
experience of different contexts of political control during the conflict, following the 
concepts of Kalyvas (2006). As explained in section 1, a schedule of control was 
constructed and this is used here to produce indicators of political control, namely the 
number of years lived under each type of control. As with other indicators, it is 
noticeable that paid workers lived a higher proportion of their lives in disputed 
territories and under the control of the Timorese resistance. The difference is even more 
noticeable when looking at the number of school years. 
It is now clear that the violence endured by the Timorese during the 25 years of 
Indonesian occupation was not homogeneously experienced by all. The level of 
violence and the characteristics of political control in a given territory that were 
experienced by any one Timorese during her lifetime - and even more so during her 
school life - can be significantly different from that experienced by another person 
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depending on the district and year of her birth. These heterogeneous dimensions make it 
possible to empirically assess how conflict affected returns to education in post-conflict 
Timor-Leste. The investigation into these dimensions and issues will be undertaken 
following the methodology discussed in the next section. 
5- Empirical Strategy  
Let us, therefore, consider that for every individual 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑝 of the subsample of n 
individuals with a formal, wage earning, occupation, 𝑦𝑖 represents her average hourly 
wage.27 Building on Becker (1962) and Mincer (1974), the empirical model starts from 
an earnings equation with the following stochastic form: 
ln 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑎0 + 𝑟 ∗ 𝑆
′ + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑡𝑖
2 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝑋𝑖
′ + 𝜃 ∗ 𝑊𝑖′ + 𝑢𝑖, (1) 
where 𝐸(𝑢𝑖) = 0, 𝑡𝑖 corresponds to her work experience, starting immediately after 
completion of schooling,28 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of individual, household, industry and region-
specific control variables and 𝑊𝑖 is a vector of individually specific conflict related 
variables. The empirical strategy explores a vector of schooling indicators, 𝑆𝑖, which 
include the years of education, 𝑠𝑖, as per Becker (1962) and incorporates education 
specific signals perceived by the labour market, building on the contribution initiated by 
Spence (1973). These are control variables indicating the last complete level of 
education, testing for the “diploma effect” – as reported in in-depth interviews 
                                                          
27 This variable is calculated using the information on wages per period and number of periods worked by 
the individual corresponding to the last payment reported in the TLSLS questionnaire. This is chosen in 
order to separate income effects from possible labour supply effects, namely the likelihood of more 
educated individuals working more hours, as proposed by Henderson et al. (2011) and Addabbo and 
Favaro (2011). 
28 Experience is calculated as follows: 𝑡𝑖 = (𝐴𝑖 − 𝑠𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖) where 𝐴𝑖 is the current age, 𝑠𝑖 is her number of 
schooling years and 𝑏𝑖 is her age at the beginning of school. In Henderson et al. (2011), potential working 
experience was calculated as age minus years of schooling minus 6. Addabbo and Favaro (2011, p. 4594) 
advise caution regarding the use of such a measure of experience, since it does not account for periods of 
absence from the labour market, due to unemployment, inactivity, illness or even parenthood. 
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conducted in Timor as factors valued by Timorese students, trainees and employers.29 
The control variables in vector 𝑋𝑖 encompass several covariates recommended by the 
literature on empirics of returns to education. Activity sector and employer type controls 
are constructed as part of this vector of covariates, accounting for the heterogeneity of 
job placements, with interrelations between the type of employer and years of 
education.30 This approach allows us to assess diverse returns to education depending 
on type of employer. Employer heterogeneity is also controlled via the number of 
workers on the job.31 Intrinsic individual characteristics and skills are also controlled 
for: gender, knowledge of other languages, household size,32 migrant status, marital 
status and ethnicity. Finally, possible geographic segregation of markets is tested by 
controlling for rural/urban residence and incorporating regional dummies.33 The conflict 
variables vector, 𝑊𝑖, includes the following set of covariates: yearly average number of 
civilians killed or disappeared; yearly average number of deaths due to hunger or 
illness; years under extreme killings; years under extreme hunger and illness; years in a 
disputed territory; and years in a territory controlled by the Resistance. All of these are 
considered in relation to the factor of whether they occurred during school life or during 
the wider lifetime. These covariates present a significant correlation. Therefore, each 
variable is tested individually and, only those proven to be significant are tested 
together. 
An empirical analysis of returns to education in a post-conflict setting such as the 
Timorese has to account for the distinct characteristics of paid workers when compared 
                                                          
29 This approach builds on studies, documented by Zhu (2011, p. 84) regarding the Chinese labour 
market, that account for non-linear returns to education through dummy variables that identify different 
levels of education as Heckman and Li (2004) and Knight and Song (2003). 
30 These follow the works by Willis (1986) and Verhaest and Omey (2011). 
31 As suggested by Verhaest and Omey (2011, p. 7). 
32 The latter is also found in Verhaest and Omey (2011, p. 7). 
33 Following Alves (2012). 
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with the general population. A selection bias is likely to affect the estimates resulting 
from an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) as equation (1) expresses, in fact, the expected 
value of (log) earnings for those individuals with a paid job, i.e.: 
𝐸(𝑦𝑖|𝑖 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡). 
This likely selection bias was first addressed by Gronau (1974) and Heckman (1976). 
Building on their approach it is possible to test if the experience of violence during the 
conflict has a significant impact on labour market participation, thus affecting earnings 
and returns to education. Controlling for this impact, it would be possible to correct for 
this bias. 
Let then 𝑃𝑖 be the probability of participating in the labour market, following a process 
defined by the following equation: 
𝑃𝑖 = 1{𝛼0 + 𝜑 ∗ 𝑍𝑖
′ + 𝜗 ∗ 𝑄𝑖
′ + 𝑣𝑖 > 0}, (2) 
where 𝐸(𝑣𝑖) = 0, 𝑍𝑖 is a vector of individual, household, industry and region specific 
control variables: age; gender; years of education; marital status; controls for command 
of a second language (Indonesian, Portuguese and English) to assess eventual language 
barriers to the labour market; control for urban/rural residence and regional controls; 
and controls for ethnicity. In similar fashion to the earnings models, 𝑄𝑖 encompasses all 
the conflict indicators included in 𝑊𝑖. The results discussed below will be based on OLS 
and Full Information Maximum Likelihood Heckman Selection Model34 regressions, 
clustered at the household level. 
Prior to discussing the empirical results, however, it is important to address other 
relevant sources of bias, particularly due to likely endogeneity of education and of 
                                                          
34 This approach is inferred by Puhani (2000), among others, to be the best. 
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conflict. A clear source of endogeneity in education results from the ability bias and 
stems from the insight drawn out by Spence (1973). If the concern is to evaluate the 
impact of knowledge and skills received through education upon increased productivity 
- as measured through efficient wages - then some bias may exist. Higher education 
may correlate with (unknown) higher intrinsic skills, which in turn, are likely to 
correlate with a better paid job. This endogeneity effect causes returns to education to 
be over-estimated. 
Reviews such as that of Ashenfelter et al. (1999, p. 454-456) have discussed different 
approaches proposed to address this type of endogeneity. In particular, there is the 
explicit introduction of ability proxies as controls. Griliches and Mason (1972) and 
Griliches (1977) used the result of IQ tests including regressions on siblings or twins 
considering eventual “sibling/twin effects” (i.e., the presumption that siblings or twins 
share the same genetically primed ability). Use was also made of Instrument Variable 
(IV) methodologies, particularly using parents’ education as instruments of the person’s 
own education. One may find some grounds to argue that the existing bias does not lead 
to an erroneous assessment of the economic behaviour of agents. Neither households 
(when deciding on whether their school-age members should stay in school) nor 
businesses (when hiring) look for a distinction between the level of schooling acquired 
and the inherent skills that allowed for such acquisition. Rather, it is the perception of 
higher worth of a (prospective) worker by the (prospective) employer that motivates the 
latter to award an education premium, as Willis (1986) stressed. If unobserved abilities 
were to significantly bias the employers’ analysis, they would be incurred in costs 
which would make them observable. In some recruitment processes employers do incur 
those costs and applicants can be subjected to (psychometric) tests that seek to depict 
mathematical, logical, reading and writing - and even inter-relational - skills. However, 
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as documented by Jenkins (2001), Taylor, Kelty and McDonnel (2002) and Williams 
(2009), while these are now more popular in industrialized countries than ever before, 
they are still used by only up to half of the employers and mostly only for particular 
placements (namely in management posts). It is not clear, therefore, that market agents 
consider an eventual endogeneity bias in education as an obstacle to their best choice 
(either in relation to hiring or investment in education). This argument however, cannot 
overshadow the knowledge that ability, being unknown and positively correlated with 
education and earnings, originates an unobservable variable bias that causes returns to 
education to be overestimated, if no process is found to account for it. 
Ideally, one would seek to make ability observable, namely through IQ tests. However, 
data limitations do not allow this to be possible when studying post-conflict returns to 
education in Timor-Leste. Other methods, such as regression discontinuity were found 
not to be possible as no fitting events were found. This leaves IV as the possible 
approach, tried empirically in early analysis for this study. Both parents’ education 
attainment levels were explored as instruments. However, two constraints made that 
endeavour fail. On one hand, TLSLS (2007) data misses information on parents’ 
education for nearly half of the sampled individuals, leading to a significant loss in 
observations to support the study. On the other hand and more significantly, due to a 
significant lack of investment in education during Portuguese rule and the difficulties of 
Indonesian occupation, the average level of attainment of the Timorese is almost 
insignificant, one year of education and without a significant variance. This made 
parents’ education a very weak instrument. This situation speaks to side reservations 
that are raised in the review by Heckman and Urzua (2009, p. 17) regarding the 
application of IV namely: ‘weak instruments can give biased estimates’, ‘IV estimates 
rest on strong, a priori data assumptions’, ‘in a heterogeneous model, different 
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instruments will give different estimates’ and ‘the IV estimate, depending on the 
instrument used and assumptions made will give different estimates on the return to 
education, which are often incorrectly interpreted’. In the same sense, Dickson and 
Harmon (2011, p. 1118) state: ‘[E]stimates of this return vary significantly, depending 
on the data sets used, the assumptions made and the estimation techniques. In terms of 
broad methodologies, the focus on the issue of endogeneity often requires identifying 
assumptions that cannot be empirically tested or are, at best, somewhat fragile in 
estimation.’. 
With these limitations, an IV approach was also found to not be possible. Under these 
data constraints, it is advisable to assume that the estimates of returns to education 
found and presented in the following section are over-estimated. 
The introduction of indicators of violence and conflict cannot overlook potential 
endogeneity. It may be the case that reverse causality does not occur between the 
variables in the left-hand side of the mincerian equation and the Heckman selection 
equation, measured in 2007, and the conflict indicators (all reporting to the period 1975 
to 1999). However, one cannot overlook reasonable expectations of omitted variable 
bias or correlated measurement error. A possible omitted variable bias regarding the 
indicator of intensity of violence, (namely, civilians killed during school year) is the 
average income at the district level. Following the mincerian equation, this variable is 
not included in the empirical model. As discussed before, Justino and Verwimp (2006) 
found that in Rwanda, there was targeting of richer households. In that case, and during 
the conflict, one could establish reverse causality between earnings and conflict: the 
richer were targeted, increasing the violence directly affecting them and, endogenously 
decreasing average earnings. There were reports of FRETILIN elites having been 
targeted by Indonesian forces and some elite schools being targeted during invasion 
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(Felgueiras and Martins, 2006). This being the case, income level, during the conflict, 
would have been a cause of victimization. If income differences were to have been 
maintained after the conflict, even though there were post-conflict aid policies that 
targeted and supported those found to be more affected by the conflict, then the earlier 
income differences may still partly explain post-conflict differences in earnings by 
district. These differences would be due to economic spill-over effects: the richer 
districts could have been more hit by the conflict and are still the wealthiest areas. This 
effect, though, is not clearly apparent. Dili, the richest district in the country was one of 
the least affected by hunger, while Baucau and Bobonaro, the second and third richest, 
were among the most affected during the beginning phase of violence. In synthesis, 
districts where currently earnings are higher, having been relatively richer and more hit 
than the others during conflict, would show an unobserved bias towards an 
underestimation of the negative impact of this dimension of conflict. 
On the other hand the endurance effects of famines provoked by the actions of 
protagonists from the Indonesian occupation violence may also correlate with omitted 
variables. The extreme events of hunger reported in Timor-Leste happened during the 
invasion period (1975-85) and resulted from the military tactics of encirclement and 
siege deployed by the Indonesian army (CAVR, 2005). These effects did not directly 
arise as a cause of the military action itself but as a reaction to the invasion. People fled 
to mountainous terrains making those the places where siege and forced displacement or 
village uprooting were more severe. So, although not directly causal, there is a strong 
correlation between having been born in a more mountainous terrain, being alive in the 
period 1975-85, and being a victim of the siege tactics. This would have meant 
experiencing periods of extreme hunger. As the level of internal migration in Timor is 
extremely low, people were very likely to still live in those same mountainous areas as 
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in 2007. Most of the more mountainous districts in Timor are also among the poorest, 
the exception being Baucau (the second richest) which also encompasses the second 
highest mountain in the country. There may, therefore, be an omitted variable guiding 
effects such as Timorese experiencing higher prevalence of extreme hunger and also 
earning lower wages. A negative impact of conflict may therefore be overestimated 
while an eventual positive effect may be underestimated. 
Finally, one may also find omitted variable bias regarding the political control variables. 
Again, due to terrain conditions, the control of the Resistance was sustained for longer 
in the most mountainous districts (particularly those furthest to the East) and in those 
areas where transport infrastructure was least developed in Timor during Portuguese 
colonization. Although investments were put in place by the Indonesian and - after 
independence - in the reconstruction efforts, these same conditions remain in these 
districts of Timor, making them locations of lower participation in the formal labour 
market. To a lesser extent, these conditions also applied to districts that sustained longer 
periods of dispute, particularly when compared to those areas where Indonesia sustained 
longer territorial control. There is, therefore, a possibility of negative effects of conflict 
on participation in the formal labour market, tested in the first stage of the Heckman 
selection regression, which may have been overestimated. 
While time invariant characteristics were controlled through district level and ethno-
linguistic fixed effects, in order to address these sources of endogeneity, an IV approach 
was applied using the distance to the western border of Timor-Leste with Indonesia as 
an instrument. This strategy made use of the fact that the Indonesian operations’ 
logistics were systematically supported through their western half of the island of 
Timor, where, namely a vast number of Timorese were forcefully displaced during the 
post 1999 referendum violence, as per CAVR (2005). It was also explored by Justino et 
58 
 
al. (2013, 2011). This allowed for stronger control but also more violence to be enacted 
by Indonesia in the western districts of Timor-Leste while giving more control of the 
easternmost district to the Resistance and making the central districts spaces where there 
was a higher degree of dispute. The forms of severe violence were also enabled by this 
logistical feature, again as reported in CAVR (2005). So, while the efforts of invasion 
lasted longer in the districts at a greater distance from the western border, as is shown in 
Figure 3 and Figure 4, above, the destruction enacted in the post-referendum period was 
stronger closer to the border, where pro-Indonesia militias received more support and 
were better armed. Therefore, as was described in historical reports, namely Taylor 
(1999, 1990) and CAVR (2005), the distance to the border is expected to be correlated 
with the indicators of conflict used. On the other hand, it is important to take into 
account what are the main economic centres of Timor-Leste - such as the capital Dili 
and Same closer to the west, Baucau and Lospalos in eastern districts and, finally 
Maliana near the western border. In these areas there was higher Timorese post-conflict 
economic activity, higher participation in the formal labour market and greater earnings. 
The distance of these towns and their districts to the western border differs quite 
significantly. In fact, there is no significant correlation between the level of economic 
activity at the district level and the distance to the border. This makes the latter a 
possible instrument in an IV approach. 
The test of the IV approach using distance to the border as an instrument, however, 
failed to identify empirical evidence of endogeneity. Contrary to what would be 
expected, the distance to the border revealed itself to be a weak instrument in relation to 
the variables civilian killed during school, number of school years in disputed districts 
and number of school years in districts controlled by the Resistance. The Sargan test, 
however, revealed it to be a good instrument for years of extreme hunger during school. 
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Finally, for all the variables, the instrument failed to fulfil the exclusion restriction. In 
all cases, the null hypothesis of exogeneity in the Durbin-Wu-Hausman F test cannot be 
rejected. Therefore, this study is not able to apply an IV approach. However, the biases 
discussed above must be taken into consideration when analysing the results. 
Bearing these data constraints in mind, the empirical model will be used to try and test 
the theoretical hypothesis presented in section 2. In the next section we will present and 
discuss the empirical results. 
6- Results 
Applying the empirical strategy presented in the previous section, it is possible to test 
the theoretical hypothesis, presented in section 3, that there are two channels through 
which conflict affects post-conflict earnings and returns to education. The first channel, 
conflict induced decreases in productivity, should reduce both earnings and returns to 
education. A second channel, conflict induced scarcity of qualified human resources, 
should increase earnings and returns to education.  
These effects are tested against the backdrop of a baseline model that presumes no 
effects from conflict. The effects of conflict are then added to the estimation in an 
attempt to isolate the theoretically presumed channels. The results of the estimations are 
presented below in Table 10 and Table 11. The models presented are the parsimonious 
estimations of returns to education, resulting from the test of all covariates referred to in 
section 5.35 
                                                          
35 While the selection model presented was estimated with all the variables referred to in section 5 above, 
the following variables were tested and dropped from the earnings models due to lack of statistical 
significance: number of co-workers; employer type dummies identifying Private Companies, 
Government, State Enterprises, Self-Employment and Other and respective interaction with Years of 
Education; dummies identifying completion of primary, pre-secondary, secondary and graduate 
education; dummies identifying command of English and Indonesian; marital status (1 for married or 
widow); household size and gender (1 for female). 
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Before addressing the earnings model, however, it is important to discuss the adequate 
estimation approach, looking into the Heckman selection models in Table 10. The 
selection model suggests the following switching variables: age; urban residence; 
gender (1 for a women); command of Indonesian and English languages; marital status 
(1 if married or a widow); and the political dimensions of the conflict (number of school 
years living in a disputed district and living in a district controlled by the Resistance). 
The signs of the estimates in the selection model follow stylized facts.36 
The political dimension of the conflict in Timor, presented in sections 2 and 4, appears 
to affect participation in the labour market. In fact, those were the only conflict-related 
indicators found to significantly affect participation. The effect they had on earnings is 
neither direct nor does it directly affect returns to education. However, the indicators 
suggest that when controlled for other variables - including regional fixed effects - those 
that lived a higher number of their school years in disputed districts were more likely to 
participate in the formal post-conflict labour market. Meanwhile, those that lived more 
school years in districts controlled by the Resistance were less likely to have a role in 
the labour market. 
The first effect may be the result of a higher need for post-conflict reconstruction work 
in districts that had been contested the longest, as the violence and destruction of 
infrastructure was most extreme in these locations. As most of the formal employment 
is linked with either international aid or public administration, this might justify a 
significant positive correlation. On the other hand, the experience of education in 
territories controlled by the Resistance had a negative impact on participation in the 
                                                          
36 I would like to highlight, however, the signal arising from the coefficient on gender, as it suggests 
segregation in the labour market. This indicates that, in the Timorese economy in 2007, gender based 
discrimination, while not being significant once women enter the formal labour market, is significant on 
entry. 
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formal labour market. This may be derived from a higher probability of exclusion from 
education and also from employment opportunities during occupation. It also points to 
an eventual absence of positive discrimination of putative “loyalists”. These 
interpretations, however, should be validated by further investigation of the political 
dimensions of the conflict and its relation with the post-conflict labour market. 
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Table 10: Heckman selection models 
 Simple Mincer Baseline Model 
Violence experienced 
during school year 
School years exposed to 
extreme violence 
Both channels 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman 
 β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) 
Heckman Selection Model           
Constant  -3.564***  -3.555***  -3.872***  -3.379***  -3.872*** 
  (0.135)  (0.135)  (0.150)  (0.133)  (0.150) 
Age  0.013***  0.013***  0.014***  0.013***  0.014*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Years of Education  0.093***  0.093***  0.083***  0.060***  0.083*** 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Urban  0.420***  0.422***  0.475***  0.464***  0.475*** 
  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.066)  (0.060)  (0.066) 
Gender (1 = Woman)  -0.751***  -0.751***  -0.679***  -0.717***  -0.680*** 
  (0.061)  (0.061)  (0.066)  (0.060)  (0.066) 
Speaks Bahasa Indonesian  0.479***  0.475***  0.606***  0.450***  0.606*** 
  (0.088)  (0.088)  (0.098)  (0.087)  (0.098) 
Speaks Portuguese  0.481***  0.474***  0.537***  0.506***  0.537*** 
  (0.058)  (0.058)  (0.063)  (0.059)  (0.063) 
Speaks English  0.153*  0.159**  0.149*  0.189**  0.148* 
  (0.079)  (0.079)  (0.082)  (0.081)  (0.082) 
Is Married or a Widow(er)  0.975***  0.976***  0.739***  0.783***  0.739*** 
  (0.086)  (0.086)  (0.100)  (0.095)  (0.100) 
Number of school years in 
disputed districts 
     0.075***  0.072***  0.074*** 
     (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Number of school years in 
districts controlled by the 
Resistance 
     -0.037***  -0.029**  -0.037*** 
     (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Individual & Household Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectorial Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethnicity Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ath ρ  -0.078  -0.191**  -0.251***  -0.192**  -0.242*** 
  (0.086)  (0.080)  (0.084)  (0.079)  (0.084) 
Ln σ  -0.036  -0.104**  -0.109**  -0.100**  -0.112** 
  (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.049)  (0.044)  (0.049) 
N 1195 20976 1195 20976 1119 20698 1195 20774 1119 20698 
R2 0.050  0.185  0.165  0.187  0.167  
Log-likelihood -1651.07 -149349.87 -1559.39 -146221.00 -1441.86 -124797.31 -1557.68 -141129.03 -1440.31 -124767.57 
χ2  0.823  5.678  8.948  5.835  8.248 
p-value  0.364  0.017  0.003  0.016  0.004 
Source: Author’s computations using TLSLS (2007) and CAVR (2006); Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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By observing the 𝜒2 tests in columns (2), (4), (6), (8) and (10) and correspondent p-
values it can be established that selection bias affects the OLS estimates, as the 
hypothesis of independent equations is rejected in all models with the exception of the 
simplest, and rather incomplete, mincerian formulation in columns (1) and (2). 
Therefore, the results of the earnings model in Table 11 will focus on the Heckman 
estimates. 
The analysis of the baseline model gives some insights into a post-conflict labour 
market. The simple mincerian equation (see columns (1) and (2) in Table 11) presents 
the stylized results, with returns to education amounting to 3.0%-3.9%, in the lower 
band of comparable countries reviewed in section 2, above. The complete baseline 
model (see columns (3) and (4) in Table 11) presents some evidences that the average 
returns to education indicated in the first model do not represent an economy-wide 
reality but result from some specific factors. There is also evidence of a more than 
proportional earnings premium being awarded to those that completed technical and 
vocational training or a postgraduate degree. Those with command of the Portuguese 
language also seem to have gained a higher wage, when controlling for other factors. It 
is not clear whether these premiums result from productivity enhancing skills or are, 
instead, signals of particular market preferences or scarcity of human resources37. A 
final factor is revealed by the decomposition of the earnings structure according to the 
type of employer. Only two types of employer seemingly have wage profiles that give 
an education premium: rural public works programmes and NGOs.  
                                                          
37 This may be the case of the command of Portuguese language having an effect. It was reintroduced in 
Timor, adopted as official language and initially as language of education after independence. However, 
only 16% of the TLSLS representative sample stated they could speak it. 
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Table 11: Mincerian equations 
 Simple Mincer Baseline Model 
Violence experienced 
during school year 
School years exposed to 
extreme violence 
Both channels 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman 
 β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) 
Earnings model           
Constant -1.389*** -1.150*** -1.749*** -1.226*** -1.994*** -1.334*** -1.754*** -1.250*** -1.968*** -1.339*** 
 (0.189) (0.327) (0.339) (0.406) (0.369) (0.476) (0.358) (0.445) (0.378) (0.485) 
Years of Education 0.039*** 0.030** 0.015 -0.002 0.037*** 0.013 0.017 -0.002 0.037*** 0.014 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) 
Experience 0.032*** 0.029** 0.017* 0.008 0.017 0.003 0.014 0.003 0.015 0.002 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) 
Experiences2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Finished Vocational School   0.336** 0.356** 0.319** 0.430** 0.340** 0.431** 0.342** 0.442** 
   (0.147) (0.165) (0.151) (0.189) (0.151) (0.171) (0.156) (0.193) 
Finished Graduate School   0.775*** 0.701*** 0.642** 0.549** 0.782*** 0.709*** 0.671** 0.577** 
   (0.252) (0.242) (0.277) (0.267) (0.263) (0.256) (0.287) (0.274) 
Works in a Rural Public Works 
Programme (RPW) 
  -0.722*** -0.712*** -0.157 -0.189 -0.734*** -0.729*** -0.198 -0.219 
  (0.248) (0.237) (0.292) (0.284) (0.236) (0.228) (0.285) (0.279) 
Education x (RPW)   0.037* 0.037* -0.007 -0.003 0.038* 0.039** -0.004 -0.001 
   (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.021) 
Works in an NGO (NGO)   -0.398 -0.420* -0.447 -0.502* -0.398 -0.433* -0.460 -0.509* 
   (0.248) (0.247) (0.290) (0.286) (0.248) (0.249) (0.291) (0.287) 
Education x (NGO)   0.042* 0.044** 0.046* 0.051** 0.043* 0.047** 0.046* 0.051** 
   (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025) 
(A) Yearly average kills and 
disappearances during school 
years in the birth district 
    0.008 0.009   0.005 0.007 
    (0.006) (0.006)   (0.007) (0.007) 
Education x (A)     -0.001 -0.001*   -0.001 -0.001 
     (0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001) 
(B) Number of school years 
experiencing extreme deaths by 
hunger/illness in the birth district 
      0.146* 0.129* 0.138 0.104 
      (0.081) (0.078) (0.097) (0.094) 
Education x (B)       -0.011* -0.010 -0.008 -0.006 
       (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Individual & Household Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectorial Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethnicity Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Source: Author’s computations using TLSLS 2007 and CAVR 2006; Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
65 
 
These results, which hold in almost all the empirical models analysed in Table 11, are 
important because they may reflect an important distortion in the labour market of 
Timor and eventually those in other post-conflict countries. They are particularly 
important because these two employers represent the “aid industry” in Timor and 
because the empirical models show no significant returns to education for other types of 
employment. Notably, there are no significant returns to education for the average 
worker of the main employer – the Timorese Government. 
The introduction of conflict indicators in the empirical mincerian models, in columns 
(5) to (10), completes the analysis of the Timorese labour market as a case study of a 
post-conflict setting. Having tested the set of indicators of conflict described in sections 
2 and 4, this study only finds two dimensions of the Timorese conflict that may have 
affected earnings and returns to education. These factors are, first, yearly average kills 
and disappearances, during school years and in the birth district (see columns (5), (6), 
(9) and (10) in Table 11); and, second, the number of school years in which there had 
been an experience of extreme deaths by hunger/illness in the birth district (see columns 
(7), (8), (9) and (10) in Table 11). Notably, this study only finds evidence of significant 
impacts from violence being experienced on earnings and returns to education if that 
violence was experienced during the school years. 
The significant dimension of the Timorese conflict relates to levels of physical violence 
experienced during the school years. As per Table 9, an average Timorese paid worker 
lived her school years in an environment where 12 people per year (1 per month) were 
killed because of Indonesian military operations, Resistance actions or other conflict-
related events. This experience closely correlates with impacts experienced in the 
households, such as the loss of family members or having a member with a disability 
(Evans and Miguel, 2007; Ibáñez and Moya, 2006; Justino, 2009). It also correlates with 
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impacts experienced in the area of residence and education, with similar effect factors 
such as the destruction of infrastructure or increased difficulty in accessing education  
(Ichino and Winter-Ebmer, 2004; Lai and Thyne, 2007). The coefficients of the 
interaction between the first indicator of violence and years of education (in columns (5) 
and (6)) point to a correlative reduction of the returns to education of 0.1 per cent per 
person killed in every year of education. An average Timorese would experience, 
therefore, a reduction of 1.2 per cent in the absolute value of returns to education due to 
the exposure to violence (killings and disappearances) in her birth district during her 
school years. This evidence is in accordance with the first theoretically hypothesized 
channel of impact, through which conflict may affect earnings and returns to education.  
The second dimension of the conflict relates to extreme events experienced by the 
Timorese during the conflict, namely extreme deaths due to hunger and illness. 
Although it correlates with the previous dimension, what is analysed here is the length 
of time during which extreme levels of violence, or their consequences, were 
experienced by the individual and during her school life. In particular, this second 
significant dimension of conflict is the number of school years during which the 
individual witnessed extreme numbers of deaths due to hunger and illness in her birth 
district. As reported in section 2, the periods of extreme levels of hunger and death by 
illness during the Timorese conflict happened in the first period, namely, during the 
invasion and consolidation of the Indonesian military power. They correlated with 
forced displacements (inside the same district or even subdistrict) and burnings of crops 
(CAVR, 2005). The level of disruption of livelihoods was extreme. Reports from 
interviewed Timorese during field research speak of a period where many families spent 
periods of months in the woods, with poor nourishment and either little or no access to 
schooling (in the form of popular education provided by volunteers and resistance 
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fighters). Looking at column (8) in Table 11, there seems to be no evidence of a 
significant impact of this dimension from the Timorese conflict on post-conflict returns 
to education.38 However, there is an estimated significant increase of 0.13 in the log of 
hourly wage earnings, or 1.14 USD in the hourly wage per year, related to extreme 
violence experienced, from an average wage of 1.16 USD, as presented in Table 11, 
above. This evidence seems to partially support the theoretical hypothesis of a scarcity 
effect on earnings but not on returns to education. 
Columns (9) and (10) present an attempt to test the effects of both conflict dimensions 
previously discussed, by including them in the same empirical model. Although the 
signs of the coefficients are maintained, the high correlation between the two channels 
gives them loose statistical significance. An investigation into what channel is more 
prevalent may be conducted in other settings, where this colinearity is less prevalent. 
As mentioned before, the impacts of conflict were empirically tested against the 
backdrop of a comprehensive empirical mincerian model, presented in columns (3) and 
(4), and expanded in the remaining columns of Table 11, through the addition of the 
conflict indicators. Table 11 shows only the significant conflict indicators. 
                                                          
38 The OLS estimation would suggest negative and significant negative effects (1% reduction per year of 
extreme conflict experienced). The Heckman estimate is of the same value but not significant.  
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Table 12: Robustness tests in Returns to Education: testing the robustness of conflict variables 
 Simple Mincer Adding Signals 
Adding individual and 
household controls 
Adding regional, sectorial 
and employer type controls 
Adding ethnicity controls 
(complete model) 
 OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman 
 β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) 
Earnings Model 
(A) Yearly average kills and 
disappearances during school 
years 
0.0093 0.0102 0.0092 0.0102 0.0102 0.0110 0.0102 0.0113* 0.0081 0.0094 
 (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0071) (0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0060) 
Education x (A) -0.0012 -0.0012* -0.0011 -0.0012* -0.0013* -0.0013* -0.0011 -0.0013** -0.0009 -0.0011* 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
 
(B) Number of school years 
experiencing extreme deaths 
by hunger/illness in the birth 
district 
0.1614* 0.1608* 0.1590* 0.1593* 0.1577* 0.1633* 0.1814** 0.1676** 0.1463* 0.1293* 
 (0.0878) (0.0860) (0.0879) (0.0860) (0.0868) (0.0853) (0.0822) (0.0795) (0.0808) (0.0780) 
Education x (B) -0.0115 -0.0113 -0.0111 -0.0111 -0.0118* -0.0121* -0.0127* -0.0121* -0.0107* -0.0099 
 (0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0070) (0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0062) 
Source: Author’s computations using TLSLS (2007) and CAVR (2006); Note: These robustness tests use the Heckman Selection model equation estimated in the main 
regressions; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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A set of tests was devised to assess whether the results were robust. A first test analyses 
whether the coefficients of indicators related with conflict are affected by the 
introduction of those covariates that construct the baseline model. As is noticeable in 
Table 12, above, the value of the coefficients does not change significantly.  
Another robustness test focuses on the assumptions used to construct some of the 
covariates. The main assumption relates to the age of enrolment in school. The analysis 
presumes an enrolment age of six. According to official Timorese indicators (Ministry 
of Education, 2012), the average age at enrolment at the beginning of the 2012/13 
school year was 6.4 years, with an upper-bound in the in the 1 per cent significance 
confidence interval of 7.9 years. Robustness checks are performed on all variables that 
were constructed using age of enrolment assumptions: experience and experience 
squared; average levels of violence experienced during the school years; years of 
extreme violence experienced during the school years; number of school years living in 
a disputed district; and living in a district controlled by the resistance. In Table 13 it can 
be seen that assuming the age of entry to be seven or eight years old does not alter the 
values of the coefficients greatly and, in fact, suggests higher statistical significance. 
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Table 13: Robustness tests in Returns to Education: testing the robustness to alternative age of entry 
Conflict channel Violence experienced during school years School years exposed to extreme violence 
Enrolment at age 6 7 8 6 7 8 
 OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman 
 β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) 
Earnings Model 
(A) Yearly 
average kills 
and 
disappearances 
Violence 
experienced 
during school 
years 
0.0081 0.0094 0.0138* 0.0149** 0.0136*** 0.0143***       
(0.0064) (0.0060) (0.0071) (0.0068) (0.0041) (0.0039)       
Education x (A) 
-0.0009 -0.0011* -0.0013* -0.0015** -0.0014*** -0.0015***       
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005)       
(B) Number of 
school years 
experiencing 
extreme deaths 
by 
hunger/illness 
in the birth 
district 
      0.1463* 0.1293* 0.1726** 0.1536* 0.1962** 0.1746* 
      (0.0808) (0.0780) (0.0824) (0.0808) (0.0911) (0.0902) 
Education x (B) 
      -0.0107* -0.0099 -0.0123* -0.0112* -0.0139** -0.0125* 
      (0.0064) (0.0062) (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0070) (0.0070) 
Heckman Selection Model 
Number of 
school years in 
disputed 
districts 
 
0.0746***  0.0730***  0.0703***  0.0719***  0.0701***  0.0671*** 
 (0.0104)  (0.0104)  (0.0102)  (0.0100)  (0.0100)  (0.0098) 
Number of 
school years in 
districts 
controlled by 
the Resistance 
 
-0.0370***  -0.0348***  -0.0314**  -0.0290**  -0.0267**  -0.0237* 
 (0.0132)  (0.0134)  (0.0137)  (0.0128)  (0.0130)  (0.0132) 
Source: Author’s computations using TLSLS (2007) and CAVR (2006); Note: These robustness tests use the Heckman Selection model equation estimated in the main 
regressions; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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A final robustness test focuses on the assumption of extreme violence. The empirical 
model assumes that violence in one year and one district is extreme if the indicator of 
interest exceeded the mean for all years and districts by two standard deviations or 
more. Under an assumption of normally distributed observations, that would mean that 
97.5 per cent of the observations are below that value. Robustness tests are conducted 
assuming two other alternative thresholds: an excess of one standard deviation and an 
excess of three standard deviations above the mean. This test only applies to the 
indicator of the number of years under extreme levels of deaths by hunger and illness in 
the district. As would be expected, one can notice in Table 14 that the values of the 
coefficients tend to increase as the threshold is set higher, while keeping close to the 
estimations presented above. There are indications, however, that a threshold of only 
one standard deviation in excess of the mean would be insufficient to signal extremely 
disruptive levels of violence. 
Considering the evidence from the tests conducted, the empirical results of this study 
appear to be robust.  
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Table 14: Regression Estimates of Returns to Education – Robustness test – Threshold of Extreme Violence 
Threshold of extreme violence Mean + 1 Standard deviation Mean + 2 Standard deviation (baseline) Mean + 3 Standard deviation 
 OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman 
 β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) β/(se) 
Earnings Model       
(B) Number of school years experiencing extreme 
deaths by hunger/illness in the birth district 
0.1252* 0.1090 0.1463* 0.1293* 0.2013* 0.1872* 
(0.0720) (0.0693) (0.0808) (0.0780) (0.1107) (0.1039) 
Education x (B) -0.0092 -0.0085 -0.0107* -0.0099 -0.0150* -0.0146* 
 (0.0057) (0.0055) (0.0064) (0.0062) (0.0091) (0.0086) 
Source: Author’s computations using TLSLS 2007 and CAVR (2006); Note: These robustness tests use the Heckman Selection model equation estimated in the main 
regressions; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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7- Conclusion 
Post-conflict countries look to education with hope, as a signal of re-acquired normality, 
a tool for reconstruction, and an investment in a future without conflict. This hope, 
however, has to be matched by the construction of a post-conflict economy that 
provides the needed incentives for education. This chapter analysed the effect of 
conflict on returns to education in Timor-Leste a few years after the end of 25 years of 
violent military occupation. 
The evidence uncovered in this study points to some significant results. It indicates that 
forms of violence experienced during the school life of individuals reduce the returns 
they could otherwise take from further years of education. It also indicates that the 
experience of extreme levels of violence - and the disruption to livelihoods and access 
to education arising from this - may create a scarcity of human resources, making them 
more expensive. This happens while their productivity has lowered due to the effects of 
the factors in the first channel. Evidence also points to an indication that political 
conditions under which education occurred also affected the participation in the post-
conflict labour market. The evidence of a scarcer (and therefore more expensive), less 
qualified labour force, arising as a consequence of violence makes it evident that 
conflict reduces the economic incentives for education. This may explain why a post-
conflict country is likely to have lower returns to education than other, comparable, 
countries. 
This study also shows that the challenges to the promotion of higher investment in 
education in a post-conflict country happen not only because of the conflict its people 
experienced but also because of the economic post-conflict setting. The Timorese 
evidence points out that returns to education are only significant for those involved in 
professional projects currently funded and supported by international cooperation 
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efforts, either directly in NGOs or in public projects originated and funded by 
international initiatives. This may not be a surprising result. Public administrations are 
generally bounded by the social contract not to have extremely high wages while 
securing “fair” (usually higher than market) wages for less qualified work. It is, in 
general, the private sector that tends to generate the income incentives for education. 
However, as previously signalled, post-conflict countries tend to have a depressed 
private sector. If not surprising, this situation creates a distortion in the labour market, 
drawing the most qualified labour out of national organizations and the national 
economy. It also provides signals that preferable learning options for young Timorese 
will be those academic programmes that are more likely to increase their employability 
in projects supported by international aid programmes. This acts to the detriment of both 
the national government and national private initiatives. In settings of economic and 
governance fragility, the insights provided by the evidence collected here should drive 
the actors of international development cooperation and national governments to 
analyse and improve both hiring and remuneration policies, particularly for those 
relatively few people with higher qualifications. Failing to do so may endanger the 
contribution of education to strengthening post-conflict countries. It may lead, instead to 
brain-drain dynamics and to a public service provision competition between 
international actors and (the body that needs to be the ultimate provider) the State. In the 
end, instead of strengthening the process of peace-building and reconstruction, it may 
lead to new forms of fragility. 
  
75 
 
Chapter 2: Medium-run legacies of conflict affecting the demand for 
primary education: The case of post-conflict Timor-Leste39 
 
In 1990, at Jomtien, the international community committed itself to Universal Primary 
Education as it launched the Education for All (EFA) initiative. This ambitious goal was 
to be transcribed into the Millennium Development Goals, and is still present in the 
current discussions of the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals. Education is 
undeniably a policy priority in international development. 
National commitments toward education have manifested themselves beyond the letters 
and words of statements, and are evidenced in positive achievements. Most recent 
statistics suggest a significant improvement in primary school enrolment in developing 
countries, reaching 90% in 2010, up from 82% in 1999. However, this positive story 
does not seem to resonate in the same way in conflict affected countries. Losses in 
education are among some of the devastating legacies of conflict. In its Education for 
All Global Monitoring Report dedicated to conflict, UNESCO (2011) reported the dire 
situation in Fragile and Conflict Afflicted States (FCAS). Although it only reported 35 
countries as FCAS, these encompassed 42% of all children of primary school age out of 
school in 2011, a total surpassing 28 million. More recent evidence, reported by 
Winthrop and Matsui (2013), found that a child living in a low income “fragile state” is 
three times as likely not to attend school than one living in a peaceful low income 
country. 
                                                          
39 I would like to thank Patricia Justino, Edoardo Masset, Lawrence Haddad, Jean-Pierre Tranchant, 
Yashodhan Ghorpade, Annemie Maertens, Iftikhar Hussain, Panu Pelkonen, Jan Willem Gunning Hector 
Rufrancos, Ani Silwal, Lucia Barbone, Máiréad Dunne, Kwame Akyeampong, Tony Somerset, Jimena 
Hernandez-Fernandez, Eva-Maria Eger, Fatema Rajabali and Rhiannon McCluskey for their comments 
and feedback on this and earlier versions. 
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Although it is clear that “fragile states” face severe challenges in education, there is still 
much to learn and understand about the mechanisms through which legacies of conflict 
manifest themselves, particularly as time from the conflict elapses and especially in the 
case of primary education. This study seeks to provide insight into the persistent 
impacts of conflict in decisions regarding primary education, particularly in the 
medium-run. It will look specifically at revealed demand for education, expressed as the 
decision to have a child attend primary school after five years had passed from the end 
of conflict. As evidence, it will use the case of Timor-Leste, and the nationwide living 
standards survey conducted in 2006-07 by the Timorese National Statistics Bureau 
(TLSLS, 2007). Supported by the World Bank and UNICEF, the survey inquired on 
school attendance among other topics. Accounting for a likely endogeneity of conflict, 
this study tries to infer its effects on demand for primary education. It finds evidence 
that the household’s income and the quality of education are significant drivers of the 
attendance of primary school by children and likely channels of influence of conflict on 
demand for education. It finds also evidence that, beyond these effects, a possible higher 
preference for primary education may exist among those that were more affected by 
conflict. This empirical evidence, however, was found not to be robust. 
The study is structured as follows. Section 2 will provide a brief description of Timor-
Leste and its conflict in order to set the background. In section 3, the conceptual 
framework supporting the analysis will be presented, followed by the empirical strategy 
in section 4. Section 5 describes the data, while section 6 presents the empirical results. 
A discussion of the results will conclude the paper, offering reflections on the empirical 
methodology as well as avenues for future research. 
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1- Background 
Timor-Leste is still the youngest nation in Asia. With a relatively small territory of 
14,919 km2, it became officially independent in May 2003. Timor-Leste, henceforth 
referred as Timor, is a half-island (see Figure 8 below) neighbouring Indonesia by sea in 
the North and East, by sea and land in the West (including the western half of the 
island), and Australia, by sea, in the South. With an estimated population of 1.2 million 
in 2012, this former Portuguese colony had previously experienced a very short moment 
of independence in November 28th 1975, lasting only one week. An invasion from 
Indonesia brutally ended it. 
Figure 8: Map of Timor-Leste 
 
Source: DNE (2008) 
For the next 25 years, Timor-Leste lived under a military occupation by the then 
Indonesian dictatorship of President Suharto. The Timorese had to endure continuous 
violent oppression ranging at different scales of impact across the small country. At 
times and in some districts, the levels of violence reached extreme heights, particularly 
with regard to the number of killings and disappearances perpetrated by the Indonesian 
army and pro-Indonesia Timorese militias supported by the occupying power. This can 
be seen in Figure 9, below. 
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Figure 9: Civilian killed and disappearances in each year (maximum, median and minimum) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on CAVR (2006) 
 
These events were thoroughly documented by the Timorese Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, giving rise to a dense and ample report of the history of events (CAVR, 
2005) and a dataset of reported human rights abuses (CAVR, 2006). It was also 
documented in the historical research conducted by Taylor (1990, 1999), Gunn (1999) 
and Mattoso (2005) and in the memoirs of those who lived through the process. This 
included authors such as Felgueiras and Martins (2006) and Carrascalão (2012). This 
period came to an end when, in the process of democratization undertaken by Indonesia 
and in the face of international pressure, President B. J. Habibie agreed on a referendum 
to decide whether the Timorese would desire a status of autonomy within Indonesia. If 
they refused, Indonesia would recognize the full independence of Timor. In August 
1999, 78.5% of the voters, from a turnout of 98.6%, voted against autonomy. Hence, 
Timor was to become independent. 
The cloud of occupation would not lift without a final bout of brutality. Both before and 
during the referendum campaign, pro-Indonesia militia increased their violence, a tactic 
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used to scare possible pro-independence activists and to assure a pro-autonomy vote 
(CAVR, 2005). With the victory of the independence voters, a brutal backlash ensued, 
reaching levels Timor had only witnessed in the period of invasion, as it can be seen in 
Figure 9, above40. The levels of killings and disappearances were extreme in many 
districts (as it can be seen in Table 15, below). Most notably those living in Bobonaro, 
Covalima, Ermera and Oecussi suffered the most, but those living in Dili and Liquiçá 
also witnessed high levels of violence. In all these districts the levels of killings in 1999 
were in excess of the already significant average by two or even three standard 
deviations. 
Table 15: Gradient of the number of killings per district and year 
 
Source: Author's calculations using CAVR (2006) data 
Nonetheless, even in districts that did not experience these extreme levels of violence in 
1999, the later period of Indonesian occupation was one where violence, as a continuous 
experience intensified, as presented in Figure 9. 
Yet, Timor had chosen its independence and, under the protection of the UN, led by 
Australia and with the support of the United States, Japan, Portugal and Brazil, among 
                                                          
40 The 1999 post-referendum violence took the form not only of killings but of significant property 
destruction, with scorched-earth practices and forced displacement, also reported in CAVR (2005). These 
effects were reported and surveyed in the 2001 Timor-Leste Living Standards Survey but, unfortunately, 
were not the object of a new enquiry in 2007. Meanwhile most of the displaced population is reported to 
have returned to their birth districts, as suggested in TLSLS (2007) and  the 2010 census (National 
Statistics Directorate and UNFPA, 2011) and most of the reconstruction process is reported to have taken 
place. 
72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03
Aileu -0 -0 -0 4 1.2 1.6 1.6 0.3 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0.2 -0 -0 -0 -0
Ainaro -0 -0 -0 3.1 1.1 0.9 -0 0.5 -0 -0 0.3 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0.7 -0 -0 -0 -0
Baucau -0 -0 -0 0.4 1.4 0.6 3.8 4.9 1.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.4 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0 0.4 -0 -0 -0 -0
Bobonaro -0 -0 -0 2.9 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0.4 4.5 -0 -0 -0 -0
Covalima -0 -0 -0 1.6 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.1 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 3.7 -0 -0 -0 -0
Dili -0 -0 -0 2.6 0.2 -0 0 0.1 1.6 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0.7 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 1.5 -0 -0 -0 -0
Ermera -0 -0 -0 8.3 3.9 2.9 4.6 1 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0.3 0.2 0 3.2 -0 -0 -0 -0
Lautem -0 -0 -0 -0 1.4 -0 0.1 3.2 1.2 0.6 0.9 3.2 1.1 0.3 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0.9 -0 -0 -0 -0
Liquiçá -0 -0 -0 0.9 0.2 -0 0.2 0.1 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 1.2 -0 -0 -0 -0
Manatuto -0 -0 -0 2.2 0.7 1.4 1.5 1.6 0.5 -0 0.1 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0.5 -0 -0 -0 -0
Manufahi -0 -0 -0 3.3 1.3 1.2 2.1 3.1 0.2 -0 -0 0.2 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0.2 0.2 -0 -0 -0 -0
Oecussi -0 -0 -0 0.4 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 7.6 -0 -0 -0 -0
Viqueque -0 -0 -0 0.1 1.3 0.9 1.6 2.4 0.6 -0 -0 2.2 1.3 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0.3 -0 -0 -0 -0
Color code -3 -2 -1 1 1Between 2 and 3 stdev above 
average More than 3 stdev above average
More than 3 stdev below 
average
Between 2 and 3 stdev 
below average
Around 
average
80 
 
others, security was re-established and a period of governance transition, under the 
transitory administration of the UN (1999 to 2003) followed. This was a period of 
reconstruction and significant aid investment in a number of sectors, including 
education; this led to a significant expansion in the number of schools, particularly since 
2003, as highlighted in Figure 10, below. 
This expansion of available schools was supported by  multilateral and bilateral donors, 
as highlighted by Nicolai (2004), namely: the World Bank; Portugal; UNICEF; the 
World Food Programme; New Zealand; Brazil and Ireland. Nicolai (2004) goes further, 
stating that during the UN Transition Administration of Timor (1999-2003), UNICEF 
played the role of de facto Ministry of Education. Lately, Australia has also committed 
to the support of Timorese education. 
Figure 10: Number of primary schools in Timor-Leste 1973-2012 
 
Sources: INE (1974); BPS (1989, 1993); Saldanha (1994); GERTIL, (2003) and 
Ministry of Education (2012) 
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When the school year of 2004/05 started, five years had already elapsed from the end of 
Indonesian occupation and the extreme events of violence witnessed by the Timorese in 
1999. Reconstruction was ongoing; the hope of peace had reached Timor. 
Yet, as Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão reminded the nation in 2010, Timor was, and 
still is, a post-conflict country, and the experience of conflict left its mark: 
‘Post-conflict mentality is a collective reality that cannot be ignored when a 
nation has endured the severity of losses, faced the realities of past injustices, 
and experienced generations of conflict. This painful legacy is not often 
included when considering strategic planning.’ 
Office of the Prime Minister, (2010:6) 
This study seeks to directly address this concern by reviewing and further analysing 
legacies of conflict upon the drivers of demand for primary education in a post-conflict 
setting. A brief conceptual review follows, in the next section. 
2- Conceptual Framework 
To support the analysis, it is important to look into the processes through which the 
experience of violence and conflict can induce differences in demand for education 
among otherwise similar individuals. The focus here will be placed on demand for 
primary education as an economic choice of the household, made on behalf of its child. 
A first reflection must therefore be on how conflict may affect demand for education in 
post-conflict situations. From a general perspective, most of the studies on conflict and 
education suggest there is a negative impact41. FitzGerald, Stewart and Wang (2001) 
and F. Stewart and FitzGerald (2001) point out that school enrolments either decrease in 
conflict-afflicted countries or increase less comparatively to other poor developing 
countries. By a similar token, Blattman and Annan (2010) on Uganda, Shemyakina 
(2011) in Tajiskistan, Akresh and de Walque (2008) in an examination of the impacts of 
                                                          
41 Carlton-Ford and Boop (2010), Kondylis (2010) and de Groot and Göksel (2011) review some of these 
results. 
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the Rwandan genocide and Swee (2009) on Bosnia, all find negative impacts. 
Specifically looking at Timor, Justino et al. (2013) analysed school attendance in the 
immediacy of independence (school year 2000/01) when still under UN transitional 
administration. They found that exposure to displacement and damage to houses during 
the last bout of extreme violence of 1999 induced a significant lower attendance in the 
first year post-conflict. They also found evidence of mixed impacts of conflict on school 
attainment seven years after independence. In 2007, boys affected by violence were less 
likely to have completed primary school, while girls affected by conflict were more 
likely to have finished their primary education. Frances Stewart, Huang, and Wang 
(2001) had already found mixed results for changes in primary school enrolments in 
conflict countries, a result that seems to be confirmed by Justino et al. (2013). Focusing 
on demand for education - manifested through the choice of having children attend 
school - this study built on this last contribution, and sought to verify whether or not the 
short-run effects of conflict on revealed demand for primary education that was 
manifested in 2001 still persisted in 2004/5. It did this by making use of a richer dataset 
to try to infer possible impacts and to deepen the contextual analysis of demand in a 
post-conflict setting. 
In the search for a deeper analysis of impacts of conflict it will be helpful to 
acknowledge processes through which conflict may affect household preferences 
towards education. Two dual psychosocial dimensions may arise as a consequence of 
the violence that take place during a conflict: trauma and resilience. Each can, in turn, 
be reflected in post-conflict preferences regarding education. 
On one hand we have trauma. The United Nations’ Report on the Impact of Armed 
Conflict on Children (Machel, 1996), refers to psychosocial impact as one of the most 
significant impacts of conflict on children, together with factors such as threats to health 
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(namely HIV-AIDS), gender based exploitation and violence, malnutrition42 and 
disease. The emergence of post-traumatic stress due to conflict is also highlighted by 
Dyregrov et al. (2002) and, in the specific case of Timor-Leste, by Silove et al. (2009). 
These effects on children can shape their attitudes towards the realities of schooling, 
including the meeting of new colleagues, the engagement in different environments and 
the mere issue of getting to school. The general assumption of intra-household altruism 
leads us to assume that children’s perceptions of school will also have a bearing on their 
parent’s own appreciation of the risks. Parents themselves, together with the other adults 
in the household, can also become more fearful about the security of their children. 
Skonhoft (2000), who researched Burundian Hutu refugees, found that in the face of the 
slaughtering of educated people of the same ethnicity, many parents became reluctant to 
send their children to school, even in refugee camps. These changes in households’ 
perception can, as found in Burundi, have defining effects on the way parents value the 
utility that can be derived from their children’s schooling. It can ultimately lead them 
not to have their children attend school. Other effects were empirically found to result 
from an experience of violence and conflict. Higher pessimism (Bozzoli et al., 2011) 
and higher sensitivity to uncertainty (Shemyakina, 2011) can also be results of violence 
and conflict. 
These effects, as Silove et al. (2009) found, can outlast the conflict itself and still be felt 
in the post-conflict setting. The effects are thus compounded in the post conflict setting 
where they may lead to a reduced preference for education among those most affected 
by conflict. 
                                                          
42 The relevance of malnutrition and food security in conflict and post-conflict settings is addressed in 
significant research by Breisinger et al. (2014), Calderone et al. (2014) or Maystadt et al. (2014). 
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On the other hand, conflict can induce resilience, as stressed by Blattman and Annan, 
(2010) or Bellows and Miguel (2009). Referring to the work of Tedeschi and Calhoun 
(1996) and Powell et al. (2003), Bellows and Miguel (2009) suggest that positive 
changes in political agency and beliefs may arise from conflict, which, arguably, can be 
construed as resilience effects. If resilience effects dominate, then surviving a conflict 
may induce a peace dividend in the form of positive aspirations, and thus lead 
eventually to a lower risk aversion and a longer foresight. Resilience may also be 
fostered in the aftermath of the conflict through reconstruction aid efforts targeted to 
areas and people more affected. These resilience effects may include the fostering of 
gender equality, in the case of Timor, as was found by Olsson (2009). 
An analysis of impacts of conflict and violence on post-conflict behaviours, particularly 
in the case of forms of direct violence such as killings, is always an analysis of 
survivors, of individuals that experienced an environment where the level of killings of 
others was more or less intense. This experience can then take two different forms: it 
can either involve, first, the experience of a continuum of violence or, second, a shock 
(or a succession of shocks) of violence experienced during one’s life or the life of one’s 
child. In both cases, the experiences can induce trauma and/or resilience. However, 
while an experience of a continuum of violence may lead to adaptation and coping 
strategies that can eventually lead to resilience, the experience of a shock of extreme 
violence may be more likely to lead to trauma. On the other hand, if factors of resilience 
are to be strong enough so as to overcome the trauma induced by shocks of extreme 
violence, then they are also likely to prevail against the trauma induced by experiences 
of continua of violence. In such a case, one should expect that, in a post-conflict 
situation, positive reactions to the experience of conflict, namely expressed through the 
choice of having the child attend primary education, would prevail.  
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Qualitative research undertaken in Timor in 2012, where life stories interviews were 
conducted with Timorese in regions differently affected by the conflict43, suggests that 
the resilience effect may not be negligible. In all the interviews conducted, a high 
preference for education and an assertion that it is of great importance was revealed, 
both by young people interviewed and by parents, regarding their children. As an 
example of what could be perceived as a change in attitudes towards education, from 
the in-conflict to the post-conflict setting, these were the words of a young man from the 
suco of Parlamento in the district of Lautém: 
‘School didn’t go well but that was war strategy. We wouldn’t put effort in 
school. Now after independence, it is amazing! Now school is really good! (…) 
Before, in Indonesian times, no one would organize or mobilize life towards 
becoming someone. (…) Our mothers would also not want [us to go] because 
of the war: «you go to school and then they will kill you».  (…) Now school is a 
success!’ 
Young Man from Lautem (2012)44 
The suggestion is, therefore, that a possible effect of resilience could be influencing the 
decisions of Timorese as a possible medium-run impact of conflict, or a peace dividend. 
However, a more definite assertion can only be made against the backdrop of a set of 
other factors that may also influence the choice of having a child attend primary school. 
A first important factor is, of course, the parents’ own experience of education, whether 
they attended school themselves. These are also important shapers of the household’s 
preferences towards education. 
It is also important to assert that households’ perceptions of the utility of education 
reveal themselves in choices that are guided by a broad set of other concerns and 
restrictions, as highlighted by the theory and empirics of demand for education. 
                                                          
43 A total of 24 life stories interviews were conducted in three sites: Bazartete in the district of Liquiça, in 
the West; Laclubar in the district of Manatuto, in the Centre; Lautem in the district of the same name, in 
the East. 
44 Underlining added by the author. 
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Starting from the works of Mincer (1958), Schultz (1961), Becker, (1962) and Ben-
Porath (1967), the economic problem of demand for education is constructed by 
considering the household to be facing an investment decision, an investment in human 
capital. As with other investments, education is expected to generate a yield. In this 
case, it is expected to generate an education premium, a higher wage relative to 
comparably similar workers in comparable sectors and economies, for each added year 
of schooling (Becker, 1962). Higher returns to education provide a metric for this 
premium, an indicator that education pays as an investment (Becker, 1962; Mincer, 
1974, 1958)45. It is, therefore, an expectation of positive and significant returns to 
education that constitutes the economic incentive for households’ demand for the 
education of their members46. 
The economic analysis of demand for education acknowledges that, as an investment, a 
choice of having some of the household’s members attend school is one where 
contemporaneous costs are assumed, so that future gains can be attained. This has been 
clear since the seminal works of Becker (1962) or Ben-Porath (1967), but also 
Wilkinson (1966), Heckman (1976), Lazear (1977) or Mattila (1982).47 Education 
                                                          
45 However, it does not equate to a return on investment, as it does not relate the wage premium to the 
costs of education. 
46 The links between returns to education and demand for education have been recently reviewed by 
Colclough et al. (2010). Returns to education were recently found to be significant determinants of 
demand by Kingdon and Theopold (2008) on India, Brand and Xie (2010) on China or Attanasio and 
Kaufmann (2014) on Mexico. 
47 A thorough review of the seminal literature in demand for education can be found in Freeman (1987). 
Literature on demand for education has expanded, with a focus, mostly on higher education. Important 
examples are Willis and Rosen (1978), Fuller et al., (1982), Manski and Wise (1983), Altonji (1991), 
Manski (1993), Duchesne and Nonneman, (1998), Cameron and Heckman (2001), Canton and de Jong 
(2005) ,Saiti and Prokopiadou (2008), Brand and Xie (2010), Flannery and O’Donoghue, (2013), 
Delavande and Zafar (2014) or Prada and Urzúa (2014). A review of econometric studies on higher 
education can be found in Ehrenberg (2004). Recent empirical applications in developing countries can be 
found in King (1993) on higher education in Puerto Rico, Kingdon and Theopold (2008) on India, Lloyd 
et al., (2009) on Pakistan, Nerman and Owens, (2010) on Tanzania, Oketch and Ngware (2010), Oketch 
et al. (2012) and Bold et al. (2014) on primary education in Kenya, Weir (2011) on Ethiopia, Chow and 
Shen (2006), Qian and Smyth (2011) and Deng et al. (2014) on China, Jensen (2010) on the Dominican 
Republic, Stephen (2012) on Nigeria, Glewwe and Kassouf, (2012) on Brazil, Albert and David (2012) on 
primary education in the Philippines, Biltagy (2012) on Egypt, Lincove (2012) on Uganda, Verdú et al. 
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requires a reduction in consumption of other goods, to support the acquisition of books, 
school material, school uniforms and other education related materials, but also 
payment of tuition when education is not free48. This makes the household income a key 
enabler of education demand49. The financial burden can, of course, be assisted by 
external assistance, reducing the contemporaneous investment50. 
The choice for education also requires a consideration of the use of time (which is 
substituting education for leisure, home care activities and labour). In particular, the 
need for an intra-household division of labour makes it important to understand the size 
and structure of the household51, but also the traditional attribution of tasks, according 
to gender52, age or even status in relation to other members (to be the first child, to be 
adopted into the family, a niece or nephew of the household head, etc.)53. Not only 
inside the household, but outside, the use of time in education raises opportunity costs, 
themselves correlated with the wage levels that could be earned contemporaneously (as 
opposed to those that can be earned in the future)54. In that sense, the level of education 
already achieved can have a dual effect, either as an enabler of progression, as it marks 
investment already done, or as a boundary above which the household’s preferences 
switch to contemporaneous earnings. As the dimension of investment prevails 
throughout the decision-making process, access to credit and credit constraints are also 
important factors55. Finally, a key dimension of the investment nature of demand for 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(2013) on higher education in Colombia, Benhassine et al. (2013) on Morocco, Bader (2014) on higher 
education in Jordan and Attanasio and Kaufmann (2014) on higher education in Mexico. 
48 The significance of these costs is highlighted is studies like Ohba (2011) or Albert and David (2012). 
49 The same was found by studies such as Chow and Shen (2006), Kingdon and Theopold (2008), Qian 
and Smyth (2011) and Albert and David (2012) 
50 This effect is suggested in studies such as Glewwe and Kassouf (2012) or Benhassine et al. (2013). 
51 As suggested by White and Masset (2003) 
52 Different effects of covariates of demand according to gender are studies, for instance, by Lincove 
(2012) on Nigeria, Deng et al. (2014) on China or Attanasio and Kaufmann (2014) on Mexico. 
53 These variables were highlighted in the qualitative interviews conducted in Timor-Leste. 
54 The importance of these opportunity costs is highlighted by Weir (2011), 
55 The same is suggested is studies such as Masset (2010) 
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education is also the perceived quality of schools and teaching. Glewwe (2002) 
highlights this, inferring the significance of school quality as a determinant of 
households’ choices56. 
Among these drivers of demand, some may have been affected by conflict themselves. 
A first effect can be found on returns to education. Chamarbagwala and Morán (2011) 
suggest that conflict may induce decreased expectations of returns to education. In 
Chapter 1, evidence is found that the experience of conflict did, in fact, affect post-
conflict returns to education in Timor-Leste. Violence experienced during the school 
life of individuals, namely killings, is found to induce lower returns to education. The 
experience of extreme levels of violence, namely hunger, the disruption of livelihoods 
and of access to education derived from these may, on the other hand, seem to create a 
scarcity of human resources, making them more expensive. This happens while their 
productivity has been lowered due to the first channel. Overall, that study finds 
evidence of the negative impact on productivity to override the human capital scarcity 
effect, inducing, therefore lower post-conflict returns to education. These effects are 
induced by education decisions that occurred during the conflict and the post-conflict 
economic setting. If post-conflict demand for primary education is shown to react to 
expected returns to education, this may be evidence of an indirect effect of conflict.   
Another indirect effect can be found through the household’s income, if it proves, as 
theoretically expected, to be a significant driver of demand for education. Justino and 
Verwimp (2006) estimated that 20% of the Rwandan population moved into poverty, as 
a consequence of the genocide. Income reductions may have happened directly or via 
the destruction of productive assets or crops as found by Verwimp et al. (2010) or 
                                                          
56 Other recent studies referring the significance of perceived quality of education and of access to schools 
are Lloyd et al. (2009) or Albert and David (2012). 
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Bundervoet (2007). The destruction of assets, Ibáñez and Moya (2009) highlight, 
reduces the income generating capacity of households and this may force them, in 
extreme cases, into a low yielding livelihood strategy and into a poverty trap. This 
means, as Akbulut-Yuksel (2009) also points out, that asset destruction immediately 
reduces the household income, reducing, therefore, the scope of non-income generating 
activities that members of the household may engage in, including education. This was 
observed by Shemyakina (2011) who found a strong negative association between 
female enrolment in education and past damage to the household dwelling. These 
impacts on the household’s income generating capacities may have still persisted in the 
medium-run. While Badiuzzaman et al. (2011) allude to a “Phoenix” factor, a rapid 
economic recovery after extended conflicts, Cerra and Saxena (2008) point to a partial 
rebound after civil war, a recovery of half the loss in four years while the remainder 
takes more than a decade to recover. Although there is no empirical evidence regarding 
Timor, it would be reasonable to assume that this was also the case there where full 
economic potential was not yet reached in 2004/05, five years after the end of conflict. 
The assumption in this study is that, in 2004/05, the average Timorese household, and 
especially those more affected by the conflict, were still experiencing a lower income 
than they would otherwise have had, if the conflict had not occurred.57 
Finally, another key dimension through which conflict may indirectly affect demand for 
education comes through the quality of education and, in the case of primary education, 
the perception of it by parents. Studies such as Lai and Thyne (2007) and Ichino and 
Winter-Ebmer (2004) look at impacts such as schools destroyed, access disrupted, 
migration or targeting of teachers. By affecting the quality of schools and imposing a 
scarcity of teachers, conflict affects the quality of education provided. Swee (2009) 
                                                          
57 This is, of course, an assumption that recommends itself to be tested in future research. 
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found that, in Bosnia, the destruction of school buildings and educational facilities but 
also the migration of teachers resulted in reduced access to education, increasing its cost 
to the household, but also reducing its efficacy. Without any particular correlation with 
the intensity of violence, Timor experienced a significant reduction in the quality of 
schooling as a direct consequence of its independence, with the repatriation of nearly 
two thirds of the teaching body back to Indonesia58. The introduction of the Portuguese 
language in teaching, after 25 years of being outlawed - and when it has never been 
prevalent, even during the 500 years of colonization by the European nation - has placed 
a pressure on the quality of education that was still persistent in 2012, at the time 
fieldwork was conducted. This happened at the same time as many schools were being 
constructed, as depicted in Figure 10 above. It is therefore, a reasonable assumption that 
also in Timor the experience of conflict induced a reduction in school quality. If 
households were to appear, empirically, sensitive to perceptions of school quality when 
deciding on their children’s attendance of primary school, then this could be construed 
as a channel of an indirect effect of conflict. 
These three dimensions, returns to education, household income and (perceived and 
actual) quality of education may also be seen as channels of indirect medium-run effects 
of conflict. Taken together with other drivers of demand discussed here, and with the 
direct effects of conflict, these dimensions can further an understanding of the demand 
for primary education in a post-conflict setting such as Timor was in 2004/05. 
                                                          
58 This number was independently stated by two key informants, one working with the Timorese Ministry 
of Education and the other a former official of this Ministry, interviewed in 2012. According to Ministry 
of Education (2011:33-34), in 1996 only 65 of all the teachers in the third level of basic education who 
were Timorese stayed after 1999 to provide for the education of what were then 21.810 students. 
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Building on this discussion, the following section presents the empirical strategy used to 
seek to assess medium-run impacts of conflict on post-conflict demand for primary 
education. 
3- Empirical Strategy 
Building on the previous discussion on the drivers of demand, this study seeks to 
empirically assess the possibility of identifying inferable medium-run impacts of 
conflict on the demand for primary education. It will undertake this by looking into the 
households’ decision to have their children aged 6 to 14 years old attend primary 
school59. 
As this is a binomial choice, this study applies a Probit regression, as used in studies 
such as Justino et al. (2013), Deng et al. (2014) or Attanasio and Kaufmann (2014). Let, 
therefore, 𝑌1
∗ be a latent variable that linearly expresses the probability of attending 
school, i.e., 
𝑌1
∗ = 𝛼 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓 ∗ 𝛽𝑐 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀1 (1) 
As it is only possible to observe whether each child attends school or not, 𝑦1𝑖, it is 
assumed that: 
𝑦1𝑖 = {
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦1
∗ ≤ 0
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦1
∗ > 0
 
with 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓 being the indicator of violence experienced during the conflict, 𝑋 being the 
vector of all other variables theoretically established as determinants of the choice of 
attendance and 𝜀1~𝑁(0, 𝜎1
2). 
                                                          
59 Following Timorese law, marriage is only legal above the age of 14. As it is a decisive milestone, it is 
used to mark the end of the cohort of interest. 
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Seeking to assess the possible inference of impact of conflict on the demand for primary 
education, two alternative proxies of the violence experienced during the Timorese 
conflict are used: 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓1 = Average Killings during the life of the child, expressing the 
continuum of violence the household witnessed in the district of birth of the child and 
during the conflict; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓2 = Shock of extreme violence during the life of the child, a 
binomial variable that indicates whether extreme levels of violence manifested 
themselves, at the district of the child’s birth and during her lifetime. The attribution to 
each child of the experience of an extreme shock follows the procedure applied by 
Justino et al. (2013). The attribution is made if, in any year of her life, the level of 
killings and disappearances in her district of birth exceeded the mean for all years and 
districts by two standard deviations or more. In their study, as in Chapter 1, a count of 
the number of years when such a threshold is passed is undertaken. In this study, as can 
be perceived in Figure 9 and Table 15 above, during the life of children aged between 6 
and 14 years old in 2004, and therefore born between 1990 and 1998, only one event of 
extreme violence (the 1999 post-referendum brutal backlash by the Indonesian military 
and affiliate militias) had occurred. 
For each of these conflict indicators, the test of possible direct medium-run effects is 
conducted by, in a stepwise process, introducing further structure to the vector of 
covariates of attendance, 𝑋. 
In a first regression, let 𝑋 = [𝑋1], expressing a set of individual, household and local 
specific covariates that, as discussed in section 2, may affect demand for primary 
education: gender (1 if female), age, age2, binomial indicator that the child’s household 
resides in an urban or rural area (1 if urban), binomial indicator that the child’s father 
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attended school, binomial indicator that the child’s mother attended school60, binomial 
indicator that the child migrated, binomial indicator that the child is the first child, 
binomial indicator that the child is adopted, binomial indicator that the child is a 
niece/nephew of the household head, ln (number of household members) and the share 
of each of the following cohorts in the household: boys aged 0-1, 2-4, 5-9, 10-14 and 
men aged above 65; girls aged 0-1, 2-4, 5-9, 10-14 and women aged above 65. 
As referred to in section 2, the size and constitution of the household allows for a proxy 
of the intra-household division of labour, particularly with regards to what hours of care 
activities the child is involved in. Although the TLSLS (2007) provides information on 
reported hours of such work, its addition to the empirical model would impose on it 
endogenous effects. As discussed in section 2, the theory of education demand sets the 
choice of education to be concurrent with the choices of time use for work and care. 
While a possible empirical approach to such economic problems of the household 
would be a multinomial probability regression on the three alternative time uses, the 
nature of the empirical problem this study seeks to address, with the presence of many 
sources of endogeneity that recommend Instrumental Variable approaches to be tested, 
suggests that Probit and IV Probit regressions should be adopted. To account for the 
drivers of choice for care work, and in part also those for other work outside, the 
household’s size and composition - not endogenous to school attendance - were 
therefore integrated into the empirical model. 
In a second regression, let 𝑋 = [ 𝑋1 𝑋2], where 𝑋2 is a vector of covariates that 
express the nature of education as an investment: completed years of education (as an 
                                                          
60 Preferably, this study would use information on the years of education of each of the parents. However, 
the TLSLS 2007 only reports data on education of 888 fathers of the 6,032 children aged between 6 and 
14 (with an average of 1.4 years of education) and of 641 mothers (with an average of 1.16 years of 
education). It provides, however, a full indication of whether the parents attended school. Therefore, the 
study uses this as an indication of the level of parent’s education. 
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indicator of human capital already accumulated by the child), estimated returns to 
education (calculated estimates of the model used in the analysis of post-conflict returns 
to education in Timor, in Chapter 1, with to same datasets used in this study), average 
wage at the cluster level (as an indicator of the opportunity cost of education), number 
of cows (as a proxy for credit worthiness, significant because in 2005 bancarization had 
not yet occurred in Timor and because cows were still a very important component of 
dowries in the country), binomial variable on whether the household had been denied 
credit (an indicator of access to credit). 
The use of the average wage at the cluster level as an indicator of the opportunity costs 
of education follows the rationale presented before regarding the concurrent decision on 
use of time, in this case between education and work outside of the household. Again, 
the use of an indicator of occupation would introduce endogeneity into the empirical 
model. 
The indicators of credit worthiness and access to credit seek to act as proxies for the 
potential cost of credit and credit constraints faced by the household, so as to address 
the inter-temporal optimization rational inherent to the decision on education.61 
In a final, third regression, a full empirical model of demand is tried. Let, then 𝑋 =
[ 𝑋1 𝑋2 𝑋3 ], where 𝑋3 is a vector of covariates that incorporate the dimensions of 
education as an economic good that is consumed: current household per capita income, 
average private per capita expenditure in education at the cluster level, average 
distance to primary school at the cluster level (as proxies of direct costs of education), 
average external financing to education at the cluster level (as a proxy of potential 
                                                          
61 A calculated average rate of interest for credit received by the households at a cluster level was 
considered in an early empirical analysis. However, due to the low bancarization of the country, a 
significant proportion of the households and clusters did not report loans received or interest rates. 
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support for education available to the household) and percentage of school drop-outs 
attributed to insufficient quality, to insufficient access and to insecurity in the district of 
birth (as indicators of the perception of school quality). This latter regression will be 
used for further robustness tests and sample decomposition analysis.62 
Lack of reliable information on income at the household level required the search for a 
proxy variable. A first possible solution would be to use household expenditure as a 
proxy. However household expenditure is endogenous in all resource generating time 
uses and, therefore, of substitute ones. There is, therefore a strong suspicion of 
endogeneity with the decision of attendance of primary school by the child. To 
overcome this limitation, an instrumental variable approach is adopted and tested. The 
household per capita income, proxied by the per capita expenditure, is therefore 
estimated using the remaining variables in the empirical model and the following 
instruments (as representative of productive assets and wealth): years of education of 
the household head, controls for type of dwelling owned (bamboo house, semi-
permanent, traditional house, small house in compound of main house, permanent 
house, emergency/tent, other), area of owned plot, value of owned plot, area of plots 
partly owned, variables indicative of the number of units of livestock owned (buffalos, 
bali cows, horses, pigs, goats, sheep, chicken or ducks) and total value of the livestock. 
For each relevant regression, joint significance of the instruments is used to test for 
eventual weak instruments. In all of them, the instruments were found significant by the 
Sargan test. Endogeneity was also tested, following the procedure presented in 
Wooldridge (2010:587). As endogenity was found to exist, the estimate from the 
regression on instruments was used. 
                                                          
62 A full description of the variables is in the appendix. 
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While the chosen covariates of the demand for primary education may be able to 
address perceived risks of endogeneity, there are reasonable expectations that the 
indicators of conflict may not. It may be the case that reverse causality does not occur 
between attendance to school, measured in 2004/05, and the conflict indicators, all 
reporting to the period 1975 to 1999. However, one cannot overlook reasonable 
expectations of omitted variable bias or correlated measurement error. In the conflict 
literature one can find evidence of endogeneity of conflict due to factors such as income 
and victimization of richer individuals and more educated individuals, as per Justino 
and Verwimp (2006). The empirical strategy adopted in this study, as it explores many 
covariates of demand for education, may possibly reduce the scope of omitted variables. 
To strengthen this possibility, all regressions also include district and ethno-linguistic 
control variables. It may, however, not encompass all possibilities. A possible omitted 
variable bias regarding both indicators of intensity of violence, civilian killed during the 
life of the individual and the binomial indicator of the experience of a shock of extreme 
violence, is the degree of socio-economic linkages between the populations in the 
districts of Timor and the neighbouring western half of the island, part of Indonesia. In 
these districts, it would be more likely for a higher proportion of the population to be 
sympathetic to a stronger integration of the two parts of the island. While a border was 
created in 1859 under a treaty between the then colonial powers of Portugal and 
Netherlands, Bowden and Hajek (2007) and Soares (2003) show that a commonality of 
language exists between different Timorese peoples across it, linking both sides. This 
commonality predates Indonesian occupation and may have promoted a higher 
allegiance to a project of integration among the peoples closer to the border. This may 
have propitiated for two characteristics to positively correlate: attendance of Indonesian 
education and formation of pro-Indonesia groups. The first effect, during the 25 years of 
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occupation could lead to relatively more educated parents and a higher preference for 
the education of their children during occupation. The second effect would lead to a 
higher likelihood of militia formation and higher levels of violence in the post-
referendum events. Among these events was a massive displacement of Timorese to 
Indonesian West Timor, from which not all Timorese returned after independence. If 
those that stayed in West Timor were more committed to Indonesia (including being 
afraid of reprisals from violent acts perpetrated in 1999), they would also be more likely 
to have their children in school prior to the violent events that correlated with regime 
and sovereignty change in Timor. All other effects remaining unchanged, this would 
lead to a lowering in preferences to school in the post-conflict setting at a district level 
due to an unobserved shift in the prevalent characteristics of people residing in those 
districts. If that is the case then, without correction, there could be an over-estimation of 
negative impacts of conflict on the choice of having children attend primary school. 
To address this possible source of time-variant endogeneity, an IV approach was 
applied, using the distance to the western border of Timor-Leste with Indonesia as an 
instrument. This instrument was explored by Justino et al. (2013, 2011). This strategy 
made use of the fact that the Indonesian operations’ logistics were systematically 
supported through their western half of the island of Timor, where, namely a vast 
number of Timorese were forcefully displaced in the post 1999 referendum violence, as 
per CAVR (2005). This allowed for stronger control but also more violence to be 
enacted by Indonesia in the western districts of Timor-Leste. The forms of severe 
violence were also enabled by this logistical feature, again as reported in CAVR (2005), 
particularly in the case of the destruction enacted in the post-referendum period, which 
was stronger closer to the border, where pro-Indonesia militias received more support 
and were better armed. Therefore, and as it was described in historical reports, namely 
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Taylor (1990; 1999) and CAVR (2005), the distance to the border is expected to be 
correlated with the indicators of conflict used. Meanwhile, higher levels of attendance to 
primary education occur is districts that are either closer to the border, such as 
Bobonaro or Cova Lima, the capital Dili (more central) or the farther east districts of 
Baucau and Lautem63. Finally, it was noticed that the partial correlation statistic 
between attendance and distance to the border is very low and non-significant. These 
suggest that the distance to the border is a possible instrument. 
The empirical model is, therefore, estimated using Probit and IV Probit regressions. As 
it is likely that more than one child of primary school age resided in the same 
household, the variance-covariance matrixes were clustered by household. As 
mentioned before, the regressions were run with district and ethno-linguistic controls.64 
The next session will briefly present the data used in this analysis. 
4- Data Description 
This study uses the dataset of the Timor-Leste Survey of Living Standards of 2007 
(TLSLS), conducted by the Timorese National Directorate of Statistics (DNE), with the 
support of the World Bank and UNICEF. A representative set of 4,470 households was 
interviewed, with 25,000 people surveyed, from all districts of Timor-Leste, of which 
6,032 were aged between 6 and 14 years old. 
The study uses a second dataset, the Human Rights Violations Database (CAVR, 2006), 
containing 11,315 observations of human rights abuses in order to generate the 
indicators of conflict. The observations were collected from narrative statements of 
deponents to the Timorese Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CAVR), qualitative 
reports from Amnesty International and data collected by the Timorese NGO 
                                                          
63 This can be confirmed in  Table 17. 
64 Empirical estimation is done using the STATA 13 SE software package. 
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FOKUPERS. Under the CAVR mandate, Benetech-HRDAG produced and presented 
calculations of human rights violations in Timor-Leste in support of the commission’s 
final report entitled “Chega!”(CAVR, 2005). 
Table 16: School attendance in 2004-05 per age (6 to 18 year olds) and gender (%) 
Age 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Female              
Prim. 6.6 25.8 49.7 72.4 81.4 80.3 81.8 73.4 59.4 47.2 32.6 15.8 15.4 
Sec. - - - - - - 2.9 10.5 25.3 35.4 46.9 57.7 51.4 
Male              
Prim. 8.0 24.0 49.4 71.6 76.8 83.3 81.4 78.6 68.6 51.3 44.6 24.2 20.9 
Sec. - - - - - - 2.7 8.4 18.2 28.1 37.3 50.0 48.9 
All              
Prim. 7.3 24.9 49.6 72.0 79.1 81.8 81.6 76.1 63.9 49.3 39.0 20.3 18.1 
Sec. - - - - - - 2.8 9.4 21.8 31.7 41.7 53.6 50.2 
Source: author’s calculations using TLSLS (2007) 
 
In Table 16, above, it is possible to notice some relevant characteristics of Timorese 
school attendance in the post-conflict school year of 2004/05. A first characteristic is the 
late entrance into school. A second noticeable characteristic is an indication that school 
attendance reaches relatively high values, close to 86%, around the ages of 12-14 years. 
This is an indication of a preference by the households to send their young members to 
school, but also of some barriers that may vary in importance with age. The statistics 
reveal a slow progression in education and suggest a high number of grade repetitions. 
The significant reduction in attendance, after its maximum values, suggests a relatively 
small schooling attainment amongst young Timorese. A final point should be noted in 
relation to the similitude in attendance rates between boys and girls. There is some 
indication of a slightly higher attendance rate of girls in earlier ages and of young boys 
at later ages but the differences are not statistically significant65. 
  
                                                          
65 A battery of t-tests on the difference of attendance for each age did not reject the null hypothesis of no 
difference in any of the cases. 
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Table 17: Primary school attendance in 
2004-05 (age 6 to 14) by district and 
type of residence 
Distrito Rural Urban Total 
Aileu 46% . 46% 
Ainaro 62% 61% 61% 
Baucau 60% 58% 60% 
Bobonaro 61% 58% 59% 
Cova Lima 68% 67% 67% 
Dili 77% 69% 70% 
Ermera 40% 55% 41% 
Lautem 64% 64% 64% 
Liquica 45% 54% 49% 
Manufahi 56% 55% 55% 
Manatuto 64% 65% 64% 
Oecussi 38% 58% 47% 
Viqueque 60% 50% 56% 
Total 53% 62% 57% 
Source: author’s calculations using TLSLS (2007) 
A review of Table 17 reveals significant regional differences in primary school 
attendance. In some of the Timorese districts, Aileu, Ermera, Liquiçá and Oecussi, the 
school attendance was also significantly different, depending on the typology of 
residence66. 
  
                                                          
66 T-tests performed reject the hypothesis of equal average school attendance in rural and urban 
households of the districts mentioned. 
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Table 18: Primary school attendance in 
2004-05 by ethno-linguistic group and 
gender (age 6 to 14) 
Ethno-linguistic 
group 
Male Female Total 
Tetum 72% 68% 70% 
Baequeno 45% 48% 46% 
Bunak 67% 65% 66% 
Fatalucu 63% 62% 63% 
Galolen 64% 74% 70% 
Kaklun bi . 0% 0% 
Kemak 46% 47% 46% 
Laklei 53% 56% 54% 
Macalero 77% 63% 70% 
Macasae 63% 64% 63% 
Mangilih 50% 0% 33% 
Mambae 51% 50% 50% 
Midiki 58% 67% 62% 
Naueti 71% 79% 74% 
Sa ani 67% 40% 56% 
Tetum ter 54% 60% 57% 
Tokodete 51% 43% 47% 
Uaimua 45% 49% 47% 
Bahasa In 71% 50% 62% 
Portugues 50% 100% 67% 
Inggris 100% 0% 50% 
Other 59% 59% 59% 
Total 58% 57% 57% 
Source: author’s calculations using TLSLS (2007) 
A review of Table 18, above, reveals some significant differences in primary school 
attendance between ethno-linguistic groups. It is important to notice that most of these 
differences correlate with the geographic diversity shown is the previous table, as most 
ethno-linguistic groups reside in one district alone. Despite some distinct differences in 
average school attendance according to gender and ethno-linguistic group they are not 
statistically significant. 
An analysis of the indicators of conflict used, in Table 19 below, shows that there is not 
much heterogeneity attributable to gender differences and type of residence. On 
average, a household witnessed close to 7 killings or disappearances per year, during the 
life of their primary school aged children and while the conflict was occurring. Close to 
30 percent of the children in the sample lived through the events of extreme violence in 
1999. 
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Table 19: Conflict indicators by gender and type of residence 
  Gender Urban / Rural 
All 
  Girls Boys Urban Rural 
Variable N=2947 N=3085 N=2793 N=3239 N=6032 
Conflict 1: Average killings 
during life 
6.4 6.7 6.2 6.9 6.5 
(6.7) (7.0) (6.4) (7.2) (6.8) 
Conflict 2: Shock of extreme 
violence during life 
27% 28% 21% 33% 27% 
(44.2%) (45.0%) (40.8%) (47.0%) (44.6%) 
Source: author’s calculations using TLSLS (2007) 
 
As would be expected, and can be seen in Table 20, school attendance is higher in urban 
areas. Other noticeable differences are in the prevalence of migrants and, to a lesser 
extent, the percentage of children residing in households headed by an aunt or uncle. On 
the other hand, no significant differences are noticeable between girls and boys. 
Table 20: School attendance, individual, household and local level indicators 
  Gender Urban / Rural 
All 
  Girls Boys Urban Rural 
Variable N=2947 N=3085 N=2793 N=3239 N=6032 
Attending School in 2004/05 
57.1% 57.6% 61.8% 53.4% 57.3% 
(49.5%) (49.4%) (48.6%) (49.9%) (49.5%) 
Female 
- - 48.9% 48.8% 48.9% 
- - (50.0%) (50.0%) (50.0%) 
Urban 
46% 46% - - 46% 
(50%) (50%) - - (50%) 
Age 
10 10 10 10 10 
(3) (3) (3) (3) (3) 
Father Attended School 
2.6% 2.8% 4.0% 1.6% 2.7% 
(16.1%) (16.4%) (19.6%) (12.5%) (16.2%) 
Mother Attended School 
1.6% 1.3% 2.0% 1.0% 1.5% 
(12.7%) (11.5%) (14.1%) (9.9%) (12.1%) 
Migrated 
3.1% 3.5% 5.5% 1.4% 3.3% 
(17.2%) (18.5%) (22.8%) (11.7%) (17.9%) 
First child 
22.8% 20.9% 21.1% 22.4% 21.8% 
(42.0%) (40.6%) (40.8%) (41.7%) (41.3%) 
Adopted 
1.4% 1.7% 1.4% 1.6% 1.5% 
(11.6%) (12.9%) (11.9%) (12.6%) (12.3%) 
Niece/Nephew 
3.0% 3.2% 3.9% 2.4% 3.1% 
(17.0%) (17.7%) (19.5%) (15.3%) (17.4%) 
Household Size 
7.3 7.2 7.5 7.0 7.2 
(2.3) (2.3) (2.4) (2.2) (2.3) 
Source: author’s calculations using TLSLS (2007) 
An analysis of the indicators of education as an investment, in Table 21, shows that, on 
average, Timorese children aged between 6 and 14 had completed only the first grade. 
Expected returns to education are significantly low, but so are the opportunity costs. 
The households own close to one cow and only very few had a loan denied. It is also 
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noticeable that there is a relative homogeneity between girls and boys and between 
urban and rural dwellers, while the heterogeneity within each group is more significant. 
Table 21: Indicators of education as an investment 
  Gender Urban / Rural 
All 
  Girls Boys Urban Rural 
Variable N=2947 N=3085 N=2793 N=3239 N=6032 
Completed Years of Education 
1 1 2 1 1 
(2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 
E(Returns to Education) 
1.29% 1.30% 1.29% 1.30% 1.30% 
(0.6%) (0.6%) (0.6%) (0.6%) (0.6%) 
Average local hourly wage 
0.05 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.05 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.21) (0.12) (0.17) 
Number of cows owned 
0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 
(3.7) (2.1) (3.0) (3.0) (3.0) 
Household had loan denied 
2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
(14%) (16%) (15%) (14%) (15%) 
Source: author’s calculations using TLSLS (2007) 
 
The analysis of Table 22, below, reveals again some heterogeneity between urban and 
rural areas. Urban households have, on average, higher income; face higher education 
costs; have access to more external financial support; and their children take less time to 
reach school. 
Table 22: Indicators of education as a consumption good 
  Gender Urban / Rural 
All 
  Girls Boys Urban Rural 
Variable N=2947 N=3085 N=2793 N=3239 N=6032 
Per capita Monthly Household 
Income 
22.9 22.7 26.8 19.4 22.8 
(13.5) (12.8) (15.4) (9.6) (13.1) 
Average local education costs 
(monthly) 
26.0 25.3 32.3 20.0 25.7 
(18.0) (16.7) (20.5) (11.3) (17.4) 
Average local subsidies to 
education 
1.7 1.5 2.3 1.0 1.6 
(4.4) (3.7) (4.6) (3.5) (4.1) 
Average local time to primary 
school (in minutes) 
28.8 28.6 23.0 33.6 28.7 
(17.6) (16.8) (11.9) (19.3) (17.2) 
Insufficient Quality 
2.1% 2.2% 1.6% 2.7% 2.2% 
(2.2%) (2.3%) (1.4%) (2.6%) (2.2%) 
Insufficient Access 
6.5% 6.5% 5.2% 7.6% 6.5% 
(3.7%) (3.7%) (3.0%) (4.0%) (3.7%) 
Insufficient Security 
0.8% 0.9% 0.6% 1.0% 0.8% 
(1.3%) (1.4%) (0.9%) (1.6%) (1.4%) 
Source: author’s calculations using TLSLS (2007) 
 
Significantly, perceptions of school quality are also better for urban dwellers. On the 
other hand, no significant differences are noticeable between girls and boys. 
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As a first approximation in the analysis of medium-run impacts of conflict on school 
attendance, in Table 23 below, it is possible to compare the average probability of 
attendance and the average values of the covariates described in section 3, depending on 
whether the household experienced the shock of extreme violence or not. 
Table 23: Descriptive statistics on the experience of extreme conflict 
  Experienced Extreme Violence 
All 
  Yes No 
Variable 1653 4379 6032 
Attending School in 2004/05 
64.5% 54.6% 57.3% 
(47.9%) (49.8%) (49.5%) 
Female 
47% 49% 49% 
(49.9%) (50.0%) (50.0%) 
Urban 
36% 50% 46% 
(47.9%) (50.0%) (49.9%) 
Age 
11 9 10 
(2) (3) (3) 
Father Attended School 
2.8% 2.7% 2.7% 
(16.5%) (16.1%) (16.2%) 
Mother Attended School 
1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 
(12.2%) (12.0%) (12.1%) 
Migrated 
3.0% 3.4% 3.3% 
(17.1%) (18.1%) (17.9%) 
First child 
25.5% 20.4% 21.8% 
(43.6%) (40.3%) (41.3%) 
Adopted 
1.6% 1.5% 1.5% 
(12.7%) (12.1%) (12.3%) 
Niece/Nephew 
4.5% 2.6% 3.1% 
(20.7%) (15.9%) (17.4%) 
Household Size 
6.9 7.4 7.2 
(2.2) (2.3) (2.3) 
Completed Years of Education 
1 1 1 
2 2 2 
E(Returns to Education) 
1.12% 1.36% 1.30% 
(1.05%) (0.22%) (0.59%) 
Average Local hourly wage 
0.07 0.05 0.05 
(0.3) (0.1) (0.2) 
Number of cows owned 
1.3 0.7 0.9 
(2.9) (3.0) (3.0) 
Household had loan denied 
1% 3% 2% 
(11.2%) (15.9%) (14.7%) 
Per capita Monthly Household Income 
23.3 22.6 22.8 
(12.9) (13.2) (13.1) 
Average local education costs (monthly) 
21.9 27.1 25.7 
(12.7) (18.6) (17.4) 
Average local subsidies to education 
(monthly) 
0.8 1.9 1.6 
(1.6) (4.6) (4.1) 
Average local time to primary school (in 
minutes) 
33.5 26.9 28.7 
(19.9) (15.6) (17.2) 
Insufficient Quality 
1.9% 2.3% 2.2% 
(1.1%) (2.5%) (2.2%) 
Insufficient Access 
8.3% 5.8% 6.5% 
(3.6%) (3.6%) (3.7%) 
Insufficient Security 
1.4% 0.6% 0.8% 
(2.1%) (0.9%) (1.4%) 
Conflict 1: Average killings during life 
16.4 2.8 6.5 
(4.9) (2.3) (6.8) 
Source: author’s calculations using TLSLS (2007) 
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There is some indication, although not statistically significant, that those children that 
experienced extreme levels of violence are more likely to have attended primary school 
in 2004/05. Other differences found here are in the location of the households. There is 
a higher likelihood: that rural households would be among those that suffered from the 
experience of extreme violence in 1999; that the child would be living with uncles of 
aunts (suggesting the possibility of being orphans); that there would be reports of 
insufficient access to schools; and, as expected, that households would have 
experienced a higher average number of killings during their lifetime. 
The brief analysis of the variables in this study suggests a relative homogeneity between 
boys and girls and between urban and rural areas, while there are significant standard 
deviations within each group. This suggests it would be of interest to analyse demand 
for primary education also for the sub-samples of boys and girls and urban and rural 
dwellers. It also reveals the need to account for district and ethno-linguistic fixed 
effects. Some indication exists of a higher preference for education of those that 
experienced higher levels of violence during the conflict, as was also suggested by the 
qualitative references. 
In the next section, these suggestions will be tested. 
5- Results 
As described before, this study seeks to find possible inferences of medium-run impacts 
of conflict on households’ demand for primary education. It will do this by looking at 
each of the analyses of two manifestations of the Timorese independence conflict, 
namely, the experience of a continuum of violence while the conflict overlapped with 
the life of the child and the experience of the brutal shock of violence that occurred after 
the 1999 referendum. The analysis will also make use of the covariates of demand for 
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education, following theoretical and empirical evidence found in other settings, so as to 
better understand post-conflict demand for primary education and highlight the possible 
indirect effects of conflict, through the channels discussed in section 2 above. It will, 
finally, seek to build a possible synthesis of inferable effects. 
5.1 Continuum of violence witnessed by the household during the life of the child 
The possible medium-run impacts of a continuum of violence experienced during the 
last years of the Timorese conflict, when it overlapped with the lives of the children of 
primary school age in 2004/05, focuses - as noted above - on the impacts of 
heterogeneous levels of average number of people reported to have been killed or 
disappeared in each children’s district of birth during their live time. 
The Instrumental Variables (IV) approach, suggested in the section 3, using distance to 
the border as an instrument, found empirical evidence of the instrument to be a 
significant and strong regressor, as per the Sargan test (presented in Table 51). The 
exclusion restriction test rejected the null of exogeneity, following the procedure 
presented in Wooldridge (2010:587). As proposed in section 3, this test was performed 
against the backdrop of an empirical reduced form model of demand for primary 
education that sought to account for the heterogeneity in individual, household and local 
characteristics; drivers of education as an investment; consumption constraints; 
restrictions of access to school; and perceptions of school quality and constraints to its 
efficacy. It also accounted for district level and ethno-linguistic fixed effects, trying to 
control for specific unobservable time-invariant characteristics that may, therefore, have 
manifested themselves both during the duration of the conflict in Timor and, already in 
a post-conflict stage, in 2004/05. It is, therefore, plausible to infer that, even though no 
longer mechanisms of reverse causality are taking place, there are still sources of 
omitted variable bias that, as hypothesised in section 3 above, may lead to an over-
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estimation of negative impacts of conflict on demand for education. This would suggest 
a higher prevalence of trauma than may be the case or it may point to an under-
estimation of positive impacts, i.e., suggesting lower prevalence of resilience. The 
results, presented in Table 24, below, suggest that this may be the case. 
Table 24: Primary Education Demand - Standard Models with Conflict 1: Average killings during life of the child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Individual, Household & Local + Education as Investment Standard Model 
 Probit  IV Probit Probit  IV Probit Probit  IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Explained variable = Probability of child, between ages 6 and 14, to have attended school in the 2004/05 school year 
Constant -12.231*** 1.557 -12.577*** 30.423*** -12.505*** -4.831 
 (0.556) (4.684) (0.564) (9.517) (0.768) (2.951) 
Conflict 1: Average 
killings during life 
-0.019*** 0.338*** -0.021*** 1.079*** -0.023*** 0.166** 
(0.007) (0.121) (0.007) (0.244) (0.007) (0.071) 
Female -0.132** -0.137** -0.138** -0.147** -0.117* -0.120** 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060) 
Age 2.311*** -0.526 2.437*** -6.588*** 2.514*** 0.950 
 (0.104) (0.965) (0.112) (2.001) (0.113) (0.595) 
Age2 -0.102*** 0.026 -0.108*** 0.300*** -0.111*** -0.040 
 (0.005) (0.044) (0.005) (0.090) (0.005) (0.027) 
Urban -0.053 -0.021 -0.040 0.023 -0.558*** -0.524*** 
 (0.065) (0.067) (0.066) (0.068) (0.093) (0.095) 
Father Attended School 0.042 0.004 0.058 -0.075 -0.102 -0.112 
 (0.183) (0.183) (0.185) (0.184) (0.175) (0.174) 
Mother Attended School 0.276 0.427* 0.288 0.717*** 0.117 0.209 
 (0.253) (0.254) (0.244) (0.256) (0.222) (0.224) 
Migrated -0.049 -0.509** -0.086 -1.505*** -0.237* -0.460*** 
 (0.150) (0.211) (0.139) (0.343) (0.139) (0.148) 
First Child 0.046 0.077 0.050 0.106 0.011 0.025 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) 
Adopted -0.105 0.045 -0.081 0.354 -0.107 -0.029 
 (0.245) (0.242) (0.242) (0.246) (0.229) (0.228) 
Niece/Nephew 0.191 0.152 0.171 0.012 0.090 0.070 
 (0.143) (0.141) (0.137) (0.143) (0.140) (0.140) 
Ln (Household Size) 0.084 0.092 0.051 0.056 0.470*** 0.433*** 
 (0.089) (0.088) (0.087) (0.087) (0.112) (0.113) 
Share of boys 0-1 0.372 0.585 0.424 1.264** 1.223** 1.296** 
 (0.531) (0.543) (0.531) (0.572) (0.541) (0.543) 
Share of boys 2-4 0.813** 0.668* 0.970** 0.494 1.600*** 1.456*** 
 (0.387) (0.392) (0.384) (0.400) (0.387) (0.391) 
Share of boys 5-9 0.230 -0.400 0.302 -1.694*** 0.594* 0.223 
 (0.298) (0.362) (0.300) (0.508) (0.317) (0.341) 
Share of boys 10-14 -0.316 -0.136 -0.213 0.302 0.240 0.299 
 (0.307) (0.315) (0.304) (0.340) (0.316) (0.316) 
Share of men above 65 -0.682 -1.073 -0.663 -1.818** -0.136 -0.385 
 (0.682) (0.705) (0.675) (0.733) (0.686) (0.700) 
Share of girls 0-1 0.189 -0.598 0.283 -1.990*** 0.947* 0.518 
 (0.540) (0.605) (0.538) (0.727) (0.558) (0.592) 
Share of girls 2-4 0.322 0.465 0.390 0.957** 0.623 0.692* 
 (0.408) (0.421) (0.403) (0.429) (0.412) (0.413) 
Share of girls 5-9 0.843*** 0.400 0.839*** -0.600 1.127*** 0.848*** 
 (0.304) (0.341) (0.302) (0.441) (0.306) (0.329) 
Share of girls 10-14 -0.193 -0.080 -0.124 0.096 0.017 0.049 
 (0.308) (0.312) (0.305) (0.315) (0.311) (0.310) 
Share of women above 
65 
0.663 0.244 0.685 -0.567 0.604 0.394 
(0.665) (0.673) (0.639) (0.695) (0.625) (0.629) 
Completed Years of 
Education 
  -0.006 0.096*** -0.062** -0.041 
  (0.023) (0.033) (0.024) (0.027) 
E(Returns to Education)   -15.099** 40.942*** -18.000*** -8.423 
   (6.866) (14.215) (6.692) (7.683) 
Average local wage   0.118 0.179 -0.186 -0.141 
   (0.162) (0.159) (0.160) (0.165) 
Number of cows owned   0.060*** 0.057*** 0.037*** 0.040*** 
   (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
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Primary Education Demand - Standard Models with Conflict 1: Average killings during life of the child (cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Individual, Household & Local + Education as Investment Standard Model 
 Probit  IV Probit Probit  IV Probit Probit  IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Explained variable = Probability of child, between ages 6 and 14, to have attended school in the 2004/05 school year 
Household had a loan 
denied 
  -0.517*** -0.432*** -0.268* -0.276* 
  (0.161) (0.158) (0.161) (0.160) 
E (Per capita Monthly 
Household Income) 
    0.055*** 0.050*** 
    (0.009) (0.009) 
Average local education 
costs 
    -0.006** -0.006** 
    (0.003) (0.003) 
Average local subsidies 
to education 
    0.001 0.001 
    (0.007) (0.007) 
Average time to primary 
school 
    -0.003 -0.002 
    (0.002) (0.002) 
Insufficient Access     -6.601*** -6.626*** 
     (1.514) (1.531) 
Insufficient Quality     -36.367*** -37.767*** 
     (8.675) (8.726) 
Insufficient Security     -11.444 -12.948 
     (11.184) (11.298) 
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethno-linguistic fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 6031 6022 6031 6022 6022 6022 
Pseudo R2 0.2846 0.2879 0.2952 0.2987 0.3085 0.3069 
Log-Likelihood -125766.170 -125043.323 -123889.822 -123148.361 -121425.639 -121698.394 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Source: author’s calculations on data from TLSLS (2007) and CAVR (2006) 
 
They make this case, however, with a puzzling sign reversion, from a negative 
coefficient for the impact of conflict in the Probit regressions (columns 1, 3 and 5), to a 
positive coefficient in the IV Probit regressions (columns 2, 4 and 6). Notably, while the 
absolute values of the IV Probit estimates are much higher, the estimated standard 
deviations are also much higher, suggesting lower efficiency. While adding into the 
empirical model further significant correlates of attendance in primary education (from 
models in column 1-2 to 5-6) the signs of the coefficients of this indicator of conflict 
remain stable and unaltered. This suggests the need for care in the inference of effects of 
conflict, using this indicator, and the need of further testing. 
Before progressing with this line of analysis, there are reasons to analyse the covariates 
of demand for primary education in post-conflict Timor-Leste that were used, in order 
to validate their inclusion in the empirical testing but also because they provide 
important insights. These can be seen in Table 24, above, and Table 25, below. On 
average, and keeping all other variables constant, a girl seemed to be less likely to 
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attend primary school in Timor in 2004/05. The likelihood of attendance of an urban 
child also seemed to be lower than that of an otherwise similar rural child. The negative 
sign should not suggest, directly, an urban disadvantage, as our discussion on the data 
revealed that those living in urban spaces benefited, on average, from a set of conditions 
that are also suggested as significant and conducive to higher primary school 
attendance67. Children that migrated seemed less likely to attend primary school, while 
those living in larger households - particularly if they had younger children or children 
their own age and, probably, also, had younger parents - were more likely to have 
attended school in 2004/05. 
Table 25: Primary Education Demand - Standard Models with Conflict - Marginal Effects - Conflict 1: Average killings 
during life of the child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Individual, Household & Local + Education as Investment Standard Model 
 Probit  IV Probit Probit  IV Probit Probit  IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Explained variable = Probability of child, between ages 6 and 14, to have attended school in the 2004/05 school year 
Conflict 1: Average 
killings during life 
-0.005*** 0.092*** -0.006*** 0.290*** -0.006*** 0.044** 
(0.002) (0.033) (0.002) (0.065) (0.002) (0.019) 
Female -0.036** -0.038** -0.037** -0.039** -0.031* -0.032** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Age 0.633*** -0.144 0.658*** -1.772*** 0.666*** 0.252 
 (0.024) (0.263) (0.026) (0.534) (0.025) (0.158) 
Age2 -0.028*** 0.007 -0.029*** 0.081*** -0.029*** -0.011 
 (0.001) (0.012) (0.001) (0.024) (0.001) (0.007) 
Urban -0.015 -0.006 -0.011 0.006 -0.148*** -0.139*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.025) 
Father Attended School 0.012 0.001 0.016 -0.020 -0.027 -0.030 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.046) (0.046) 
Mother Attended School 0.076 0.117* 0.078 0.193*** 0.031 0.056 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.066) (0.069) (0.059) (0.060) 
Migrated -0.013 -0.139** -0.023 -0.405*** -0.063* -0.122*** 
 (0.041) (0.057) (0.038) (0.091) (0.037) (0.039) 
First Child 0.013 0.021 0.013 0.028 0.003 0.007 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Adopted -0.029 0.012 -0.022 0.095 -0.028 -0.008 
 (0.067) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.061) (0.060) 
Niece/Nephew 0.052 0.042 0.046 0.003 0.024 0.019 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) 
Ln (Household Size) 0.023 0.025 0.014 0.015 0.124*** 0.115*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.029) (0.030) 
Share of boys 0-1 0.102 0.160 0.114 0.340** 0.324** 0.344** 
 (0.145) (0.148) (0.143) (0.153) (0.143) (0.144) 
Share of boys 2-4 0.223** 0.183* 0.262** 0.133 0.423*** 0.387*** 
 (0.106) (0.107) (0.103) (0.108) (0.102) (0.104) 
Share of boys 5-9 0.063 -0.109 0.082 -0.455*** 0.157* 0.059 
 (0.082) (0.099) (0.081) (0.136) (0.084) (0.091) 
Share of boys 10-14 -0.087 -0.037 -0.057 0.081 0.063 0.079 
 (0.084) (0.086) (0.082) (0.091) (0.084) (0.084) 
  
                                                          
67 It is relevant to notice, however, that an average urban child that was only to have access to the socio-
economic conditions of an average rural child, would probably face a harsher environment in an urban 
setting and be less likely to attend primary school. 
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Table 25: Primary Education Demand - Standard Models with Conflict - Marginal Effects - Conflict 1: Average killings 
during life of the child (cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Individual, Household & Local + Education as Investment Standard Model 
 Probit  IV Probit Probit  IV Probit Probit  IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Explained variable = Probability of child, between ages 6 and 14, to have attended school in the 2004/05 school year 
Share of men above 65 -0.187 -0.293 -0.179 -0.489** -0.036 -0.102 
 (0.187) (0.193) (0.182) (0.197) (0.182) (0.186) 
Share of girls 0-1 0.052 -0.163 0.076 -0.535*** 0.251* 0.138 
 (0.148) (0.165) (0.145) (0.195) (0.148) (0.157) 
Share of girls 2-4 0.088 0.127 0.105 0.257** 0.165 0.184* 
 (0.112) (0.115) (0.109) (0.115) (0.109) (0.109) 
Share of girls 5-9 0.231*** 0.109 0.226*** -0.161 0.298*** 0.225*** 
 (0.083) (0.093) (0.081) (0.118) (0.081) (0.087) 
Share of girls 10-14 -0.053 -0.022 -0.033 0.026 0.005 0.013 
 (0.085) (0.085) (0.082) (0.085) (0.082) (0.082) 
Share of women above 
65 
0.182 0.067 0.185 -0.152 0.160 0.105 
(0.182) (0.184) (0.172) (0.187) (0.165) (0.167) 
Completed Years of 
Education 
  -0.002 0.026*** -0.016** -0.011 
  (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) 
E(Returns to Education)   -4.076** 11.009*** -4.764*** -2.236 
   (1.848) (3.803) (1.764) (2.038) 
Average local wage   0.032 0.048 -0.049 -0.037 
   (0.044) (0.043) (0.042) (0.044) 
Number of cows owned   0.016*** 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Household had a loan 
denied 
  -0.140*** -0.116*** -0.071* -0.073* 
  (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
E (Per capita Monthly 
Household Income) 
    0.015*** 0.013*** 
    (0.002) (0.002) 
Average local education 
costs 
    -0.002** -0.002** 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Average local subsidies 
to education 
    0.000 0.000 
    (0.002) (0.002) 
Average time to primary 
school 
    -0.001 -0.001 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Insufficient Access     -1.747*** -1.759*** 
     (0.400) (0.406) 
Insufficient Quality     -9.625*** -10.025*** 
     (2.289) (2.309) 
Insufficient Security     -3.029 -3.437 
     (2.957) (2.995) 
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethno-linguistic fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 6031 6022 6031 6022 6022 6022 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Source: author’s calculations on data from TLSLS (2007) and CAVR (2006) 
 
Income appears to hold, as would be theoretically expected, in affecting demand for 
primary education. As per marginal effects calculated and presented, in Table 25 above, 
a child from a household earning a monthly income one standard deviation above 
another otherwise equivalent child, $13.1, would be, on average, 17% to 20% more 
likely to have attended primary education in the year of analysis. This is particularly 
relevant because, as discussed above, there is evidence that in other post-conflict 
settings - and in the medium run - households may still not have fully recovered from 
reductions in their income generating capacity caused by conflict. If that is the case, the 
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experience of conflict is still having, through this channel, a negative medium-run 
legacy on demand for education. 
Direct costs seem also to hold as significant and with the expected sign. In what could 
also be expected, opportunity costs in the form of expected work wages do not appear to 
be significant. 
Finally, perceptions of difficulties of access and poor quality are shown to have been 
significant deterrents to primary school attendance. Again, and as discussed in section 2, 
this is another potential indirect channel of medium-run impacts of conflict. If the 
effects of conflict in the reduction of school and teaching quality were not fully 
recovered, as may be the case in Timor-Leste, then there is significant evidence that the 
poorer quality retracts demand for primary education. 
A comment can also be made on some indication of credit constraints deterring demand 
for education. On one hand, in Table 24 and Table 25, one seems to find no clear 
significant evidence of education at the primary level being perceived as an investment. 
The coefficient of expected returns to education is negative in the estimation of the 
complete empirical model for demand, in columns 5 and 6 of both tables, and non-
significant in the IV Probit estimation68. In both cases, the estimated marginal effects, 
presented in Table 25 are small. A child for whom the expected returns to education 
were to be above in one standard deviation, namely 0.6%, to what another otherwise 
equivalent child could expect, would be, on average, 1% to 3% less likely to attend 
primary education, bearing in mind that the last estimate is not statistically significant. 
A similar result, of an estimated negative sign of the effect of estimated returns to 
education on demand was also found in Kingdon and Theopold (2008) and attributed to 
                                                          
68 Notably, this result comes in contradiction to the one found in the analysis of demand for secondary 
school in Chapter 3. 
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liquidity constraints. In their study, the suggestion was that, in the face of liquidity 
constraints, a higher return to education can become a signal not of future earnings but 
of immediate current earnings for whatever level of education (above zero) has already 
been attained. Liquidity constraints and other reasons for households’ heightened 
preferences for the present (high risk aversion or reduced foresight) could, in theory and 
as found by Kingdon and Theopold (2008), reverse the otherwise expected relation 
between returns to education and demand. In another study, Nakajima and Nakamura 
(2012) find in Japan that increased returns to primary education can have dual results. If 
lower returns on primary education may mean that poorer parents, less educated, have 
lower capacity to invest in the furthering of their children’s education, a high return can 
signal an opportunity cost in progressing to post-primary education and an incentive to 
end education sooner. The hypothesis suggested in their studies presents a possible path 
for further investigation and is reinforced if one considers the coefficients of the 
indicators of credit worthiness (number of cows owned) and credit constraints (having a 
loan denied by the household), which are both significant and with the theoretically 
expected signs. An understanding of the estimates found for the coefficient of expected 
returns to education may also come from the insights of Dominitz and Manski (1994), 
Manski (2004, 1993) and Manski and Wise (1983). As the distance to the formal labour 
market that generated the estimates of the expected returns to education, as per Chapter 
1, is significant among primary school aged children, the likelihood of the estimates to 
be accurate indicators of real returns to primary school education (and, more so, that 
parents are aware of those returns) is less likely. This appears to be reinforced by the 
estimates of the coefficient of expected returns to education in relation to the demand 
for secondary education in Chapter 3, which signalled the expected positive correlation. 
If so, there is also a possibility of a spurious correlation that, at the moment, cannot be 
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ruled out. A pathway to overcome this would be to require the elicitation of households’ 
expectations of returns to education, as recommended by Charles Manski. 
Linked with this distance from the labour market comes a final factor that should be 
considered. As Lewin (2005) and Kingdon and Theopold (2008) suggest, there is a 
further link mediating primary education and the labour market. This is also suggested 
in the study of post-conflict returns to education in Timor-Leste (Chapter 1) that finds 
the average level of education of a waged worker in Timor in 2007 to be 11 years, i.e. 
almost full completion of secondary school. This means that the access to formal 
employment for anyone currently attending primary school is very likely to be mediated 
by the attendance of secondary school. That being the case, the likelihood of attending 
secondary school and the expected returns to secondary education would also be factors 
under consideration by households. All these paths for future research should be 
considered to fully disentangle this unexpected result. 
An analysis of the marginal effects of the conflict indicator in Table 25 may assist in 
shedding some light on the puzzling reversal of sign from one estimation approach to 
the other. A direct reading of the coefficient suggests that the IV Probit approach 
indicates a relatively higher positive marginal effect of conflict. According to these 
estimates, a child that witnessed in her life a level of killings above in one standard 
deviation, 6.8 more killings per year, than another otherwise equivalent child, would be, 
on average, 30% more likely to attend primary education, if the IV Probit regression 
were to hold. Meanwhile she would be 3% less likely, if endogeneity was not present 
and the Probit regression were to provide unbiased estimates. The low estimate under 
the Probit estimation - together with the suggestion of over-estimation of negative 
impacts - suggests that sign reversion is not totally implausible. However, a suggestion 
of caution comes from noticing that, once again, the estimated IV Probit standard 
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deviations are also much higher, suggesting, again, lower efficiency. These indications 
leave, therefore, a suggestion of cautious analysis and the need for further testing of the 
robustness of the results. 
A robustness analysis is suggested by the indicated lateness of entry into primary 
school, as reported in Table 16. Table 52, in the appendix, shows the estimates of 
medium run effects of conflict considering different age cohorts to account for later 
entry. When the age of entrance is assumed to be 7, the Probit estimate shows itself not 
to be significant and the IV estimate’s significance is weaker. The latter is still positive, 
however. If we were to assume age of entrance to be 8 years old, neither Probit nor the 
IV Probit estimates are significant. There is, therefore, further indication of lack of 
robustness of the estimates of medium run impact of conflict. 
To further enquire into the robustness of the empirical results, the study looked into the 
decomposition of the sample according to gender and urban/rural residence. As there 
are some differences in the average attendance of children along these divisions, as 
discussed in section 4, it also allows some assessment of other possible indirect effects 
of conflict, namely via income; expected returns to education; and perceptions of access 
to and quality of education. These were all, as discussed above, demonstrably affected 
by conflict in other settings. 
Table 26: Primary Education Demand – Marginal Effects - Conflict 1: Average killings during life of the child - 
Decomposition by Gender 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Sample Girls Boys 
 Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Explained variable = Probability of child, between ages 6 and 14, to have attended school in the 2004/05 school year 
Conflict 1: Average 
killings during life 
-0.006*** 0.044** -0.006** -0.159*** -0.005** -0.559 
(0.002) (0.019) (0.003) (0.058) (0.002) (0.367) 
Female -0.031* -0.032** . . . . 
 (0.016) (0.016) . . . . 
Age 0.666*** 0.252 0.709*** 1.959*** 0.605*** 5.154* 
 (0.025) (0.158) (0.037) (0.482) (0.036) (3.019) 
Age2 -0.029*** -0.011 -0.032*** -0.088*** -0.026*** -0.231* 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.022) (0.002) (0.136) 
Urban -0.148*** -0.139*** -0.132*** -0.155*** -0.162*** -0.246*** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.032) (0.034) (0.036) (0.081) 
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Table 26: Primary Education Demand – Marginal Effects - Conflict 1: Average killings during life of the child - 
Decomposition by Gender (cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Sample Girls Boys 
 Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Explained variable = Probability of child, between ages 6 and 14, to have attended school in the 2004/05 school year 
Father Attended School -0.027 -0.030 0.060 0.064 -0.090 -0.070 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.065) (0.065) (0.063) (0.064) 
Mother Attended School 0.031 0.056 0.017 -0.052 0.028 -0.229 
 (0.059) (0.060) (0.081) (0.086) (0.079) (0.187) 
Migrated -0.063* -0.122*** -0.047 0.131 -0.084 0.583 
 (0.037) (0.039) (0.054) (0.081) (0.052) (0.441) 
First Child 0.003 0.007 0.020 0.009 -0.018 -0.057 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.039) 
Adopted -0.028 -0.008 -0.002 -0.065 -0.039 -0.275 
 (0.061) (0.060) (0.068) (0.072) (0.078) (0.174) 
Niece/Nephew 0.024 0.019 0.117** 0.135** -0.056 0.003 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.053) (0.055) (0.047) (0.061) 
Ln (Household Size) 0.124*** 0.115*** 0.077* 0.107** 0.178*** 0.284*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.041) (0.043) (0.041) (0.083) 
Share of boys 0-1 0.324** 0.344** 0.398* 0.329 0.196 -0.039 
 (0.143) (0.144) (0.211) (0.215) (0.171) (0.227) 
Share of boys 2-4 0.423*** 0.387*** 0.383*** 0.494*** 0.479*** 0.908*** 
 (0.102) (0.104) (0.145) (0.153) (0.134) (0.308) 
Share of boys 5-9 0.157* 0.059 0.172 0.485*** 0.185* 1.268* 
 (0.084) (0.091) (0.121) (0.165) (0.102) (0.738) 
Share of boys 10-14 0.063 0.079 0.105 0.058 0.030 -0.109 
 (0.084) (0.084) (0.119) (0.120) (0.109) (0.143) 
Share of men above 65 -0.036 -0.102 -0.071 0.128 -0.025 0.706 
 (0.182) (0.186) (0.227) (0.245) (0.279) (0.550) 
Share of girls 0-1 0.251* 0.138 0.315 0.692*** 0.189 1.503* 
 (0.148) (0.157) (0.216) (0.261) (0.187) (0.899) 
Share of girls 2-4 0.165 0.184* 0.197 0.146 0.130 -0.078 
 (0.109) (0.109) (0.153) (0.154) (0.139) (0.199) 
Share of girls 5-9 0.298*** 0.225*** 0.281** 0.498*** 0.303*** 1.113** 
 (0.081) (0.087) (0.112) (0.142) (0.113) (0.544) 
Share of girls 10-14 0.005 0.013 0.129 0.127 -0.174 -0.226* 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.112) (0.112) (0.124) (0.129) 
Share of women above 
65 
0.160 0.105 0.130 0.298 0.215 0.862* 
(0.165) (0.167) (0.226) (0.236) (0.208) (0.471) 
Completed Years of 
Education 
-0.016** -0.011 -0.010 -0.029** -0.022** -0.089** 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.045) 
E(Returns to Education) -4.764*** -2.236 -3.782* -11.941*** -6.241** -35.253* 
 (1.764) (2.038) (2.083) (3.799) (2.792) (19.392) 
Average local wage -0.049 -0.037 -0.064 -0.097 -0.027 -0.141 
 (0.042) (0.044) (0.063) (0.065) (0.055) (0.101) 
Number of cows owned 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011** 0.008 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Household had a loan 
denied 
-0.071* -0.073* -0.149** -0.140** -0.025 0.002 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.066) (0.065) (0.054) (0.055) 
E (Per capita Monthly 
Household Income) 
0.015*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.032*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.011) 
Average local education 
costs 
-0.002** -0.002** -0.001 -0.002* -0.002 -0.002** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Average local subsidies 
to education 
0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.003 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Average time to primary 
school 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.002** -0.000 -0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Insufficient Access -1.747*** -1.759*** -1.733*** -1.690*** -1.640*** -1.626*** 
 (0.400) (0.406) (0.570) (0.577) (0.532) (0.529) 
Insufficient Quality -9.625*** -10.025*** -9.049*** -7.660** -9.507*** -4.481** 
 (2.289) (2.309) (2.936) (2.983) (3.557) (1.875) 
Insufficient Security -3.029 -3.437 -5.848 -4.478 0.214 5.967 
 (2.957) (2.995) (3.898) (3.925) (4.274) (5.803) 
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethno-linguistic fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 6022 6022 2937 2937 3081 3081 
Statistics from the underlying regressions 
Pseudo R2 0.3085 0.3069 0.2998 0.2981 0.3357 0.3346 
Log-Likelihood -121425.639 -121698.394 -60723.699 -60866.886 -58986.322 -59087.142 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Source: author’s calculations on data from TLSLS (2007) and CAVR (2006) 
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The analysis of Table 26 and Table 27suggest that medium-run direct after effects of 
conflict, beyond eventual effects through channels such as the household’s income or 
school quality, may not be robust. Table 26 below shows estimates of marginal effects 
for the sub-samples of girls and boys. While the Probit estimates remain relatively 
robust, the IV Probit estimate of marginal effects for boys (in column 6) is larger than 
for the full sample but statistically insignificant and the one for girls (in column 4) is 
now negative, while statistically significant. More important, as it can be seen in Table 
53, in the appendix, the test of endogeneity, as per Wooldridge (2010:587), does not 
reject exogeneity in either case. Therefore, no inference from the instrumental variables 
regressions on girls and boys is, indeed, valid. The results found when decomposing the 
sample based on gender, therefore, further suggest a lack of robustness of the 
instrumental variable estimates. This result suggests particular caution in any 
affirmation regarding effects of conflict beyond those that may have been generated 
through the channels of income, expected returns to education or perceived quality of 
education. 
In Table 27 we can see that estimates of the coefficient of the conflict indicator are 
either statistically insignificant or indicate small effects (a 5% reduction in probability 
of attendance for a one standard deviation increase of the average number of killings 
above the average in rural areas and under the Probit estimation, as in column 5). Added 
to this evidence, it can be seen in Table 54 that, although the first stage regressions 
suggest that distance to the border is a strong instrument, exogeneity can only be 
(weakly) rejected in the urban subsample, following Wooldridge (2010:587). The 
empirical evidence, therefore, suggests evermore caution regarding the robustness of 
any inference on medium-run impacts of conflict on demand for primary education. 
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Table 27: Primary Education Demand – Marginal Effects - Conflict 1: Average killings during life of the child - 
Decomposition Urban / Rural 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Sample Urban Rural 
 Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Explained variable = Probability of child, between ages 6 and 14, to have attended school in the 2004/05 school year 
Conflict 1: Average 
killings during life 
-0.006*** 0.044** -0.002 0.059 -0.007*** -0.186 
(0.002) (0.019) (0.003) (0.036) (0.002) (0.276) 
Female -0.031* -0.032** -0.074*** -0.076*** -0.021 -0.017 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.025) (0.019) (0.019) 
Age 0.666*** 0.252 0.716*** 0.211 0.658*** 2.131 
 (0.025) (0.158) (0.037) (0.300) (0.031) (2.273) 
Age2 -0.029*** -0.011 -0.034*** -0.011 -0.028*** -0.095 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.103) 
Urban -0.148*** -0.139*** . . . . 
 (0.024) (0.025) . . . . 
Father Attended School -0.027 -0.030 -0.078 -0.081 0.040 0.047 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.060) (0.060) (0.057) (0.058) 
Mother Attended School 0.031 0.056 0.011 0.038 -0.032 -0.111 
 (0.059) (0.060) (0.083) (0.084) (0.074) (0.150) 
Migrated -0.063* -0.122*** -0.063 -0.136** -0.016 0.201 
 (0.037) (0.039) (0.040) (0.054) (0.059) (0.336) 
First Child 0.003 0.007 0.045 0.050 -0.018 -0.031 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.032) (0.032) (0.022) (0.030) 
Adopted -0.028 -0.008 -0.170* -0.144 0.003 -0.075 
 (0.061) (0.060) (0.088) (0.089) (0.064) (0.134) 
Niece/Nephew 0.024 0.019 0.085* 0.079 -0.000 0.017 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.058) 
Ln (Household Size) 0.124*** 0.115*** 0.135*** 0.124*** 0.106*** 0.141** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.044) (0.045) (0.038) (0.066) 
Share of boys 0-1 0.324** 0.344** 0.237 0.264 0.362** 0.283 
 (0.143) (0.144) (0.212) (0.212) (0.172) (0.205) 
Share of boys 2-4 0.423*** 0.387*** 0.506*** 0.460*** 0.391*** 0.529** 
 (0.102) (0.104) (0.155) (0.158) (0.123) (0.240) 
Share of boys 5-9 0.157* 0.059 0.233* 0.112 0.142 0.494 
 (0.084) (0.091) (0.133) (0.151) (0.098) (0.551) 
Share of boys 10-14 0.063 0.079 -0.188 -0.171 0.086 0.042 
 (0.084) (0.084) (0.121) (0.122) (0.100) (0.123) 
Share of men above 65 -0.036 -0.102 0.152 0.080 -0.062 0.170 
 (0.182) (0.186) (0.264) (0.271) (0.213) (0.426) 
Share of girls 0-1 0.251* 0.138 0.234 0.087 0.285 0.722 
 (0.148) (0.157) (0.235) (0.254) (0.175) (0.693) 
Share of girls 2-4 0.165 0.184* -0.256 -0.235 0.267** 0.204 
 (0.109) (0.109) (0.178) (0.179) (0.127) (0.158) 
Share of girls 5-9 0.298*** 0.225*** 0.189 0.101 0.339*** 0.598 
 (0.081) (0.087) (0.124) (0.136) (0.097) (0.416) 
Share of girls 10-14 0.005 0.013 0.144 0.150 -0.052 -0.063 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.119) (0.119) (0.099) (0.101) 
Share of women above 
65 
0.160 0.105 0.622** 0.550** 0.057 0.265 
(0.165) (0.167) (0.259) (0.261) (0.197) (0.368) 
Completed Years of 
Education 
-0.016** -0.011 -0.014 -0.007 -0.008 -0.031 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.035) 
E(Returns to Education) -4.764*** -2.236 -5.972** -2.746 -4.157** -13.693 
 (1.764) (2.038) (2.533) (3.274) (1.923) (14.599) 
Average local wage -0.049 -0.037 0.002 0.014 -0.099 -0.133 
 (0.042) (0.044) (0.041) (0.043) (0.065) (0.086) 
Number of cows owned 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.007* 0.007* 0.010** 0.009* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Household had a loan 
denied 
-0.071* -0.073* -0.056 -0.057 -0.069 -0.062 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.065) (0.065) (0.049) (0.050) 
E (Per capita Monthly 
Household Income) 
0.015*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.019** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) 
Average local education 
costs 
-0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.001 -0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Average local subsidies 
to education 
0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Average time to primary 
school 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
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Table 27: Primary Education Demand – Marginal Effects - Conflict 1: Average killings during life of the child - 
Decomposition Urban / Rural (cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Sample Urban Rural 
 Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Explained variable = Probability of child, between ages 6 and 14, to have attended school in the 2004/05 school year 
Insufficient Access -1.747*** -1.759*** -1.216 -2.395 -0.814 23.085 
 (0.400) (0.406) (2.087) (2.133) (0.745) (36.913) 
Insufficient Quality -9.625*** -10.025*** 1.818 10.371* 2.668 27.906 
 (2.289) (2.309) (2.021) (5.532) (2.757) (38.928) 
Insufficient Security -3.029 -3.437 -7.056 32.370 -28.467 -436.889 
 (2.957) (2.995) (11.584) (26.851) (44.536) (629.256) 
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethno-linguistic fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 6022 6022 2787 2787 3233 3233 
Statistics from the underlying regressions 
Pseudo R2 0.3085 0.3069 0.2853 0.2851 0.3373 0.3353 
Log-Likelihood -121425.639 -121698.394 -29587.407 -29595.949 -88364.268 -88633.030 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Source: author’s calculations on data from TLSLS (2007) and CAVR (2006) 
 
Finally, robustness tests were conducted to an underlying hypothesis behind the choice 
of conflict indicator: the location where violence was experienced. Relying on the very 
low internal migration rate observed in Timor (as referred to in section 4 above), the 
assumption was that the levels of violence reported in the district of birth of the child 
and during her life were, in fact, actually witnessed by the household. That would not be 
the case for those that migrated out of the district during the years of the conflict and 
were, therefore, somewhere else, experiencing different levels of violence. A robustness 
test is, then, running the estimation for non-migrants only, as shown in Table 28.  
Table 28: Primary Education Demand - Conflict 1: Average killings during life of the child - Robustness to migration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Baseline model Non-Migrants 
 Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Conflict 1: Average killings 
during life 
-0.023*** 0.166** -0.023*** -0.764* 
(0.007) (0.071) (0.007) (0.461) 
N 6022 6022 5822 5822 
Log-Likelihood -121425.639 -121698.394 -117481.805 -117726.589 
 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Note: Coefficients of the conflict variables were estimated with the remaining covariates of the 
study’s standard models. Source: author’s calculations on data from TLSLS (2007) and CAVR (2006) 
 
While the Probit estimate shows to be robust to this change, but still small, the IV Probit 
coefficient is now negative and weakly significant. It is important to notice that 
although testing for robustness of the indicator, this test induces a type of selection bias. 
Those that migrated out of the districts may, themselves, have particular, non-random, 
preferences. In particular, migrants tend to be more forward looking and investment 
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prone. Adding to this is the fact that, according to the 2010 Census (National Statistics 
Directorate and UNFPA, 2011), education is one of the main reasons for migration. 
Nonetheless, this test adds further suggestions of lack of robustness of the IV Probit 
coefficient for the impact of conflict, using the indicator of violence as a continuum. 
In summary, there is a plausible suggestion of overestimation of the Probit coefficient of 
the medium-run impact of conflict and, for the full sample, an indication of a possible 
positive effect on post-conflict preferences for primary education beyond what can 
possibly be attributed to indirect effects. This indication, however, does not appear to be 
robust. 
There is, however, some other relevant empirical evidence that this study allows us to 
highlight, regarding drivers of post-conflict demand for primary education in the case of 
Timor. An analysis of the decompositions in Table 26 and Table 27 reveal that, as 
suggested by the descriptive statistics, an older child is more likely to attend primary 
school than a younger child, with a correction with age. This correlation holds for all 
subsamples, as shown in both tables, although it is not significant in some of the IV 
Probit regressions. The urban correction factor, suggested in the full sample holds for 
both girls and boys, as per Table 26. The migration of children only seems to have 
penalized those that migrated to urban areas, when compared to those that were original 
residents69. The support of a larger household and the presence of younger children of 
close ages seem to correlate with higher school attendance for boys and girls, both 
residing in urban or rural settings. 
An analysis of possible channels of indirect effects of conflict also shows important 
insights. The negative partial correlation between returns to education and school 
                                                          
69 This may suggest some degree of discrimination against them or lack of social support networks to 
them or their households. 
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attendance seems to hold for all subsamples. The same happens with the positive partial 
correlation between a higher household income and demand for primary education. 
Finally, effects of perceptions of access to school and school quality only seem to hold 
in the gender decomposition, while not holding in the urban/rural one. These are 
potential channels through which the experience of conflict may have affected post-
conflict demand for primary education. Other effects, beyond these and using the first 
conflict indicator, while suggesting some higher preference for primary education of 
those more affected by conflict (but lower of girls) did not show to be robust. 
An analysis of the second indicator of conflict reinforces this conjecture. 
5.2 Experience of violent shock during the life of the child 
As in the case of the previous indicator of conflict, the effect of the Timorese conflict 
using the experience of a violent shock during the life of the child was estimated using 
Probit and IV Probit regressions. 
Table 29: Primary Education Demand - Standard Models with Conflict 2: Extreme Killings Shock 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Individual, Household & 
Local 
+ Education as Investment Standard Model 
 Probit  IV Probit Probit  IV Probit Probit  IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Explained variable = Probability of child, between ages 6 and 14, to have attended school in the 2004/05 school year 
Constant -
11.941*** 
-6.993*** -12.306*** 4.315 -12.226*** -4.362 
 (0.514) (1.728) (0.525) (3.735) (0.737) (3.147) 
Conflict 2: Shock of 
extreme violence during life 
-0.314*** 2.972*** -0.358*** 10.285*** -0.402*** 4.260** 
(0.109) (1.103) (0.110) (2.388) (0.112) (1.831) 
Female -0.129** -0.159*** -0.136** -0.222*** -0.115* -0.155** 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.062) (0.060) (0.062) 
Age 2.242*** 1.324*** 2.373*** -0.903 2.446*** 0.998* 
 (0.093) (0.322) (0.102) (0.739) (0.104) (0.574) 
Age2 -0.098*** -0.059*** -0.105*** 0.039 -0.107*** -0.044* 
 (0.004) (0.014) (0.005) (0.033) (0.005) (0.025) 
Urban -0.055 -0.020 -0.041 0.043 -0.561*** -0.488*** 
 (0.065) (0.067) (0.065) (0.069) (0.094) (0.100) 
Father Attended School 0.034 0.086 0.050 0.201 -0.112 -0.017 
 (0.184) (0.183) (0.186) (0.183) (0.176) (0.176) 
Mother Attended School 0.282 0.306 0.296 0.314 0.124 0.164 
 (0.256) (0.250) (0.246) (0.241) (0.224) (0.223) 
Migrated -0.019 -0.604** -0.048 -1.952*** -0.195 -0.987*** 
 (0.148) (0.244) (0.138) (0.446) (0.139) (0.317) 
First Child 0.047 0.059 0.051 0.047 0.012 0.018 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) (0.071) (0.071) 
Adopted -0.110 0.035 -0.087 0.356 -0.114 0.093 
 (0.245) (0.243) (0.242) (0.251) (0.229) (0.238) 
Niece/Nephew 0.197 0.119 0.178 -0.127 0.099 -0.021 
 (0.143) (0.144) (0.137) (0.156) (0.140) (0.150) 
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Table 29: Primary Education Demand - Standard Models with Conflict 2: Extreme Killings Shock (cont) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Individual, Household & Local + Education as Investment Standard Model 
 Probit  IV Probit Probit  IV Probit Probit  IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Explained variable = Probability of child, between ages 6 and 14, to have attended school in the 2004/05 school year 
Ln (Household Size) 0.080 0.121 0.048 0.149* 0.467*** 0.445*** 
 (0.089) (0.089) (0.088) (0.089) (0.112) (0.112) 
Share of boys 0-1 0.388 0.401 0.437 0.705 1.242** 1.218** 
 (0.531) (0.534) (0.532) (0.534) (0.543) (0.542) 
Share of boys 2-4 0.809** 0.775** 0.965** 0.868** 1.599*** 1.415*** 
 (0.388) (0.388) (0.384) (0.382) (0.387) (0.394) 
Share of boys 5-9 0.217 -0.051 0.290 -0.639* 0.584* 0.118 
 (0.298) (0.311) (0.300) (0.351) (0.318) (0.361) 
Share of boys 10-14 -0.296 -0.410 -0.194 -0.588* 0.261 0.015 
 (0.307) (0.309) (0.305) (0.311) (0.316) (0.339) 
Share of men above 65 -0.689 -0.783 -0.671 -0.892 -0.148 -0.324 
 (0.680) (0.690) (0.672) (0.686) (0.683) (0.696) 
Share of girls 0-1 0.204 -0.457 0.298 -1.681** 0.971* -0.024 
 (0.541) (0.587) (0.539) (0.697) (0.559) (0.702) 
Share of girls 2-4 0.322 0.418 0.387 0.827** 0.622 0.753* 
 (0.407) (0.419) (0.402) (0.421) (0.411) (0.416) 
Share of girls 5-9 0.827*** 0.685** 0.824*** 0.286 1.115*** 0.815** 
 (0.304) (0.307) (0.302) (0.325) (0.307) (0.334) 
Share of girls 10-14 -0.174 -0.293 -0.102 -0.617* 0.041 -0.214 
 (0.309) (0.310) (0.306) (0.319) (0.312) (0.335) 
Share of women above 65 0.648 0.641 0.672 0.686 0.594 0.583 
 (0.664) (0.658) (0.639) (0.631) (0.626) (0.623) 
Completed Years of 
Education 
  -0.008 0.099*** -0.064*** -0.009 
  (0.023) (0.034) (0.024) (0.035) 
E(Returns to Education)   -15.856** 41.757*** -18.880*** 6.493 
   (6.991) (14.738) (6.828) (12.359) 
Average local wage   0.115 0.071 -0.187 -0.149 
   (0.159) (0.156) (0.157) (0.164) 
Number of cows owned   0.059*** 0.069*** 0.037*** 0.045*** 
   (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Household had a loan denied   -0.525*** -0.273 -0.279* -0.200 
   (0.162) (0.166) (0.162) (0.163) 
E (Per capita Monthly 
Household Income) 
    0.055*** 0.046*** 
    (0.009) (0.010) 
Average local education 
costs 
    -0.006** -0.007*** 
     (0.003) (0.002) 
Average local subsidies to 
education 
    0.000 0.004 
    (0.008) (0.007) 
Average time to primary 
school 
    -0.003 -0.002 
    (0.002) (0.002) 
Insufficient Access     -6.686*** -6.145*** 
     (1.515) (1.580) 
Insufficient Quality     -36.337*** -40.529*** 
     (8.617) (8.705) 
Insufficient Security     -12.039 -14.527 
     (11.104) (11.319) 
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethno-linguistic fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 6031 6022 6031 6022 6022 6022 
r2 0.2848 0.2873 0.2957 0.2981 0.3092 0.3069 
Ll -125714.202 -125137.403 -123800.885 -123247.845 -121308.848 -121698.394 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Source: author’s calculations on data from TLSLS (2007) and CAVR (2006) 
 
As before, the IV approach, using distance to the border as an instrument, found 
empirical evidence that this instrument was a significant and strong regressor, as per the 
Sargan test, and the exclusion restriction test rejected the null of exogeneity, following 
the procedure presented in Wooldridge (2010:587). The robustness of the coefficient of 
122 
 
impact was also tested through the stepwise addition of correlates of demand for 
education theoretically and empirically established in other settings, as it can be seen in 
Table 29, Table 30 and Table 55 (this latter one in the appendix). Not only the 
coefficients remain significant, the duality of sign found with the previous indicator 
reveals itself again. 
Table 30: Primary Education Demand – Marginal Effects - Standard Models with Conflict 2: Extreme Killings Shock 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Individual, Household & 
Local 
+ Education as Investment Standard Model 
 Probit  IV Probit Probit  IV Probit Probit  IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Explained variable = Probability of child, between ages 6 and 14, to have attended school in the 2004/05 school year 
Conflict 2: Shock of extreme 
violence during life 
-0.086*** 0.813*** -0.097*** 2.768*** -0.106*** 1.131** 
(0.030) (0.300) (0.030) (0.635) (0.029) (0.484) 
Female -0.035** -0.043*** -0.037** -0.060*** -0.030* -0.041** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Age 0.614*** 0.362*** 0.640*** -0.243 0.647*** 0.265* 
 (0.020) (0.088) (0.022) (0.199) (0.022) (0.152) 
Age2 -0.027*** -0.016*** -0.028*** 0.010 -0.028*** -0.012* 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.007) 
Urban -0.015 -0.005 -0.011 0.011 -0.148*** -0.129*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.026) 
Father Attended School 0.009 0.023 0.013 0.054 -0.030 -0.004 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.046) (0.047) 
Mother Attended School 0.077 0.084 0.080 0.084 0.033 0.043 
 (0.070) (0.068) (0.066) (0.065) (0.059) (0.059) 
Migrated -0.005 -0.165** -0.013 -0.525*** -0.052 -0.262*** 
 (0.040) (0.066) (0.037) (0.119) (0.037) (0.084) 
First Child 0.013 0.016 0.014 0.013 0.003 0.005 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Adopted -0.030 0.010 -0.023 0.096 -0.030 0.025 
 (0.067) (0.066) (0.065) (0.067) (0.060) (0.063) 
Niece/Nephew 0.054 0.032 0.048 -0.034 0.026 -0.006 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.037) (0.042) (0.037) (0.040) 
Ln (Household Size) 0.022 0.033 0.013 0.040* 0.123*** 0.118*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.029) (0.030) 
Share of boys 0-1 0.106 0.110 0.118 0.190 0.328** 0.323** 
 (0.145) (0.146) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) 
Share of boys 2-4 0.221** 0.212** 0.260** 0.234** 0.423*** 0.376*** 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.103) (0.103) (0.102) (0.105) 
Share of boys 5-9 0.059 -0.014 0.078 -0.172* 0.154* 0.031 
 (0.082) (0.085) (0.081) (0.094) (0.084) (0.096) 
Share of boys 10-14 -0.081 -0.112 -0.052 -0.158* 0.069 0.004 
 (0.084) (0.085) (0.082) (0.084) (0.084) (0.090) 
Share of men above 65 -0.189 -0.214 -0.181 -0.240 -0.039 -0.086 
 (0.186) (0.189) (0.181) (0.185) (0.181) (0.185) 
Share of girls 0-1 0.056 -0.125 0.080 -0.453** 0.257* -0.006 
 (0.148) (0.160) (0.145) (0.187) (0.148) (0.186) 
Share of girls 2-4 0.088 0.114 0.104 0.223** 0.164 0.200* 
 (0.111) (0.114) (0.108) (0.113) (0.108) (0.110) 
Share of girls 5-9 0.226*** 0.187** 0.222*** 0.077 0.295*** 0.216** 
 (0.083) (0.084) (0.081) (0.087) (0.081) (0.089) 
Share of girls 10-14 -0.048 -0.080 -0.028 -0.166* 0.011 -0.057 
 (0.085) (0.085) (0.082) (0.086) (0.082) (0.089) 
Share of women above 65 0.177 0.175 0.181 0.185 0.157 0.155 
 (0.182) (0.180) (0.172) (0.170) (0.165) (0.165) 
Completed Years of 
Education 
  -0.002 0.027*** -0.017*** -0.002 
  (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) 
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Table 30: Primary Education Demand – Marginal Effects - Standard Models with Conflict 2: Extreme Killings Shock 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Individual, Household & 
Local 
+ Education as Investment Standard Model 
 Probit  IV Probit Probit  IV Probit Probit  IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Explained variable = Probability of child, between ages 6 and 14, to have attended school in the 2004/05 school year 
E(Returns to Education)   -4.275** 11.238*** -4.989*** 1.724 
   (1.878) (3.948) (1.797) (3.280) 
Average local wage   0.031 0.019 -0.050 -0.040 
   (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) 
Number of cows owned   0.016*** 0.018*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Household had a loan denied   -0.142*** -0.073 -0.074* -0.053 
   (0.044) (0.045) (0.043) (0.043) 
E (Per capita Monthly 
Household Income) 
    0.015*** 0.012*** 
    (0.002) (0.003) 
Average local education costs     -0.002** -0.002*** 
     (0.001) (0.001) 
Average local subsidies to 
education 
    0.000 0.001 
    (0.002) (0.002) 
Average time to primary 
school 
    -0.001 -0.001 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Insufficient Access     -1.767*** -1.631*** 
     (0.400) (0.419) 
Insufficient Quality     -9.603*** -10.758*** 
     (2.270) (2.300) 
Insufficient Security     -3.182 -3.856 
     (2.932) (3.000) 
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethno-linguistic fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 6031 6022 6031 6022 6022 6022 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Source: author’s calculations on data from TLSLS (2007) and CAVR (2006) 
 
Although the indication of a shock would suggest reading the marginal effect result 
directly, the values would be misleading. Again, although counter-intuitively, it is more 
meaningful to translate the impact of a one standard deviation equivalent change in the 
(let us call it for the sake of the interpretation) probability of having experienced the 
violent 1999 post-referendum shock. In this case, such an increase (of 40%) translates 
into a probability of such a child having attended primary education in 2004/05 lower, 
on average, in 4% if considering the (likely to be overestimated) Probit estimate, or 
higher in 45% if considering the IV Probit estimate. Again, such a high potential 
correction of the coefficient, together with much higher standard deviations, suggests 
the need to control for its robustness. A further robustness test was added in this case. 
The analysis was to test the effects of extreme shocks of violence, defined as the 
experience of at least a year when the number of killings and disappearances reported in 
the district of birth exceeded the yearly average for all districts throughout the 25 years 
of Indonesian occupation in two standard deviations. In Table 31, below, the values of 
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the coefficients result from a complete empirical model with the threshold defined, with 
alternatives of one and three standard deviations in excess of the average. The signs and 
statistical significance of the coefficients, both in the Probit and IV Probit estimations 
hold, despite, again, of higher standard deviations, indicators of lower efficiency of the 
latter estimations. 
Table 31: Primary Education Demand - robustness threshold of extreme violence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Threshold = +1 Standard Dev. Baseline Threshold = +3 Standard Dev. 
 Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Conflict 2: Shock of 
extreme violence during 
life 
-0.568*** 1.649** -0.402*** 4.260** -0.402*** 4.260** 
(0.097) (0.709) (0.112) (1.831) (0.112) (1.831) 
N 6022 6022 6022 6022 6022 6022 
Log-Likelihood -120627.692 -121698.393 -121308.848 -121698.394 -121308.848 -121698.394 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Note: Coefficients of the conflict variables were estimated with the remaining covariates of the 
study’s standard models. Source: author’s calculations on data from TLSLS (2007) and CAVR (2006) 
Following a robustness test strategy similar to the one explored above, the lateness of 
entry into primary school can be explored. Table 56, in the appendix, shows the 
estimates of medium run effects of conflict considering different age cohorts to account 
for later entry. When the age of entrance is assumed to be higher than 6, neither the 
Probit nor the IV Probit estimates are significant, reinforcing, therefore, the indication 
of a lack of robustness of the estimates of medium run impact of conflict. 
The same can be read from the estimates in Table 32 and Table 33 and the first stage 
tests for the IV regressions in Table 57 and Table 58. As it can be seen, the IV Probit 
estimates do not show themselves to be robust to the decomposition. In fact, although 
distance to the border is shown to be a strong regressor of the conflict indicator, 
exogeneity cannot be rejected and the IV estimates for girls and boys cannot be used in 
inference. Therefore, an equally negative and significant IV Probit coefficient of the 
conflict indicator, found in the regression on the subsample of girls, fails to be valid for 
inference. The IV estimates for Rural and Urban subsamples are also not valid for 
inference for, as it can be seen in Table 58, the Wooldridge test of significance of the 
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residual does not allow us to reject the exogeneity of the experience of conflict to 
unknown drivers of demand for education, using distance to the border as an instrument. 
A robustness test performed in the location where violence was experienced, as 
presented in Table 3470, gives the same indication. 
On the other hand, the empirical results regarding structural drivers of demand for 
primary education in the empirical models that incorporate the experience of the 1999 
post-referendum violent shock hold with the same signs and significance as reported in 
the case of the use of average killings during the life of the child as a proxy of conflict. 
Table 32: Primary Education Demand– Marginal Effects - Conflict 2: Shock of extreme violence during life of child - 
Decomposition by Gender 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Sample Girls Boys 
 Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Explained variable = Probability of child, between ages 6 and 14, to have attended school in the 2004/05 school year 
Conflict 2: Shock of 
extreme violence 
during life 
-0.106*** 1.131** -0.116*** -1.817*** -0.083** -0.131 
(0.029) (0.484) (0.043) (0.668) (0.041) (2.669) 
Female -0.030* -0.041** . . . . 
 (0.016) (0.016) . . . . 
Age 0.647*** 0.265* 0.689*** 1.216*** 0.588*** 0.601 
 (0.022) (0.152) (0.032) (0.211) (0.032) (0.826) 
Age2 -0.028*** -0.012* -0.031*** -0.054*** -0.025*** -0.026 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.036) 
Urban -0.148*** -0.129*** -0.133*** -0.157*** -0.162*** -0.162*** 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.032) (0.035) (0.036) (0.052) 
Father Attended School -0.030 -0.004 0.059 0.020 -0.093 -0.093 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.065) (0.067) (0.063) (0.084) 
Mother Attended School 0.033 0.043 0.019 0.009 0.029 0.029 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.082) (0.082) (0.080) (0.082) 
Migrated -0.052 -0.262*** -0.030 0.251** -0.078 -0.063 
 (0.037) (0.084) (0.055) (0.118) (0.051) (0.460) 
First Child 0.003 0.005 0.018 0.018 -0.017 -0.018 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Adopted -0.030 0.025 -0.005 -0.080 -0.040 -0.044 
 (0.060) (0.063) (0.068) (0.074) (0.079) (0.141) 
Niece/Nephew 0.026 -0.006 0.116** 0.164*** -0.052 -0.054 
 (0.037) (0.040) (0.053) (0.058) (0.047) (0.080) 
Ln (Household Size) 0.123*** 0.118*** 0.076* 0.084** 0.177*** 0.178*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) 
Share of boys 0-1 0.328** 0.323** 0.404* 0.400* 0.197 0.198 
 (0.143) (0.143) (0.212) (0.212) (0.171) (0.171) 
Share of boys 2-4 0.423*** 0.376*** 0.388*** 0.445*** 0.474*** 0.486*** 
 (0.102) (0.105) (0.145) (0.148) (0.134) (0.174) 
Share of boys 5-9 0.154* 0.031 0.178 0.358*** 0.179* 0.183 
 (0.084) (0.096) (0.121) (0.137) (0.103) (0.285) 
Share of boys 10-14 0.069 0.004 0.101 0.202 0.037 0.046 
 (0.084) (0.090) (0.119) (0.128) (0.109) (0.188) 
Share of men above 65 -0.039 -0.086 -0.076 -0.013 -0.027 -0.024 
 (0.181) (0.185) (0.225) (0.232) (0.279) (0.296) 
  
                                                          
70 The same caveat on the fact that this robustness test in itself generates a selection bias that may 
contribute to the result found. 
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Table 32: Primary Education Demand– Marginal Effects - Conflict 2: Shock of extreme violence during life of child - 
Decomposition by Gender (cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Sample Girls Boys 
 Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Explained variable = Probability of child, between ages 6 and 14, to have attended school in the 2004/05 school year 
Share of girls 0-1 0.257* -0.006 0.320 0.714*** 0.193 0.202 
 (0.148) (0.186) (0.216) (0.266) (0.186) (0.622) 
Share of girls 2-4 0.164 0.200* 0.201 0.152 0.126 0.125 
 (0.108) (0.110) (0.152) (0.154) (0.139) (0.162) 
Share of girls 5-9 0.295*** 0.216** 0.276** 0.385*** 0.302*** 0.311 
 (0.081) (0.089) (0.112) (0.121) (0.113) (0.198) 
Share of girls 10-14 0.011 -0.057 0.140 0.247** -0.173 -0.172 
 (0.082) (0.089) (0.112) (0.122) (0.124) (0.201) 
Share of women above 
65 
0.157 0.155 0.131 0.117 0.212 0.219 
(0.165) (0.165) (0.226) (0.225) (0.208) (0.207) 
Completed Years of 
Education 
-0.017*** -0.002 -0.010 -0.032*** -0.022** -0.023 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.034) 
E(Returns to Education) -4.989*** 1.724 -4.079* -13.700*** -6.341** -6.705 
 (1.797) (3.280) (2.145) (4.358) (2.813) (15.069) 
Average local wage -0.050 -0.040 -0.066 -0.076 -0.026 -0.026 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.062) (0.063) (0.055) (0.057) 
Number of cows owned 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.011** 0.009** 0.008 0.008 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Household had a loan 
denied 
-0.074* -0.053 -0.150** -0.177*** -0.029 -0.028 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.066) (0.065) (0.054) (0.068) 
E (Per capita Monthly 
Household Income) 
0.015*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) 
Average local education 
costs 
-0.002** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Average local subsidies 
to education 
0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.002 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Average time to primary 
school 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.002** -0.000 -0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Insufficient Access -1.767*** -1.631*** -1.744*** -1.903*** -1.665*** -1.687*** 
 (0.400) (0.419) (0.569) (0.591) (0.534) (0.573) 
Insufficient Quality -9.603*** -10.758*** -9.059*** -7.271** -9.472*** -9.367** 
 (2.270) (2.300) (2.930) (3.002) (3.532) (4.750) 
Insufficient Security -3.182 -3.856 -5.869 -4.677 -0.014 0.522 
 (2.932) (3.000) (3.883) (3.922) (4.239) (4.998) 
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethno-linguistic fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 6022 6022 2937 2937 3081 3081 
Statistics from the underlying regressions 
Pseudo R2 0.3092 0.3069 0.3007 0.2981 0.3360 0.3346 
Log-Likelihood -121308.848 -121698.394 -60645.659 -60866.886 -58963.061 -59087.143 
 
Table 33: Primary Education Demand – Marginal Effects - Conflict 2: Shock of extreme violence during life of child - 
Decomposition Urban / Rural 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Sample Urban Rural 
 Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Explained variable = Probability of child, between ages 6 and 14, to have attended school in the 2004/05 school year 
Conflict 2: Shock of 
extreme violence 
during life of child 
-0.106*** 1.131** -0.009 1.516 -0.159*** 10.092 
(0.029) (0.484) (0.048) (0.927) (0.035) (15.712) 
Female -0.030* -0.041** -0.075*** -0.089*** -0.021 -0.109 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.026) (0.019) (0.140) 
Age 0.647*** 0.265* 0.699*** 0.228 0.655*** -2.523 
 (0.022) (0.152) (0.029) (0.290) (0.028) (4.860) 
Age2 -0.028*** -0.012* -0.033*** -0.012 -0.028*** 0.111 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.013) (0.001) (0.213) 
Urban -0.148*** -0.129*** . . . . 
 (0.024) (0.026) . . . . 
Father Attended School -0.030 -0.004 -0.079 -0.047 0.036 0.254 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.060) (0.063) (0.057) (0.338) 
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Table 33: Primary Education Demand – Marginal Effects - Conflict 2: Shock of extreme violence during life of child - 
Decomposition Urban / Rural (cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Sample Urban Rural 
 Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Explained variable = Probability of child, between ages 6 and 14, to have attended school in the 2004/05 school year 
Mother Attended School 0.033 0.043 0.011 0.021 -0.031 0.049 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.082) (0.083) (0.075) (0.136) 
Migrated -0.052 -0.262*** -0.063 -0.324** -0.027 -1.741 
 (0.037) (0.084) (0.042) (0.157) (0.059) (2.680) 
First Child 0.003 0.005 0.046 0.047 -0.019 -0.007 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.032) (0.032) (0.022) (0.028) 
Adopted -0.030 0.025 -0.170* -0.101 -0.002 0.459 
 (0.060) (0.063) (0.088) (0.097) (0.064) (0.711) 
Niece/Nephew 0.026 -0.006 0.085* 0.047 0.003 -0.260 
 (0.037) (0.040) (0.050) (0.056) (0.050) (0.403) 
Ln (Household Size) 0.123*** 0.118*** 0.135*** 0.128*** 0.104*** 0.060 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.044) (0.044) (0.037) (0.079) 
Share of boys 0-1 0.328** 0.323** 0.239 0.236 0.377** 0.343** 
 (0.143) (0.143) (0.212) (0.212) (0.172) (0.175) 
Share of boys 2-4 0.423*** 0.376*** 0.505*** 0.446*** 0.397*** -0.011 
 (0.102) (0.105) (0.155) (0.159) (0.123) (0.637) 
Share of boys 5-9 0.154* 0.031 0.229* 0.075 0.146 -0.895 
 (0.084) (0.096) (0.132) (0.163) (0.098) (1.596) 
Share of boys 10-14 0.069 0.004 -0.187 -0.272** 0.094 -0.477 
 (0.084) (0.090) (0.121) (0.133) (0.100) (0.888) 
Share of men above 65 -0.039 -0.086 0.156 0.101 -0.055 -0.449 
 (0.181) (0.185) (0.265) (0.269) (0.211) (0.617) 
Share of girls 0-1 0.257* -0.006 0.230 -0.106 0.294* -1.942 
 (0.148) (0.186) (0.235) (0.317) (0.174) (3.449) 
Share of girls 2-4 0.164 0.200* -0.257 -0.214 0.266** 0.564 
 (0.108) (0.110) (0.178) (0.180) (0.126) (0.479) 
Share of girls 5-9 0.295*** 0.216** 0.186 0.089 0.342*** -0.323 
 (0.081) (0.089) (0.124) (0.140) (0.096) (1.015) 
Share of girls 10-14 0.011 -0.057 0.145 0.056 -0.044 -0.638 
 (0.082) (0.089) (0.119) (0.130) (0.099) (0.922) 
Share of women above 
65 
0.157 0.155 0.619** 0.617** 0.059 0.045 
(0.165) (0.165) (0.259) (0.259) (0.199) (0.199) 
Completed Years of 
Education 
-0.017*** -0.002 -0.014 0.005 -0.009 0.116 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.008) (0.193) 
E(Returns to Education) -4.989*** 1.724 -5.882** 2.563 -4.593** 52.024 
 (1.797) (3.280) (2.523) (5.921) (2.000) (87.147) 
Average local wage -0.050 -0.040 0.002 0.011 -0.099 -0.031 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.063) (0.121) 
Number of cows owned 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.007* 0.009** 0.010** 0.026 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.023) 
Household had a loan 
denied 
-0.074* -0.053 -0.055 -0.030 -0.071 0.089 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.065) (0.067) (0.049) (0.253) 
E (Per capita Monthly 
Household Income) 
0.015*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.009** 0.015*** -0.006 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.032) 
Average local education 
costs 
-0.002** -0.002*** -0.002** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.004 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Average local subsidies 
to education 
0.000 0.001 0.003 0.004 -0.001 0.005 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) 
Average time to primary 
school 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Insufficient Access -1.767*** -1.631*** -1.314 -0.603 -0.548 -73.437 
 (0.400) (0.419) (2.074) (2.142) (0.744) (111.547) 
Insufficient Quality -9.603*** -10.758*** 2.106 15.915* 2.978 -76.955 
 (2.270) (2.300) (2.053) (8.778) (2.815) (122.521) 
Insufficient Security -3.182 -3.856 -5.704 66.796 -32.514 1220.216 
 (2.932) (3.000) (11.700) (46.760) (45.456) (1921.537) 
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethno-linguistic fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 6022 6022 2787 2787 3233 3233 
Statistics from the underlying regressions 
Pseudo R2 0.3092 0.3069 0.2851 0.2851 0.3400 0.3353 
Log-Likelihood -121308.848 -121698.394 -29595.247 -29595.949 -88011.692 -88634.892 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Source: author’s calculations on data from TLSLS (2007) and CAVR (2006) 
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Table 34: Primary Education Demand - Conflict 2: Shock of extreme violence during life of child -  Robustness to migration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Baseline model Non-Migrants 
 Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Conflict 2: Years with extreme 
kills during life 
-0.402*** 4.260** -0.404*** -10.015** 
(0.112) (1.831) (0.123) (4.531) 
N 6022 6022 5822 5822 
Log-Likelihood -121308.848 -121698.394 -117400.671 -117726.589 
 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Note: Coefficients of the conflict variables were estimated with the remaining covariates of the 
study’s standard models. Source: author’s calculations on data from TLSLS (2007) and CAVR (2006) 
 
6- Discussion of results and conclusion 
As suggested by qualitative research conducted in Timor - including life story 
interviews - and by the descriptive statistics presented, there is an indication of a 
slightly higher attendance in primary education among those children that experienced 
the Timorese conflict, five years after it ended. This higher attendance occurs despite 
impacts of conflict on income and quality of education that are likely to induce a 
contrary effect. This would suggest that another sort of impact could be present, namely, 
of an induced higher preference for education as a resilience effect71. The empirical 
evidence for the full sample appears to suggest this to be the case. However, the result 
proves itself not to be robust and should not, therefore, be affirmed as externally valid. 
This empirical result cannot be analysed without looking into the characteristics and 
limitations of the empirical strategy used. While the IV approach that was applied 
revealed a source of endonegeity (one that suggested overestimation of negative effects 
of conflict over demand for education), the lack of robustness of the IV coefficient on 
either conflict indicator suggests that other sources of endogeneity may be present. As 
Heckman and Urzua (2009:17) argue, ‘in a heterogeneous model, different instruments 
will give different estimates’. In this case, the same instrument, in different samplings of 
the heterogeneous reality of post-conflict Timor-Leste gave different, contradictory, 
                                                          
71 This could, for instance, take the form of longer foresight or preference for the future that could be 
modelled as a reduction on time discount rate. Households that experienced more violence, after peace 
ensued may have experienced a stronger change of expectations, valuing the future more and therefore 
being more willing to save now for education. 
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estimates. That was particularly the case for the subsamples of girls and of non-
migrants. This happened despite the fact that the instrument, already explored by Justino 
et al. (2013, 2011), was found to be a significant regressor of both the proxies of 
conflict used and that it also passed the exclusion test. It therefore suggests that, 
particularly in the cases of the referred subsamples the instrument is picking up other 
sources of endogeneity. Such a situation precludes any certainty in the inference of 
other possible medium-term impacts of the experience of conflict beyond those that may 
arise through income or quality of education. Further research should try to unpick the 
possible different sources of endogeneity, starting with the subgroups of girls and those 
that do not migrate out of their districts. 
Avenues of enquiry on how to robustly infer the existence of the impacts suggested by 
the regression on the full sample, could examine other alternative pathways. 
A first approach would be to depart from the assumption that the experience of conflict 
by children may be the only channel of direct impacts of conflict on demand for 
education. It is clear that parents, and not children, play the most significant role in 
determining the decision about them attending school, at least until a certain age. As 
discussed in section 2, the assumption was one of intra-household altruism, by which 
the decision makers recognize and value the children’s experience of violence or are 
sensitized by the extreme risks incurred by children during their first years of life. It 
may be the case that it is the parents’ own experience of violence that influences the 
decision. In the earlier analysis this hypothesis was tested, using the head of household 
as a proxy (as the dataset has information gaps on the children’s parents). The empirical 
estimates of indicators of violence witnessed by the head of household were, however, 
found to be non-significant. 
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Another possibility would be to consider the full experience of conflict by the 
household as a whole, during the 25 years of conflict. This would account for spill-over 
effects that an analysis of violence experienced only during the life of the child may 
have overlooked. However, the data available on conflict only allows disaggregation by 
district and year of occurrence. We are, therefore, unable to differentiate the experience 
of violence by the households along the timeline (as all of them exist, with different 
compositions, before, throughout and after the conflict). The only heterogeneity 
identifiable would be according to the 13 Timorese districts, differentiating the 
experience of conflict of each household solely according to what districts were more 
affected and what were affected the least. This would not allow for a strong enough 
identification of impacts of conflict. 
On the other hand, it may be the case that children may be able to recover from the 
violence they experienced during the conflict without significant medium-run impacts. 
This would mean that no significant effect of conflict would arise on the preferences of 
children for education (or their parents), beyond those that occur via the channels of 
income and perceptions of school quality. If this is the case, there is still space to 
enquire into the impacts of conflict on higher levels of education, looking at 
adolescents. These can play a more significant role in their educational choices. They 
also experienced the most extreme events of violence of the later period of the 
Indonesian occupation at an older age and may have clearer memories (and higher 
trauma) from them, but also a clearer perception of the dynamics of post-conflict 
reconstruction, with possible resilience effects. This approach is followed in Chapter 3, 
where robust findings seem to suggest that possible resilience effects may lead those 
that experienced shocks of extreme violence to be more likely to attend secondary 
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school. This effect appears to hold as robust and significant in the presence of other 
significant drivers of demand. 
It is important to notice that this present study did find evidence of channels through 
which conflict might impact demand for primary education. These channels were: first, 
that conflict might have particularly affected household’s income generating capacities 
and, through it, reduced demand for primary education; second, that conflict might have 
reduced the quality of education to such a degree that it had not recovered five years 
post-conflict, again with detrimental effects on demand for primary education. On both 
accounts, there is evidence that Timor-Leste in 2004/05 had yet not fully recovered 
from the conflict. The results in this study established that the household income and 
perceived quality are significant drivers of demand for primary education and, therefore, 
possible channels of legacies of conflict in the medium-run. Although evidence in other 
settings suggests both channels to be affected by conflict, further research should 
evaluate whether and how these impacts occurred in the medium-run in Timor-Leste. 
The results found in this study also suggest the need for further research on the relation 
between expected returns to education and demand for primary education. The evidence 
suggested that households might face liquidity constraints; future research should 
validate this insight, since this dimension not only affects education, but can reinforce 
poverty traps, as found by Masset (2010). 
The evidence found on both income and perceived quality of education recommend that 
policy should focus on these significant channels through which the experience of 
conflict may leave legacies in the medium-run. It should focus, therefore, on the supply 
side of primary education, particularly on the quality of provision. It should, however, 
not overlook significant signals of demand restrictions, particularly income related ones. 
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They also recommend a particular focus on possible discrimination, not only gender 
based but, in an ethnically diverse post-conflict setting such as Timor-Leste is, also on 
migrant children in urban settings, so as to prevent possible sources of grievance. 
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Chapter 3: A peace dividend on secondary education? 
Analysis of post-conflict demand for education and legacies of conflict 
in Timor-Leste72 
 
It is hard to contest that education is a societal investment. The correlation of higher 
schooling and higher performance in other indicators of human development is well 
established and emphasized by many studies, from Lucas (1988), Mankiw et al. (1992), 
Barro and Lee (1994), Gregorio and Lee (2002), Breierova and Duflo (2004) to Cutler 
et al. (2006)73. This agreement contributed to make Education one of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). Previously, in 1990 at Jomtien, the Education for All 
(EFA) initiative had been launched, establishing the goal of Universal Primary 
Education (UPE), which eventually became inscribed in the MDGs. This led some 
governments to devote as much as 70% of their education budget to the primary level 
(Lewin, 2005). However, Lewin, as well as other authors such as Brown (2005) or Tilak 
(2007) and multilateral agencies such as the World Bank (2005) stress the need to 
increase the focus on the next levels of education. 
As Lewin (2005) highlights, getting educated beyond primary level is considered a 
source of income opportunity worth of private investment by poor households and 
economic elites alike. Lewin also stresses that access to secondary education is 
important for achieving universal primary education: it is both an incentive for primary 
education completion, and a required step in the training of primary school teachers. 
                                                          
72 I would like to thank Patricia Justino, Edoardo Masset, Lawrence Haddad, Jean-Pierre Tranchant, 
Yashodhan Ghorpade, Annemie Maertens, Iftikhar Hussain, Panu Pelkonen, Jan Willem Gunning Hector 
Rufrancos, Ani Silwal, Lucia Barbone, Máiréad Dunne, Kwame Akyeampong, Tony Somerset, Jimena 
Hernandez-Fernandez, Eva-Maria Eger, Agnes Oftenberger and Jules Seidenburg for their comments and 
feedback in this and earlier versions. 
73 As reviewed by Barro and Lee (2013). 
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In the run-up to a post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals framework, it is key to 
ascertain what hinders or drives the attainment of education beyond primary school in 
developing countries74. However, there is a gap here, as most research still lies on 
higher education in more developed countries while most research on education in 
poorer developing countries has not looked beyond primary education. Secondary 
education in the poorest countries of the world has largely been under-researched.  
A few studies have sought to fill this gap. They include Appleton et al. (1996), looking 
at the links between primary and post-primary education in Côte d’Ivoire and Uganda, 
Palmer (2005) on Ghana, Wedgwood (2005) on Tanzania, Hayman (2005) on the 
contribution of post-primary education to poverty reduction in Rwanda, Tilak (2007) on 
India, Atchoaréna et al. (2008) on Cabo Verde, Chimombo (2009) on private provision 
of education in Malawi, Ohba (2011) on Kenya75. While this literature represents a new 
focus being directed to secondary education, it still leaves significant gaps. 
A particularly significant gap is found in the understanding of what may drive or hinder 
higher attendance of secondary education in post-conflict settings. This is of particular 
importance as countries classified as “fragile” have failed to achieve the MDGs targets 
on education (UNESCO, 2011). 
The education prospects of youth, and the incentives for them to attend secondary 
education, are particularly relevant in post-conflict countries where the “youth bulge”76 
is a security risk (Goldsmith, 2009; Huntington, 1996; Urdal, 2006; Urdal and 
                                                          
74 The goal of extending non-discriminatory access to universal secondary education is already part of the 
proposal for the Sustainable Development Goals (Open Working Group for Sustainable Development 
Goals, 2014). 
75 Another notable example is the study by Borooah and Knox (2014) on education performance in 
Northern Ireland as this could be classified as a post-conflict country. 
76 This term applies to situations, particularly common in least developed countries, where the advances 
in reduction of infant mortality lead to a significant proportion of the population to be under 15 years old 
or, more generally, under the active age. 
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Hoelscher, 2009). Drawing on the example of post-conflict Rwanda, Hayman (2005) 
already had highlighted that post-basic education and training are seen as instrumental 
in the country’s human capital development policy. 
Yet a study of demand for secondary education in a post-conflict setting is lacking. A 
focus exists, with studies such as Rose and Greeley (2006) recommending an attention 
to be given to the provision of secondary education, among other measures. 
Recommendations such as these, focusing on the supply side of education, need to be 
complemented by an analysis of the demand side, to validate their effectiveness. 
An understanding of what drives the household’s choices on secondary education is not 
complete without acknowledging the role played by conflict. The empirical research on 
impacts of conflict over education does point for negative effects in its duration and in 
the short-run post-conflict stages. However, no knowledge exists of eventual 
persistence, reduction or reversion of those effects in the medium-run, when the 
countries still face a situation of relative fragility. This study brings the existing 
literature on secondary education in developing countries into a dialogue with the 
microeconomics of conflict, as a way to assess the medium-run impacts of conflict on 
demand for secondary education. 
It focuses on Timor-Leste, a post-conflict country, classified as “fragile”77 and founder 
of the g7+ group, an association of countries self-defined as “a voluntary association of 
countries that are or have been affected by conflict” (g7+ Secretariat, 2014). This small 
island country became independent in 2003, after 500 years of Portuguese colonization, 
                                                          
77 The World Bank lists 33 countries as fragile and conflict affected. The Fund For Peace lists 35 
countries from “alert” to “very high alert” and still other 32 as “very high warning of fragility”. The 
OECD listed 51 countries as fragile in 2014. Timor-Leste is nominated in all these sets.  
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a military occupation by Indonesia from 1975 to 1999 and a period of transitional rule 
by the United Nations. 
This study focuses on the school year of 2004/05, five years after the conflict with 
Indonesia ended. The violence the Timorese experienced during that conflict varied 
depending on where they lived – it was much more pronounced in some districts than in 
others – and on their age, among other factors. This heterogeneity allows for an 
empirical analysis of impacts of conflict on post-conflict demand for secondary 
education. In this study, the impact of conflict will focus on the experience of extreme 
violence during the time of the conflict and when those that were adolescents in 2004/05 
(aged between 12 and 18) were of school age. 
Demand for secondary education will be analysed following an inter-temporal 
investment theoretical approach where attendance to school is a decision made by the 
household, but most decisively by the adolescent herself78. As presented in section 2, 
the decision on whether or not to attend secondary school is assumed to be based on the 
expected returns to education (as education is viewed as an investment), its cost, and its 
quality. The study also assumes that five years after the end of the conflict, demand for 
secondary education may still be affected by violence experienced due to the conflict - a 
hypothesis that is tested in this study. 
The empirical model, following the conceptual discussion of section 2 will be first 
estimated through a Binomial Probit with Selection regression, also known as 
Heckman-Probit (HP). It will also be estimated through an IV Probit and a simple Probit 
regression. Endogeneity of the household’s income is tested and corrected through an 
                                                          
78 While addressing the education of all adolescents, girls and boys, for simplicity and in 
acknowledgement of the equal importance of both genders, the individuals in the text will always be 
referred as “she” or “her”. 
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Instrumental Variables (IV) approach. Endogeneity of conflict is also discussed and 
accounted for through an IV approach. The empirical strategy is presented and 
discussed is section 3. 
The data used for this analysis, presented in section 4, comes from the Timor-Leste 
Survey of Living Standards of 2007 (TLSLS, 2007), in which 25,000 people (4,470 
households) from all districts of Timor-Leste were interviewed, 4,102 of which were 
aged between 12 and 18 years old. It is complemented with data from the Human Rights 
Violations Database (CAVR, 2006), containing 11,315 observations of human rights 
abuses and used to generate the indicator of conflict. 
The empirical results, presented in section 5, confirm the significance of most of the 
theoretically established covariates of demand for secondary education. As variables 
such as returns to education and quality of schooling are, as the review below will show, 
negatively impacted by conflict, there is evidence that, through these channels, the 
experience of violence and conflict leads to lower demand for education. Yet, this study 
also shows that conflict has another significant effect on the household’s preferences for 
secondary education. The evidence found suggests that adolescents who experienced a 
shock of extreme violence during their school years were more likely to attend 
secondary school five years after the end of the conflict than other, otherwise equal, 
adolescents that were spared. This result corresponds with the statements by parents 
interviewed and is object of reflection on last section of the study. 
The chapter is structured as follows. A brief description of Timor-Leste and its conflict 
will set the background in section 1. In section 2, the conceptual framework will be 
presented, followed by the empirical strategy in section 3. After a brief presentation of 
the data used, the empirical results will be presented, in sections 4 and 5, respectively. A 
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synthesis and discussion of the results will conclude the study, opening the debate for 
future reflections and ways forward in the research. 
1- Background 
With a relatively small territory of 14,919 km2, Timor-Leste, henceforth referred as 
Timor, is a half-island neighbouring Indonesia by sea in the North, East and by land in 
the West, as well as Australia, by sea, in the South. With an estimated population of 1.2 
million in 2012, this former Portuguese colony is the youngest Asian nation, as 2003 
marked the end of foreign rule over the territory. Timor had, in fact, already declared 
independence from Portugal in November 28, 1975, but a week after Indonesia invaded 
and started a period of military occupation that would last until 1999. 
Figure 11: Map of Timor-Leste 
 
Source: DNE (2008) 
For 25 years, the people of Timor-Leste lived under a violent military occupation. At 
times and in some districts, the levels of violence reached extreme levels, particularly in 
the number of killings and disappearances perpetrated by the Indonesian army and pro-
Indonesia Timorese militias supported by the occupying power. This is demonstrated in 
Figure 12, below. 
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Figure 12: Civilian killed and disappearances in each year (maximum, median and minimum) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on CAVR (2006) 
These events were thoroughly documented by the Timorese Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in its dense and ample report of the history of events (CAVR, 2005) and a 
dataset of reported human rights abuses (CAVR, 2006). They were also documented in 
the historical research conducted by Taylor (1990, 1999), Gunn (1999) and Mattoso 
(2005) and the memoirs of those that lived through the process such as Felgueiras and 
Martins (2006) or Carrascalão (2012). A referendum in August 1999, when 78.5% of 
voters, from a turnout of 98.6%, voted for Timor’s independence, ended the Indonesian 
occupation, which was not given up without a final bout of brutality. With the victory of 
the independence option, a brutal backlash ensued, reaching levels Timor had only 
witnessed in the period of invasion, as can be seen in Figure 12, above79. The scale of 
killings and disappearances was extremely high in some of the districts (see Table 35, 
below). While those living in the districts of Bobonaro, Covalima, Ermera and Oecussi 
                                                          
79 The 1999 post-referendum violence took the form not only of killings but of significant property 
destruction, with scorched-earth practices and forced displacement, also reported in CAVR (2005). These 
effects were reported and surveyed in the 2001 Timor-Leste Living Standards Survey but, unfortunately, 
were not object of new enquiry in 2007. Meanwhile most of the population displaced is reported to have 
returned to their birth districts, as suggested in TLSLS (2007) and  the 2010 census (National Statistics 
Directorate and UNFPA, 2011) and most of the reconstruction process reported to have taken place. 
140 
 
were the most affected, those living in Dili and Liquiçá also witnessed extremely high 
levels of violence in this period. 
Table 35: Gradient of the number of killings per district and year 
 
Source: Author's calculations using CAVR (2006) data 
The experience of excessive killings and disappearances were accompanied by several 
other acts of violence, including forced displacement and the destruction of property 
and schools. An illustration of the events may come for the testimony of a Timorese 
interviewed is support of this study: 
‘Then in 1999 all went to dust, there was nothing. Indonesian military and 
autonomist militias vandalised schools, important buildings, houses of people, 
including our own (…). In that moment, at school no one had school uniforms, 
nothing. The important thing was that we had school. (…) Timorese came back 
from Indonesia, some were to get a Masters, some didn’t finish their 
undergrad… patience! Some only had the secondary school, for instance. 
Those who knew how to teach could teach. In that moment, there were no 
criteria, like only graduates could teach secondary school, because of the 
emergency.’ 
Man from Laclubar (2012) 
Yet, independence had finally been achieved and security was re-established by UN 
forces, led by Australia and with the support of the United States, Japan, Portugal and 
Brazil, among others. A period of transitory administration by the UN followed, from 
1999 to 2002. This was a period of reconstruction and significant aid investment in 
many areas, including education, leading to a significant increase in the number of 
schools, particularly from 2003, as shown in Figure 13, below. 
72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03
Aileu -0 -0 -0 4 1.2 1.6 1.6 0.3 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0.2 -0 -0 -0 -0
Ainaro -0 -0 -0 3.1 1.1 0.9 -0 0.5 -0 -0 0.3 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0.7 -0 -0 -0 -0
Baucau -0 -0 -0 0.4 1.4 0.6 3.8 4.9 1.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.4 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0 0.4 -0 -0 -0 -0
Bobonaro -0 -0 -0 2.9 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0.4 4.5 -0 -0 -0 -0
Covalima -0 -0 -0 1.6 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.1 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 3.7 -0 -0 -0 -0
Dili -0 -0 -0 2.6 0.2 -0 0 0.1 1.6 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0.7 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 1.5 -0 -0 -0 -0
Ermera -0 -0 -0 8.3 3.9 2.9 4.6 1 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0.3 0.2 0 3.2 -0 -0 -0 -0
Lautem -0 -0 -0 -0 1.4 -0 0.1 3.2 1.2 0.6 0.9 3.2 1.1 0.3 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0.9 -0 -0 -0 -0
Liquiçá -0 -0 -0 0.9 0.2 -0 0.2 0.1 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 1.2 -0 -0 -0 -0
Manatuto -0 -0 -0 2.2 0.7 1.4 1.5 1.6 0.5 -0 0.1 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0.5 -0 -0 -0 -0
Manufahi -0 -0 -0 3.3 1.3 1.2 2.1 3.1 0.2 -0 -0 0.2 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0.2 0.2 -0 -0 -0 -0
Oecussi -0 -0 -0 0.4 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 7.6 -0 -0 -0 -0
Viqueque -0 -0 -0 0.1 1.3 0.9 1.6 2.4 0.6 -0 -0 2.2 1.3 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0.3 -0 -0 -0 -0
Color code -3 -2 -1 1 1Between 2 and 3 stdev above 
average More than 3 stdev above average
More than 3 stdev below 
average
Between 2 and 3 stdev 
below average
Around 
average
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This expansion of school infrastructure was supported by the intervention of multilateral 
and bilateral donors, as highlighted by Nicolai (2004), namely the World Bank, 
Portugal, UNICEF, the World Food Programme, New Zealand, Brazil and Ireland. In 
fact, Nicolai (2004) states, the UN, in particular UNICEF, played the role of a de facto 
Ministry of Education. Recently, Australia also committed to support the Timorese 
education. 
Figure 13: Number of secondary schools in Timor-Leste 1973-2012 
 
Sources: INE (1974); BPS (1989, 1993); Saldanha (1994); GERTIL, (2003) and Ministry of 
Education (2012) 
When the school year of 2004/05 started, five years had passed since the violent end of 
Indonesian occupation. The young post-conflict country was free from those violent 
events but suffered its legacies, which need to be accounted for when studying the 
demand for education. 
This study, therefore, seeks to understand how the legacy of conflict affected demand 
for secondary education. A brief review of the conceptual framework supporting the 
analysis follows in the next section. 
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2- Conceptual Framework 
An analysis of demand for secondary education in a post-conflict setting has to seek a 
dialogue between existing knowledge on demand for education on the one hand, and the 
microeconomics of conflict, particularly on the effects of conflict on decisions at the 
household level, on the other. 
As a starting point, one should look at what may drive the decision to have an 
adolescent attend secondary school. Firstly there is, of course, the parents’ own 
experience of education, and whether they attended school themselves. The household’s 
decision is, however, framed but a wider set of drivers, as it is established by the theory 
and empirics of demand for education. Starting from the works of Mincer (1958), 
Schultz (1961), Becker, (1962) and Ben-Porath (1967), the economic analysis of 
demand for education constructs it as an investment done by the household, an 
investment in human capital. As with other investments, education is expected to 
generate a yield. In this case, it is expected to generate an education premium, a higher 
wage relative to comparably similar workers in comparable sectors and economies, for 
each added year of schooling (Becker, 1962). Higher returns to education provide a 
metric for this premium, an indicator that education pays as an investment (Becker, 
1962; Mincer, 1974, 1958)80. It is, therefore, an expectation of positive and significant 
returns to education that constitutes the economic incentive for households’ demand for 
the education of their members. 
The economic analysis of demand for education acknowledges that, as an investment, a 
choice of having some of the household’s members attend school is one where 
contemporaneous costs are assumed so that future gains can be attained. This has been 
clear since the seminal works of Becker (1962) or Ben-Porath (1967), but also 
                                                          
80 However, it does not equate to a return on investment, as it does not relate the wage premium to the 
costs of education. 
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Wilkinson (1966), Heckman (1976), Lazear (1977) or Mattila (1982) and empirically 
confirmed in the empirical literature since then81. Education often requires a reduction 
in consumption of other goods, to support the acquisition of books, school material, 
school uniforms and other education related materials, and tuition fees when education 
is not free. These costs mean that household income is a key enabler of education 
demand. The financial burden can, of course, be assisted by external assistance, 
reducing the contemporaneous investment. 
Education does not only cost money, it also requires time otherwise used for leisure, 
home care activities and labour. This means that the size and structure of the 
household82 also matter, as well as the attribution of tasks in the household division of 
labour, which can depend of gender, age, marital status or other factors of intra-
household status (to be the first child, to be adopted into the family, a niece or nephew 
of the household head, et cetera). Not only inside the household, but outside, investing 
time in education implies opportunity costs, such as wages that could be earned 
contemporaneously (as opposed to those that can be earned in the future). In that sense, 
the number of years of education already attained can have a dual effect, either as an 
enabler of progression, as it marks investment already done, or as a boundary above 
which the household’s preferences switch to contemporaneous earnings. As the 
dimension of investment prevails throughout the decision process, access to credit and 
credit constraints are also important factors. Finally, a key dimension of the investment 
nature of demand for education is also the perceived quality of schools and teaching, as 
highlighted by Glewwe (2002). 
                                                          
81 A thorough review of the seminal literature in demand for education can be found in Freeman (1987). 
A list of important examples of the economic literature on education can be found in Chapter 2. 
82 The importance of accounting for the structure of the household is highlighted by White and Masset 
(2003) 
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Among the drivers of demand here described, some may be affected by conflict. A first 
effect can be found in returns to education. Chamarbagwala and Morán (2011) suggest 
that conflict may induce decreased expectations of returns to education. Chapter 1 
presents evidence that the experience of conflict did, in fact, reduce post-conflict returns 
to education in Timor. If post-conflict demand for secondary education is found to react 
to expected returns to education, this may be an evidence of an effect of conflict. 
Another effect can be found through the household’s income, if it proves, as 
theoretically expected, to be a significant driver of demand for education. Justino and 
Verwimp (2006) estimated that 20% of the Rwandan population moved into poverty as 
a consequence of the genocide. The genocide caused income reductions both directly 
and indirectly, via the destruction of productive assets and crops as found by Verwimp 
et al. (2010) or Bundervoet (2007). The destruction of assets, as Ibáñez and Moya 
(2009) highlight, can reduce the income generating capacity of households in such a 
way that forces them, in extreme cases, into a low-yielding livelihood strategy and into 
a poverty trap. This means, as Akbulut-Yuksel (2009) also points out, that asset 
destruction immediately reduces the household income and, therefore, the scope of non-
income generating activities members of the household may engage in, including 
education. This was observed by Shemyakina (2011) who found a strong negative 
association between female enrolment in education and past damages to the household 
dwelling. 
These impacts on the household’s income generating capacities may have still persisted 
in the medium-run. While Badiuzzaman et al. (2011) allude to a “Phoenix” factor, a 
rapid economic recovery after extended conflicts, Cerra and Saxena (2008) point to a 
partial rebound after civil war, a recovery of half the loss in four years while the 
remainder takes more than a decade to recover. Macroeconomic data on Timor-Leste let 
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us know that, in 2004/05 the country’s per capita GDP had still not recovered into its 
1998 level (IMF, 2000; WDI, 2011). The assumption in this study is that, in 2004/05, 
the average Timorese household, and especially those more affected by the conflict, 
were still earning a lower income than they would have, had the conflict not occurred. 
Another key dimension through which conflict may indirectly affect demand for 
education is related to the perceived quality of education and, in this case, of secondary 
education. Studies such as those by Lai and Thyne (2007) and Ichino and Winter-Ebmer 
(2004) assert the impacts of conflict on the quality of education through destroyed 
schools, disrupted access, or the migration and victimization of teachers. Swee (2009) 
found that, in Bosnia, the destruction of school buildings and educational facilities but 
also the migration of teachers resulted in reduced access to education, increasing its cost 
to the household while also reducing its efficacy. Concurrent with the final acts of 
violence, Timor experienced a significant reduction in the quality of schooling in the 
direct aftermath of its independence, with the repatriation of nearly two- thirds of its 
teaching body back to Indonesia83. This happened at the same time as a significant 
effort of school construction and reconstruction, as depicted in Figure 13 above. This 
reconstruction effort did increase the access to education but it will take longer to secure 
a full recovery in the quality of teaching through a good cadre of teachers – a concern 
which, in 2011, still guided the policy of the Government of Timor (Ministry of 
Education, 2011). If, empirically, the households show themselves as sensitive to 
perceptions of school quality when deciding on their adolescent’s attendance of 
secondary school, then this can be understood as another channel of effect of conflict. 
                                                          
83 This number was independently stated by two key informants, one working with the Timorese Ministry 
of Education and the other a former official of this Ministry (as interviewed in 2012). According to the 
Ministry of Education (2011:33-34), in 1996 only 65 of all third level basic education teachers were 
Timorese. These were the only ones that stayed after 1999 to provide for the education of what were then 
21,810 students. 
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It is possible that the impact of conflict can induce differences in demand for secondary 
education among otherwise similar individuals, beyond the ones captured by the 
channels previously reviewed. Most of the studies on conflict and education suggest a 
negative impact84. FitzGerald, Stewart and Wang (2001) and Stewart and FitzGerald 
(2001) point out that school enrolments either decrease in conflict-afflicted countries or 
increase less in these countries than in others. Negative impacts were also found in 
Uganda (Blattman and Annan, 2010), Tajikistan (Shemyakina, 2011), Rwanda (Akresh 
and de Walque, 2008), and Bosnia (Swee, 2009). In Timor, Justino, Leone and Salardi 
(2013) analysed school attendance immediately after independence (2000/01) when 
Timor was still under UN transitional administration. They found significant evidence 
that exposure to displacement and house damage during the last bout of extreme 
violence in 1999 induced lower attendance in the first year of post-conflict. They also 
found evidence of mixed impacts of conflict on school attainment seven years after 
independence. In 2007, boys affected by conflict were less likely to have completed 
primary school, relative to girls.  
The present study builds on this last contribution, seeking a deeper understanding of the 
medium-term impacts of conflict on educational outcomes through the use of a richer 
dataset.  The goal is to deepen understanding of educational demand and achievement in 
post-conflict settings based on a careful analysis of a recent case study. 
To achieve a deeper analysis of impacts of conflict, we must examine processes through 
which conflict may affect household preferences towards education. Through the many 
forms of violence that take place during a conflict, it imprints itself as an inducer of two 
dual psychosocial dimensions, trauma and resilience. Either or both of these dimensions 
                                                          
84 Carlton-Ford and Boop (2010), Kondylis (2010) and de Groot and Göksel (2011) review some of these 
results. 
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can influence post-conflict preferences regarding education, with the combinations 
observed varying from individual to individual. 
The United Nations’ Report on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children (Machel, 
1996) stresses the first dimension, trauma. It suggests that psychosocial impacts are 
among the most significant impacts of conflict on children. Other key factors cited were 
threats to health (including higher prevalence of HIV-AIDS and malnutrition) and 
gender based exploitation and violence85. The emergence of post-traumatic stress due to 
conflict is highlighted by Dyregrov et al. (2002) and, in the specific case of Timor-
Leste, by Silove et al. (2009). These effects on adolescents can shape their attitudes 
towards schooling and influence the household’s decision on their attendance. Parents 
and other adults in the household can become fearful about the security of their children 
and adolescents. Research by Skonhoft, (2000) on Burundian Hutu refugees found that, 
given past experience of educated people being slaughtered for their ethnicity, many 
parents became reluctant to send their children to school even in refugee camps. These 
changes in households’ perception can, as found in Burundi, have defining effects on 
demand for education.   
Other effects found to result from an experience of violence and conflict were higher 
pessimism (Bozzoli et al., 2011) and greater sensitivity to uncertainty (Shemyakina, 
2011). These effects can outlast the conflict and persist in the post-conflict setting 
(Silove et al., 2009), potentially leading to a reduced preference for education. 
On the other hand, conflict can induce resilience in affected populations, as stressed by 
Blattman and Annan, (2010) or Bellows and Miguel (2009). The latter cite the studies 
by Tedeschi and Calhoun (1996) and Powell et al. (2003) to suggest that positive 
                                                          
85 The relevance of malnutrition and food security in conflict and post-conflict settings is addressed in 
significant research by Breisinger et al. (2014), Calderone et al. (2014) or Maystadt et al. (2014). 
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changes in political agency and beliefs may arise from conflict, which can be construed 
as resilience effects. Where resilience effects dominate, surviving a conflict may 
produce a peace dividend in the form of positive aspirations, lower risk aversion and 
longer term perspective when evaluating alternative options of consumption, investment 
and livelihood. The decision to push for education against all odds suggested in the 
testimony by the Timorese quoted in section 1 suggests a prevalence of resilience 
effects in Timor. Resilience may also be fostered in the aftermath of conflict through 
reconstruction aid efforts targeting those areas and people worst affected. These 
resilience effects may include fostering gender equality, as found by Olsson (2009) in 
the case of Timor. 
An empirical analysis of impacts of conflict and violence on post-conflict behaviours 
can only look at survivors, individuals that, for instance, lived through a time when the 
level of killings of others was more or less intense. Their experience can take various 
different forms. In the present study, the focus is on the experience of violence as an 
extreme shock (or succession of extreme shocks) experienced by school age individuals. 
As described above, the shock experienced in 1999 was one where extreme numbers of 
killings coincided with the destruction of schools and forced displacement of 
communities. The Timorese were able to partially recover from such forms of violence, 
with help from the reconstruction of schools and the return of most of those displaced.  
Yet legacies may have remained, namely in the form of preferences regarding 
education. 
Arguably, the experience of a shock of extreme violence is more likely to lead to trauma 
than to resilience. When experienced during school age, this shock affects the education 
experience due to significant disruptions, both immediately and through any coping or 
emergency measures needed to face it, as described in section 1. When experienced at 
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school age, such shocks can induce trauma and reduced demand for schooling, as 
thoroughly documented in CAVR (2005). 
Yet in some cases resilience effects can be strong enough to overcome the trauma 
induced by these shocks, as suggested by Bellows and Miguel (2009). In these cases, 
one should expect positive reactions to the experience of conflict will prevail in post-
conflict situations, namely, in the case of this study, through the choice that adolescents 
make to attend secondary education. 
Qualitative research conducted in Timor in 2012 based on life story interviews with 
Timorese in regions differently affected by the conflict86 suggests that resilience effects 
may have prevailed in Timor. 
An example of positive aspirations regarding education comes from the words of a 
mother from the subdistrict of Bazartete, in the Western district of Liquiçá: 
‘My dream for the future of my children is education, because it is important. 
When their mother and father no longer have strength, my children need to be 
educated to be PhDs, according to their own wishes. If they can get a 
scholarship and go to [South] Korea that is also important.’ 
Woman from Bazartete (2012) 
The suggestion is, therefore, that resilience effects could be influencing the decisions of 
Timorese vis-a-vis education as a medium-run impact of conflict. At this level, Timor 
may be showing a peace dividend. 
Several key covariates of demand for secondary education in a post-conflict setting may 
be distinguished. Among them, some are possible channels of impact of conflict on 
demand for education. The overall impact of conflict may extend beyond these channels 
and eventually also be perceived as shifts in the preferences themselves. 
                                                          
86 A total of 24 life stories interviews were conducted in three sites: Bazartete in the district of Liquiça, in 
the West; Laclubar in the district of Manatuto, in the Centre; Lautem in the district of the same name, in 
the East. 
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Building on this discussion, the following section presents the empirical strategy used to 
assess medium-run impacts of conflict on post-conflict demand for secondary 
education. 
3- Empirical Strategy 
Building on the previous discussion, this study seeks to provide a deeper understanding 
of post-conflict demand for secondary education and to empirically assess the 
possibility of identifying inferable medium-run impacts of conflict on demand for 
secondary education. It will do this by looking into the households’ decision to have 
their adolescents aged 12 to 18 years old attending secondary school. 
As this is a binomial choice, this study applies a Probit regression, as used in studies 
such as Justino et al. (2013), Deng et al. (2014) or Attanasio and Kaufmann (2014). Let, 
therefore, 𝑌1
∗ be a latent variable that linearly expresses the probability of attending 
school, i.e.: 
𝑌1
∗ = 𝛼 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓 ∗ 𝛽𝑐 + 𝑋1𝛽1 + 𝑋2𝛽2 + 𝑋3𝛽3 + 𝜀1 (1) 
As it is only possible to observe whether each adolescent attends school or not, 𝑦1𝑖, it is 
assumed that: 
𝑦1𝑖 = {
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦1
∗ ≤ 0
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦1
∗ > 0
 
with 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓 being the indicator of violence experienced during the conflict, 𝑋1, 𝑋2 and 
𝑋3 being vectors with other variables theoretically established as determinants of the 
choice of attendance and 𝜀1~𝑁(0, 𝜎1
2). 
Each vector of covariates of demand for secondary education express particular 
components of the interaction between characteristics intrinsic to the adolescent, her 
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household or their place of residence and other socio-economic factors that theoretically 
and empirically were established to correlate with attendance to school. 
𝑋1 encompasses a set of individual, household and local specific covariates that, as 
discussed in section 2, may affect demand for secondary education: gender (1 if 
female); age; age2; binomial indicator that the adolescent’s household resides in an 
urban or rural area (1 if urban); binomial indicator that the adolescent’s father attended 
school; binomial indicator that the adolescent’s mother attended school87; binomial 
indicator that the adolescent migrated; binomial indicator that the adolescent is the first 
child; binomial indicator that the adolescent is adopted; binomial indicator that the 
adolescent is a niece/nephew of the household head; binomial indicator that the 
adolescent is married; ln (number of household members); and the share of each of the 
following cohorts in the household: boys aged 0-1, 2-4, 5-9, 10-14 and men aged above 
65; girls aged 0-1, 2-4, 5-9, 10-14 and women aged above 65. 
As referred in section 2, the size and constitution of the household allow for a proxy of 
the intra-household division of labour, particularly in what regards hours of care 
activities the adolescent is involved in. Although the TLSLS (2007) provides 
information on reported hours of care work, its addition to the empirical model would 
impose on it endogenous effects. As discussed in section 2, the theory of education 
demand, sets the choice of education to be concurrent with the choices of time use for 
work and care. While a possible empirical approach to such economic problem of the 
household would be a multinomial probability regression on the three alternative time 
uses, the stochastic nature of the empirical problem this study seeks to address 
                                                          
87 Preferably, this study would use information on the years of education of each of the parents. However, 
the TLSLS 2007 only reports data on education of 1,113 fathers of the 4,102 adolescents aged between 12 
and 18 (with an average of 1.13 years of education) and 845 mothers (with an average of 0.8 years of 
education). It provides, however, a full indication of whether the parents attended school. Therefore, the 
study uses this as an indication of the level of parent’s education. 
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recommended a linear probability analysis to be adopted. To account for the drivers of 
choice for care work, and in part also those of outside work, the household size (in 
logarithm) and composition, not endogenous to school attendance, were therefore 
integrated in the empirical model. 
𝑋2 is a vector of covariates that express the nature of education as an investment: 
completed years of education (as an indicator of human capital already accumulated by 
the adolescent); estimated returns to education ( calculated estimates of the model used 
in the analysis of post-conflict returns to education in Timor, in Chapter 1, with the 
same datasets used in this study); average wage at the cluster level (as an indicator of 
the opportunity cost of education); number of cows (as a proxy for credit worthiness, 
significant because in 2005 bancarization had not yet occurred in Timor and because 
cows are still a very important component of dowry in the country); binomial variable 
on whether the household had been denied credit (an indicator of access to credit). 
The use of the average wage at the cluster level as an indicator of the opportunity costs 
of education follows the rationale presented before regarding the concurrent decision on 
use of time, in this case between education and work outside of the household. Again, 
the use of an indicator of occupation would introduce endogeneity into the empirical 
model. 
The indicators of credit worthiness and access to credit seek to proxy for the potential 
cost of credit and credit constraints faced by the household, so as to address the inter-
temporal optimization rationale inherent to the decision on education.88 
                                                          
88 A calculated average rate of interest for credit received by the households at a cluster level was 
considered in early empirical analysis. However, due to the low bancarization of the country, a significant 
proportion of the households and clusters did not report loans received or interest rates. 
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𝑋3 is a vector of covariates that incorporates the dimensions of education as an 
economic good that is consumed: current household per capita income; average per 
capita private expenditure in education at the cluster level; average distance to 
secondary school at the cluster level (as proxies of direct costs of education); average 
external financing to education at the cluster level (as a proxy of potential support for 
education available to the household); and percentage of school drop-outs attributed to 
insufficient quality, to insufficient access and to insecurity in the district of birth (as 
indicators of the perception of school quality). This latter regression will be used for 
further tests of robustness and sample decomposition analyses.89 
Lack of reliable information on income at the household level required the search for a 
proxy variable. A first possible solution would be to use household expenditure as a 
proxy. However household expenditure is endogenous on all resource generating time 
uses and, likewise, of substitute ones. Therefore, there is a strong suspicion of 
endogeneity with the decision of attendance to secondary school by the adolescent. To 
overcome this limitation, an instrumental variable approach is adopted and tested. The 
household per capita income, as a proxy of per capita expenditure is, therefore 
estimated using the remaining variables in the empirical model and the following 
instruments, representative of productive assets and wealth: years of education of the 
household head, controls for type of dwelling owned (bamboo house, semi-permanent, 
traditional house, small house in compound of main house, permanent house, 
emergency/tent, other), area of owned plot, value of owned plot, area of plots partly 
owned, variables indicative of the number of units of livestock owned (buffalos, bali 
cows, horses, pigs, goats, sheep, chicken or ducks) and total value of the livestock90. For 
each relevant regression, joint significance of the instruments is used to test for eventual 
                                                          
89 A full description of the variables is in Table 59. 
90 Regressions not shown. 
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weak instruments. In all of them, the instruments were found significant by the Sargan 
test. Endogeneity was also tested, following the procedure presented in Wooldridge 
(2010:587). If exogeneity cannot be rejected, the household per capita expenditure is 
used as a proxy of the household’s income. If endogeneity is found to exist, the estimate 
from the instruments regression is used. 
Seeking to assess possible inference of impact of conflict on the demand for secondary 
education, the following proxy of the violence experienced during the Timorese conflict 
is used: 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓 = Shock of extreme violence during the school life of the adolescent, a 
binomial variable that indicates whether extreme levels of violence manifested 
themselves at the district of birth of the adolescent and during the time she was of 
school age. The attribution to each adolescent of the experience of an extreme shock 
follows the procedure applied by Justino et al. (2013). The attribution is made if, in any 
year of her life, the level of killings and disappearances in her district of birth exceeded 
the mean for all years and districts by two standard deviations or more. In their study, as 
in Chapter 1, a count of the number of years when such threshold is passed is done. In 
this study, as it can be perceived in Figure 12 and Table 35 above, during the school age 
of adolescents born between 1986 and 1992 and of school age from 1992 onwards (the 
oldest), only one event of extreme violence, the 1999 post-referendum brutal backlash 
by the Indonesian military and affiliate militias, occurred at the school age of the 
sampled adolescents. 
The analysis of demand for secondary education introduces another caveat. Contrary to 
attendance to primary education, analysed in the Timorese post-conflict setting in 
Chapter 2, access to secondary education is only open to those that complete primary 
education. There is, therefore, a possible selection bias. The empirical analysis in this 
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study will, therefore, use a bivariate binomial regression with sample selection, also 
known as an Heckman Probit (HP), first developed by Van de Ven and Van Praag 
(1983, 1981) and applied in various studies, including Greene (1998), or Neal (1995), 
Montmarquette et al. (2001), Grootaert and Patrinos (2002), Riphahn and 
Schieferdecker (2012), Gaeta (2013) and Rubb (2014), specifically related to choices 
regarding education. Riphahn and Schieferdecker (2012) tested and found that the 
empirical analysis of the decision to transit into tertiary education has to account for 
selection bias as only those that succeed in passing qualifying exams are entitled to 
enrol in tertiary school. Their approach approximates the conditions that inform the 
analysis of demand for secondary education, as is conducted in this study. 
Let, therefore 𝑌2
∗ be a latent variable that linearly expresses the probability of having 
completed primary school. 
𝑌2
∗ = 𝑍𝛾 + 𝜀2 (2) 
with 𝑍 being the following set of covariates: gender, age, age2, urban, father attended 
school, mother attended school, migrated, first child, adopted, niece/nephew, married, 
ln (number of household members); shares of boys aged 0-1, 2-4, 5-9, 10-14 and men 
aged above 65; shares of girls aged 0-1, 2-4, 5-9, 10-14 and women aged above 65, 
completed years of education, estimated returns to education, average wage at the 
cluster level, number of cows, binomial variable on whether the household had been 
denied credit, household per capita income, average expenditure in education at the 
cluster level, average distance to primary school at the cluster level, average external 
financing to education at the cluster level, insufficient quality, insufficient access and 
insecurity in the district of birth and the conflict indicator shock of extreme violence 
during the school life of the adolescent. As completeness of primary education is likely 
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to be dependent of the distance to the nearest primary school and not to the secondary 
school, this covariate operates as an instrument in the first stage selection equation. All 
variables, for both selection and main models are described in Table 57, in the 
appendix. It is assumed that 𝜀2~𝑁(0, 𝜎2
2).  
As it is only possible to observe whether the secondary school aged member of the 
household completed primary school or not, 𝑦2𝑖, it is assumed that: 
𝑦2𝑖 = {
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦2
∗ ≤ 0
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦2
∗ > 0
 
Under conditions, to be tested, of evident selection bias, 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝜀1, 𝜀2) = 𝜌 ≠ 0, which is 
equivalent to have (𝜀1, 𝜀2)~𝑁(0,0, 𝜎1
2, 𝜎2
2, 𝜌), a bivariate normal distribution. 
While the chosen covariates of the demand for secondary education may be able to 
address perceived risks of endogeneity, there are reasonable expectations that the 
indicators of conflict may not. A common cause of endogeneity of conflict is reverse 
causality. In this case, a reverse causality between attendance to school (measured in 
2004/05) and the conflict indicator (reporting to the period 1975 to 1999) is not likely to 
occur. However, one cannot overlook reasonable expectations of omitted variable bias 
or correlated measurement error. In the conflict literature, one can find evidence of 
endogeneity of conflict due to factors such as income and victimization of richer 
individuals and more educated individuals, as per Justino and Verwimp (2006). The 
empirical strategy adopted in this study, exploring intensively many likely covariates of 
demand for education may reduce the scope of omitted variables. To strengthen this 
possibility, all regressions also include district and ethno-linguistic control variables. It 
may, however, not encompass all possibilities. A possible omitted variable bias 
regarding the indicator of violence during the conflict, the indicator of a shock of 
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extreme violence during the school life of the adolescent, is the degree of socio-
economic linkages between the populations in the districts of Timor and the 
neighbouring western half of the island, part of Indonesia. In the districts with more 
linkages, it would be more likely for a higher proportion of the population to be 
sympathetic to a stronger integration of the two parts of the island. While a border was 
created in 1859 under a treaty between the then colonial powers of Portugal and 
Netherlands, Bowden and Hajek (2007) and Soares (2003) show that a commonality of 
language exists between the different Timorese peoples across these borders. This 
commonality predates Indonesian occupation and may have promoted a higher 
allegiance to a project of integration among the peoples closer to the border. This may 
have propitiated for two characteristics to positively correlate: attendance to Indonesian 
education and formation of pro-Indonesia groups. The first effect, during the 25 years of 
occupation could have led to relatively more educated parents and a higher preference 
for the education of their adolescents. The second effect would lead to higher likelihood 
of militia formation and higher levels of violence in the post-referendum events. Among 
these events was a massive displacement of Timorese to Indonesian West Timor, from 
which most but not all Timorese returned after independence (CAVR, 2005). If those 
that stayed in West Timor were more committed to Indonesia (including being afraid of 
reprisals from violent acts perpetrated in 1999), they would also be more likely to have 
their adolescents in school prior to the violent events that correlated with regime and 
sovereignty change in Timor. All other effects remaining unchanged, this would lead to 
a lowering in preferences to school in post-conflict at a district level due to an 
unobserved shift in the prevalent characteristics of people residing in those districts. If 
that is the case then, without correction, there could be an over-estimation of negative 
impacts of conflict on the choice of having adolescents attend secondary school. 
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To address this possible source of time-variant endogeneity, an IV approach was 
applied, using the distance to the western border of Timor-Leste with Indonesia as an 
instrument. This strategy made use of the fact that the Indonesian operations’ logistics 
were systematically supported through their western half of the island of Timor, as per 
CAVR (2005). This allowed for stronger control but also more violence to be enacted 
by Indonesia in the western districts of Timor-Leste. The forms of severe violence were 
also enabled by this logistical feature, again as reported in CAVR (2005), particularly in 
the case of the destruction enacted in the post-referendum,  with violence at a higher 
scale closer to the border, where pro-Indonesia militias received more support and were 
better armed. Therefore and as it was described in historical reports, namely Taylor 
(1990; 1999) and CAVR (2005), the distance to the border is expected to be correlated 
with the indicator of conflict used. Meanwhile, an observation of the most developed 
centres of Timor-Leste, the capital Dili, closer to the west, Baucau and Lospalos, in 
eastern districts and, finally, Maliana, near the western border, suggest that the 
Timorese post-conflict demand for education is not correlated with the distance to the 
border, allowing it to be a possible instrument. This intuition is confirmed by the 
descriptive statistics analysis performed as no significant correlation was found between 
the explained variable, attendance to secondary education, and distance to the border. 
The empirical model is, therefore, estimated using Probit, IV Probit and Heckman IV 
Probit regressions. As it is likely that more than one adolescent of secondary school age 
resided in the same household, the variance-covariance matrixes were clustered by 
household. As mentioned before the regressions were run with district and ethno-
linguistic controls.91 
                                                          
91 Empirical estimation is done using the STATA 13 SE software package. 
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4- Data Description 
This study uses the dataset of the Timor-Leste Survey of Living Standards of 2007 
(TLSLS, 2007), conducted by the Timorese National Directorate of Statistics (DNE), 
with the support of the World Bank and UNICEF. A representative set of 4,470 
households was interviewed, with 25,000 people surveyed, from all districts of Timor-
Leste, of which 4,102 are aged between 12 and 18 years old. 
The study uses a second dataset, the Human Rights Violations Database (CAVR, 2006), 
containing 11,315 observations of human rights abuses to generate the indicators of 
conflict. The observations were collected from narrative statements of deponents to the 
Timorese Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CAVR), qualitative reports from 
Amnesty International and data collected by the Timorese NGO FOKUPERS. Under the 
CAVR mandate, Benetech-HRDAG produced and presented calculations of human 
rights violations in Timor-Leste in support of the commission’s final report entitled 
“Chega!” (CAVR, 2005). 
Table 36: School attendance in 2004-05 per age (6 to 18 year olds) and gender (percentages) 
Age 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Female              
Prim. 6.6 25.8 49.7 72.4 81.4 80.3 81.8 73.4 59.4 47.2 32.6 15.8 15.4 
Sec. - - - - - - 2.9 10.5 25.3 35.4 46.9 57.7 51.4 
Male              
Prim. 8.0 24.0 49.4 71.6 76.8 83.3 81.4 78.6 68.6 51.3 44.6 24.2 20.9 
Sec. - - - - - - 2.7 8.4 18.2 28.1 37.3 50.0 48.9 
All              
Prim. 7.3 24.9 49.6 72.0 79.1 81.8 81.6 76.1 63.9 49.3 39.0 20.3 18.1 
Sec. - - - - - - 2.8 9.4 21.8 31.7 41.7 53.6 50.2 
Source: author’s calculations using TLSLS (2007) 
In Table 36, above, it is possible to notice some relevant characteristics of Timorese 
school attendance in the post-conflict school year of 2004-05. A first indication is of a 
late entry in school, with seeming detrimental impacts on entrance in secondary school. 
Notably, the age at which higher primary school enrolment is observed, 11 years old 
with 81.6% enrolled, is just one year shy of the age at which someone starting school at 
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the regular age of 6 and without repeating would begin secondary school. Consequently, 
only close to 3% of 12 year olds start secondary school and peak enrolment rate, at the 
age of 17, is only slightly above 50%. At the age of 18, nearly half the population is 
either seriously lagging behind, (even more so) still in primary education, or is already 
out of school. The significant reduction in attendance, after its maximum values, 
suggests a relatively small schooling attainment amongst young Timorese. The average 
school attainment of an 18 year old Timorese was approximately 6 years in 2004-05.  
Table 37: Secondary attendance in 2004-05 (age 
12 to 18) by district and type of residence 
District Rural Urban Total 
Aileu 14% . 14% 
Ainaro 23% 31% 27% 
Baucau 24% 43% 29% 
Bobonaro 17% 43% 26% 
Cova Lima 36% 40% 38% 
Dili 44% 48% 48% 
Ermera 11% 29% 12% 
Lautem 29% 34% 32% 
Liquica 13% 14% 13% 
Manufahi 34% 50% 42% 
Manatuto 29% 31% 29% 
Oecussi 11% 27% 20% 
Viqueque 18% 44% 28% 
Total 20% 39% 29% 
Source: author’s calculations using TLSLS (2007) 
Also noticeable is the great similitude in attendance rates amongst boys and girls with 
the very small difference found not to be statistically significant92. Table 37, above, 
reveals a very low secondary school attendance rate in Timor-Leste, below 30%. It also 
reveals significant regional differences in secondary school attendance. Nationwide and 
in half of the Timorese districts (highlighted) school attendance is also significantly 
different, depending on the typology of residence93. 
                                                          
92 A battery of t-tests on the difference of attendance for each age did not reject the null hypothesis of no 
difference in any of the cases. 
93 T-tests performed reject the hypothesis of equal average school attendance in rural and urban 
households of the districts mentioned. 
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Table 38: Secondary school attendance in 2004-05 by 
ethno-linguistic group and gender (age 12 to 18) 
Ethno-linguistic 
group 
Male Female Total 
Tetum 42% 53% 48% 
Baequeno 17% 23% 20% 
Bunak 30% 33% 31% 
Fatalucu 30% 36% 33% 
Galolen 31% 32% 32% 
Kaklun bi . 100% 100% 
Kemak 14% 26% 21% 
Laklei 33% 31% 32% 
Macalero 33% 42% 37% 
Macasae 26% 32% 29% 
Mangilih 50% . 50% 
Mambae 23% 23% 23% 
Midiki 24% 21% 23% 
Naueti 31% 19% 24% 
Sa ani 17% 14% 15% 
Tetum ter 32% 35% 33% 
Tokodete 16% 11% 14% 
Uaimua 35% 30% 32% 
Bahasa In 29% 20% 25% 
Portugues 100% . 100% 
Inggris 0% 100% 50% 
Other 28% 22% 25% 
Total 27% 32% 29% 
Source: author’s calculations using TLSLS (2007) 
A review of Table 38, above, reveals some significant differences in secondary school 
attendance between ethno-linguistic groups. It is important to notice that most of these 
differences correlate with the geographic diversity shown is the previous table, as most 
ethno-linguistic groups reside in one district alone. Among Tetum and Kemak speakers, 
average secondary school attendance of young women is statistically higher than of 
young men. In the remaining ethno-linguistic groups, gender differences are not 
statistically significant. 
As referred to in section 3, above, geographic and ethno-linguistic controls are used in 
the empirical strategy, to account for intrinsic differences as the ones suggested here. 
An analysis of the indicator of conflict used, in Table 39, below, shows that there is not 
much heterogeneity attributable to gender differences or type of residence: close to 21 
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percent of the adolescents lived through a shock of extreme violence during the time of 
the conflict and while they were already of school age. 
Table 39: Conflict indicators by gender and type of residence 
  Gender Urban / Rural 
All 
  Girls Boys Urban Rural 
Variable N=2001 N=2101 N=2049 N=2053 N=4102 
Shock of extreme violence during 
school 
21.9% 21.0% 21.1% 21.8% 21.5% 
(41.4%) (40.8%) (40.8%) (41.3%) (41.1%) 
Source: author’s calculations using TLSLS (2007) 
As expected, Table 40 below shows that school attendance is higher in urban areas. 
Interestingly, it is also higher among girls, a difference that is statistically significant. 
Other noticeable differences are the higher prevalence of migrants and of adolescents 
residing in households headed by an aunt or an uncle in urban areas while the 
percentage of married adolescents is slightly higher in rural areas. Other than in 
attendance, no significant differences are noticeable between girls and boys. 
Table 40: School attendance, individual, household and local level indicators 
  Gender Urban / Rural 
All 
  Girls Boys Urban Rural 
Variable N=2001 N=2101 N=2049 N=2053 N=4102 
Attending School in 2004/05 
32.0% 27.1% 38.7% 20.3% 29.5% 
(46.7%) (44.4%) (48.7%) (40.2%) (45.6%) 
Female 
- - 48.4% 49.1% 48.8% 
- - (50.0%) (50.0%) (50.0%) 
Urban 
50% 50% - - 50% 
(50.0%) (50.0%) - - (50.0%) 
Age 
15 15 15 15 15 
(2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 
Father Attended School 
4.9% 4.7% 6.7% 2.9% 4.8% 
(21.6%) (21.2%) (25.0%) (16.8%) (21.4%) 
Mother Attended School 
2.2% 2.6% 3.4% 1.5% 2.4% 
(14.8%) (16.0%) (18.0%) (12.2%) (15.4%) 
Migrated 
5.2% 5.0% 8.7% 1.6% 5.1% 
(22.3%) (21.9%) (28.2%) (12.6%) (22.1%) 
First child 
24.9% 26.0% 21.3% 29.6% 25.5% 
(43.3%) (43.9%) (41.0%) (45.7%) (43.6%) 
Adopted 
1.9% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 
(13.8%) (14.2%) (13.8%) (14.2%) (14.0%) 
Niece/Nephew 
7.5% 6.5% 10.2% 3.8% 7.0% 
(26.4%) (24.6%) (30.3%) (19.0%) (25.5%) 
Married 
1.8% 0.1% 0.7% 1.2% 1.0% 
(13.5%) (3.1%) (8.5%) (10.8%) (9.7%) 
Household Size 
7.3 7.3 7.6 6.9 7.3 
(2.6) (2.4) (2.6) (2.4) (2.5) 
Source: author’s calculations using TLSLS (2007) 
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An analysis of the indicators of education as an investment, in Table 41 shows that, on 
average, Timorese adolescents aged between 12 and 18 had completed only the first 
four years of basic education, with some advantage to urban residents. Expected returns 
to education are significantly low, much as the opportunity costs. The average local 
hourly wage potentially known to adolescents in urban areas is significantly higher than 
the one an average rural adolescent would expect on average to attain. The households 
own close to one cow and only very few had a loan denied.  
Table 41: Indicators of education as an investment 
  Gender Urban / Rural 
All 
  Girls Boys Urban Rural 
Variable N=2001 N=2101 N=2049 N=2053 N=4102 
Completed Years of Education 
4 4 5 3 4 
(3) (3) (3) (3) (3) 
E(Returns to Education) 
0.63% 0.56% 0.57% 0.62% 0.59% 
(1.1%) (1.3%) (1.2%) (1.3%) (1.2%) 
Average Local hourly wage 
0.06 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.06 
(0.18) (0.19) (0.23) (0.10) (0.18) 
Number of cows owned 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 
(3.7) (4.9) (4.7) (4.0) (4.4) 
Household had loan denied 
2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
(15%) (14%) (14%) (14%) (14%) 
Source: author’s calculations using TLSLS (2007) 
The analysis of Table 42, below, again reveals some heterogeneity between urban and 
rural areas. Urban households have, on average, higher income, face higher education 
costs, have access to more external financial support and their adolescents take less time 
to reach school. Perceptions of school quality also differ between urban and rural 
dwellers: in rural areas perceptions of insufficient quality, access and insecurity are 
significantly more prevalent than in urban areas. On the other hand, there are no 
significant differences in the average values of the indicators for girls and boys.  
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Table 42: Indicators of education as a consumption good 
  Gender Urban / Rural 
All 
  Girls Boys Urban Rural 
Variable N=2001 N=2101 N=2049 N=2053 N=4102 
Per capita Monthly Household 
Income 
25.4 24.4 29.3 20.5 24.9 
(31.2) (30.2) (41.7) (10.5) (30.7) 
Average local education costs 
(monthly) 
27.1 26.7 33.5 20.2 26.9 
(18.9) (17.7) (21.4) (11.2) (18.3) 
Average local subsidies to education 
1.7 1.6 2.3 1.0 1.6 
(3.9) (4.1) (4.5) (3.2) (4.0) 
Average local time to secondary 
school (in minutes) 
28.8 28.4 23.0 34.1 28.6 
(17.6) (16.5) (11.7) (19.6) (17.1) 
Insufficient Quality 
2.2% 2.2% 1.6% 2.8% 2.2% 
(2.3%) (2.3%) (1.5%) (2.8%) (2.3%) 
Insufficient Access 
6.4% 6.3% 5.0% 7.6% 6.3% 
(3.6%) (3.6%) (2.8%) (3.9%) (3.6%) 
Insufficient Security 
0.8% 0.8% 0.6% 1.0% 0.8% 
(1.3%) (1.3%) (0.8%) (1.6%) (1.3%) 
Source: author’s calculations using TLSLS (2007) 
As a first approximation to the analysis of medium-run impacts of conflict on school 
attendance, in Table 43, below, it is possible to compare the average probability of 
attendance and the average values of the covariates described in section 3, depending on 
whether the household experienced the shock of extreme violence or not. There is a 
statistically significant indication that those adolescents that witnessed extreme levels of 
violence during the conflict and while they were of school age are more likely to have 
attended secondary school in 2004/05. Other differences found are: higher likelihood of 
an adolescent that witnessed a shock of extreme violence to live with uncles of aunts; 
lower expected returns to education, which appear to be negative, on average, for those 
that experienced extreme levels of conflict; higher ownership of financial collateral and 
better access to credit (on average) of households that witnessed a shock of extreme 
violence during the life of the adolescent. 
This brief analysis of the variables in this study shows some significant dimensions of 
heterogeneity between boys and girls, between urban and rural areas, and also within 
the groups. This suggests the interest in analysing demand for secondary education also 
for the subsamples of boys and girls and urban and rural dwellers. It also reveals the 
need to account for district and ethno-linguistic fixed effects. Some indication exists of 
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a higher preference for education of those that experienced higher levels of violence 
during the conflict, as the qualitative references collected also suggested. 
In the next section, these suggestions will be tested. 
Table 43: Descriptive statistics on the experience of extreme conflict 
  Experienced Extreme Violence 
All 
  Yes No 
Variable 880 3222 4102 
Attending School in 2004/05 
39.5% 26.7% 29.5% 
(48.9%) (44.3%) (45.6%) 
Female 
50% 49% 49% 
(50.0%) (50.0%) (50.0%) 
Age 
16 15 15 
(1) (2) (2) 
Urban 
49% 50% 50% 
(50.0%) (50.0%) (50.0%) 
Father Attended School 
5.1% 4.7% 4.8% 
(22.0%) (21.2%) (21.4%) 
Mother Attended School 
2.8% 2.3% 2.4% 
(16.6%) (15.1%) (15.4%) 
Migrated 
6.4% 4.8% 5.1% 
(24.4%) (21.4%) (22.1%) 
First child 
26.8% 25.1% 25.5% 
(44.3%) (43.4%) (43.6%) 
Adopted 
1.5% 2.1% 2.0% 
(12.1%) (14.5%) (14.0%) 
Niece/Nephew 
10.3% 6.1% 7.0% 
(30.5%) (23.9%) (25.5%) 
Household Size 
6.9 7.4 7.3 
(2.5) (2.5) (2.5) 
Completed Years of Education 
5 4 4 
2 3 3 
E(Returns to Education) 
-1.23% 1.09% 0.59% 
(1.53%) (0.42%) (1.25%) 
Average Local hourly wage 
0.09 0.05 0.06 
(0.3) (0.1) (0.2) 
Number of cows owned 
2.2 0.7 1.0 
(7.0) (3.2) (4.4) 
Household had loan denied 
1% 2% 2% 
(8.2%) (15.6%) (14.3%) 
Per capita Monthly Household Income 
25.9 24.6 24.9 
(14.7) (33.8) (30.7) 
Average local education costs (monthly) 
23.7 27.7 26.9 
(14.1) (19.2) (18.3) 
Average local subsidies to education 
0.9 1.8 1.6 
(1.7) (4.4) (4.0) 
Insufficient Quality 
1.8% 2.4% 2.2% 
(1.1%) (2.5%) (2.3%) 
Insufficient Access 
7.3% 6.0% 6.3% 
(3.6%) (3.6%) (3.6%) 
Insufficient Security 
1.0% 0.8% 0.8% 
(1.8%) (1.1%) (1.3%) 
Source: author’s calculations using TLSLS (2007) 
5- Results 
The starting point of the empirical analysis of secondary school demand will take us to 
test the possibility of selection bias, as discussed in section 3. As also discussed there, 
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tests of endogeneity of the conflict indicator and of the household income were 
performed to establish if an IV approach should be adopted regarding the respective 
regressors, both in a linear probability regression (Probit or IV Probit) or in a bivariate 
binomial regression with sample selection (Heckman Probit or Heckman IV Probit). In 
both cases, the instruments discussed in section 3 were proven to be significant under 
the Sargan test. Exogeneity was rejected for the conflict indicator in all cases, following 
the test procedure presented in Wooldridge (2010:587), and therefore, the respective IV 
estimates were used. It was also rejected for the proxy of household income in the first 
stage model of the bivariate binomial regression with sample selection and again the IV 
estimates were used. In the estimations of the models of demand for secondary 
education, both in the second stage of the Heckman Probit and in the linear probability 
regressions, exogeneity of the proxy of household income could not be rejected 
following the test procedure presented in Wooldridge (2010:587). Therefore, in these 
cases, the proxy of household income discussed in section 3 was used. 
Table 44: Secondary Education Demand - Heckman Probit Regression - First Stage 
 (1st Stage) 
 Heckman IV Probit 
 b/se 
Explained variable = Probability of adolescent, between ages 12 and 18, to have  completed primary school before the 2004/05 
school year 
Constant -19.183*** 
 (2.693) 
Conflict: Shock of extreme violence during school life 2.327*** 
 (0.272) 
Female 0.040 
 (0.061) 
Age 2.072*** 
 (0.321) 
Age2 -0.055*** 
 (0.010) 
Urban -0.221* 
 (0.130) 
Father attended school -0.081 
 (0.171) 
Mother attended school -0.273 
 (0.230) 
Migrated -0.189 
 (0.189) 
First child 0.031 
 (0.083) 
Adopted -0.194 
 (0.238) 
Niece/Nephew -0.003 
 (0.154) 
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Table 44: Secondary Education Demand - Heckman Probit Regression - First Stage (cont.) 
 (1st Stage) 
 Heckman IV Probit 
 b/se 
Explained variable = Probability of adolescent, between ages 12 and 18, to have  completed primary school before the 2004/05 
school year 
Married -0.094 
 (0.373) 
Ln (Household Size) 0.187 
 (0.123) 
Share of boys 0-1 -0.614 
 (0.977) 
Share of boys 2-4 0.394 
 (0.586) 
Share of boys 5-9 0.600 
 (0.440) 
Share of boys 10-14 0.047 
 (0.379) 
Share of men above 65 -0.413 
 (0.589) 
Share of girls 0-1 -0.614 
 (0.777) 
Share of girls 2-4 0.100 
 (0.637) 
Share of girls 5-9 0.105 
 (0.495) 
Share of girls 10-14 0.572 
 (0.387) 
Share of women above 65 -0.248 
 (0.705) 
E(Returns to Education) 66.600*** 
 (9.599) 
Average local wage -0.237 
 (0.198) 
Number of cows owned -0.004 
 (0.007) 
Loan was denied -0.125 
 (0.304) 
E (Per capita Monthly Household Income) 0.034*** 
 (0.009) 
Average local education costs -0.000 
 (0.003) 
Average local subsidies to education 0.025** 
 (0.012) 
Average time to primary school -0.007** 
 (0.003) 
Insufficient Access -3.471* 
 (2.034) 
Insufficient Quality -33.641*** 
 (11.988) 
Insufficient Security -10.816 
 (14.788) 
N 4091 
N – uncensored 1396 
Pseudo R2 - 
Log-likelihood -84604.710 
Exogeneity test (H0: athrho=0)  
 c 1.640 
p-value (0.200) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Source: author’s calculations on data from TLSLS (2007) and CAVR (2006) 
Table 44 (above) presents the empirical estimates of the proposed selection model: the 
first stage of the proposed Heckman Probit approach. The likelihood of having 
completed primary school education for an adolescent aged between 12 and 18 years 
old correlates significantly and positively with the experience of a shock of extreme 
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violence during school. It is also significantly correlated with a set of correlates of 
demand for education, among those discussed in section 2: age (positively, with a 
second order correction effect); expected returns to education (positively); household 
income (positively); average local subsidies to education (positively); average local 
time to primary school (negatively); perceptions of insufficient access (negatively) and 
perceptions of insufficient quality (negatively).  
The key test of selection in demand for secondary education on the conditions of 
completion of primary education can be read in the statistical significance of the statistic 
athrho, presented in Table 44. It can be noticed that the statistic is not significant. The 
𝜒2 test statistic and p-value also show one cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity. Therefore, although there was a reasonable theoretical suspicion that a 
significant correlation between completion of primary education and attendance of 
secondary education existed, it does not seem to be the case. As the Heckman Probit 
model is estimated through a Full Information Maximum Likelihood method, the 
respective estimates for the coefficient result from an assumed asymptotic distribution 
that is different from the ones that result from a Probit or IV Probit estimation. The 
results of the second stage Heckman Probit model will therefore not be explored. They 
are, however, presented in the appendix in Table 6094. Not having found evidence of 
selection bias, the approach to the empirical analysis of demand for secondary education 
in post-conflict Timor will instead be pursued through both the Probit and IV Probit 
approaches, presented in Table 45 below. 
It is important to highlight some variables that would theoretically be expected to be 
significant for the demand of secondary education but are empirically rejected as such. 
                                                          
94 For comparison purposes, the estimates of coefficients of the Probit and IV Probit regressions in Table 
60 are based on the sub-sample of those that completed primary school and is therefore a result of 
censoring in the sample. 
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Among these and most notably are the household income95 and the local average 
education costs96. Parent’s education97, gender98, status in the household (being a first 
child99, being adopted or a niece or nephew), the composition of the household and the 
indicators of credit constraints100 were also found not to be significant determinants of 
demand for secondary education in 2004/05 Timor. 
Table 45: Secondary Education Demand – Probit and IV Probit Regressions and Marginal Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Marginal Effects 
 Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Explained variable = Probability of adolescent between ages 12 and 18, to have attended secondary school in the 2004/05 school 
year 
Constant -30.438*** -22.343*** - - 
 (3.253) (3.320) - - 
Conflict: Shock of extreme 
violence during school life 
1.815*** 13.559*** 0.264*** 2.033*** 
(0.275) (2.771) (0.038) (0.396) 
Female 0.074 0.060 0.011 0.009 
 (0.080) (0.079) (0.012) (0.012) 
Age 3.472*** 2.366*** 0.505*** 0.355*** 
 (0.396) (0.424) (0.057) (0.065) 
Age2 -0.107*** -0.072*** -0.016*** -0.011*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.002) (0.002) 
Urban -0.231** -0.383*** -0.034** -0.057*** 
 (0.117) (0.117) (0.017) (0.017) 
Father Attended School 0.251 -0.112 0.036 -0.017 
 (0.226) (0.233) (0.033) (0.035) 
Mother Attended School 0.046 0.147 0.007 0.022 
 (0.237) (0.231) (0.035) (0.035) 
Migrated -0.023 -2.137*** -0.003 -0.320*** 
 (0.202) (0.509) (0.029) (0.073) 
First Child 0.094 0.141 0.014 0.021 
 (0.113) (0.112) (0.016) (0.017) 
Adopted 0.012 -0.257 0.002 -0.039 
 (0.252) (0.258) (0.037) (0.039) 
Niece/Nephew -0.174 -0.237 -0.025 -0.036 
 (0.185) (0.181) (0.027) (0.027) 
Married -5.220*** -3.903*** -0.759*** -0.585*** 
 (0.849) (0.583) (0.118) (0.084) 
  
                                                          
95 In previous studies, as Cameron and Heckman (2001), Chow and Shen (2006) on China or Lincove 
(2012) in Nigeria, the household’s income and wealth were found to have a significant effect on 
education demand. Deng et al. (2014) on China also had found such effect to be significant, more for girls 
than for boys. 
96 Found to be significant by studies such as Weir (2011) on Ethiopia. 
97 Found to be a significant covariate in studies such as the ones conducted by Qian and Smyth (2011) on 
China or Oketch et al. (2012) on Kenya. 
98 Referred recently in studies such as Albert and David (2012) on the Philippines. 
99 Referred as important in the qualitative interviews but also is studies such as Kingdon and Theopold 
(2008). 
100 Found to be relevant determinants of education demand in India by Kingdon and Theopold (2008) and, 
specifically in Andhra Pradesh, by Masset (2010) 
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Table 45: Secondary Education Demand – Probit and IV Probit Regressions and Marginal Effects 
(c.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Marginal Effects 
 Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Explained variable = Probability of adolescent between ages 12 and 18, to have attended secondary school in the 2004/05 school 
year 
Ln (Household Size) 0.238* 0.170 0.035* 0.025 
 (0.141) (0.143) (0.021) (0.022) 
Share of boys 0-1 0.316 -1.304 0.046 -0.195 
 (0.918) (0.980) (0.134) (0.146) 
Share of boys 2-4 -0.410 -1.336* -0.060 -0.200* 
 (0.697) (0.724) (0.101) (0.108) 
Share of boys 5-9 0.225 0.718 0.033 0.108 
 (0.496) (0.510) (0.072) (0.076) 
Share of boys 10-14 -0.371 -0.063 -0.054 -0.009 
 (0.478) (0.484) (0.070) (0.073) 
Share of men above 65 -0.059 -0.421 -0.009 -0.063 
 (0.765) (0.765) (0.111) (0.114) 
Share of girls 0-1 -0.223 1.278 -0.032 0.192 
 (0.960) (0.970) (0.140) (0.144) 
Share of girls 2-4 -0.733 -1.935** -0.107 -0.290** 
 (0.846) (0.870) (0.124) (0.132) 
Share of girls 5-9 -0.459 -0.389 -0.067 -0.058 
 (0.516) (0.527) (0.075) (0.079) 
Share of girls 10-14 0.818* 0.650 0.119* 0.097 
 (0.453) (0.452) (0.066) (0.068) 
Share of women above 65 -2.473** -0.593 -0.360** -0.089 
 (1.003) (1.032) (0.143) (0.154) 
Completed Years of Education 0.473*** 0.190*** 0.069*** 0.029*** 
 (0.037) (0.065) (0.003) (0.010) 
E(Returns to Education) 108.457*** 312.137*** 15.777*** 46.796*** 
 (11.175) (56.633) (1.384) (7.975) 
Average local wage -0.133 -0.150 -0.019 -0.023 
 (0.196) (0.190) (0.028) (0.029) 
Number of cows owned 0.006 -0.017 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) 
Household had a loan denied 0.118 -0.247 0.017 -0.037 
 (0.232) (0.253) (0.034) (0.038) 
Per capita Monthly Household 
Expenditure 
0.001 0.002** 0.000 0.000** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Average local education costs 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Average local subsidies to 
education 
0.027** 0.044*** 0.004** 0.007*** 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) 
Average time to secondary school -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Insufficient Access -4.782** 4.746 -0.696** 0.712 
 (2.185) (3.065) (0.316) (0.456) 
Insufficient Quality -27.023** -39.957*** -3.931** -5.990*** 
 (11.588) (10.690) (1.686) (1.581) 
Insufficient Security -27.842* -52.132*** -4.050* -7.816*** 
 (14.245) (13.569) (2.080) (2.020) 
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethno-linguistic fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4099 4099 - - 
Pseudo-R2 0.5742 0.5614 - - 
Log-likelihood -42225.329 -43496.579 - - 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: author’s calculations on data from TLSLS (2007) and CAVR (2006) 
On the other hand, both the Probit and IV Probit regressions suggest that an effect from 
conflict may exist over the demand for secondary education in Timor, five years after it 
finished. According to the Probit marginal effect estimates (column 3), an adolescent 
that was one standard deviation more likely to have experienced a shock of extreme 
violence while of school age would have been, in 2004/05, 11% more likely to have 
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attended secondary school than an otherwise similar one. According to IV Probit 
marginal effect estimates (column 4) the difference would have been much higher, i.e. 
84% more. While the value of the IV Probit may appear excessive, it seems to confirm 
that the endogeneity the use of instruments sought to correct was indeed one of 
underestimation, suggesting therefore that the real effect is superior to the one estimated 
through the Probit regression. Nonetheless, while the absolute values of the IV Probit 
estimates are much higher, the estimated standard deviations are also much higher, 
suggesting lower efficiency. It is noticed that this suggested effect holds in an empirical 
model that encompasses many of the theoretically expected covariates of demand for 
education. 
An analysis of these also confers some interesting insights. In agreement with the 
indication of late entry into education and looking at marginal effects estimates 
(columns 3 and 4), an added year of education correlates with a higher probability of 
attendance. The estimates suggest this increase to be between 22% and 31% in the 
Probit regression and between 16% and 22% in IV Probit regression, decreasing with 
age. Those adolescents residing in urban settings appear to have a slightly lower 
probability to attend secondary school, between 3.4% and 5.7% less, than otherwise 
similar rural adolescents101. Marriage presents itself as a critical life changing effect, 
compromising education progression in post-conflict Timor. Depending on the 
regression method, the estimated marginal effects suggest a reduction in the probability 
of attending secondary school lower by 59% to 75% for a married adolescent, relative to 
an otherwise equal unmarried one.102 While the household income appear either to be 
                                                          
101 However, many other correlates show to be more beneficial in urban setting and significantly leading 
to higher probabilities of school attendance. Their coefficients seem high enough for the urban effect to 
be suggested as a correction of those. 
102 As an illustration, these were the words of a man interviewed, from the sub-district of Laclubar, 
district of Manatuto: 
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statistically insignificant or to yield close to null estimated average marginal effects (as 
shown in column 4), external support to education seems to significantly promote a 
higher attendance to secondary school103. The marginal effects of a one standard 
deviation increase in support (corresponding to an increase in USD$4.00 per month) 
seemingly corresponds to an increase in the probability of attendance of 2% to 3%. A 
reduction in the time cost of transiting to school, namely through better transport or an 
increase in the school density, also correlates with higher secondary school 
attendance104. A decrease of one standard deviation, 17.1 minutes, appears to yield an 
estimated increase in school attendance of close to 2%. Finally, also the perceptions of 
school quality and conditions of security in accessing education in 2004/05 appear to be 
significant105. A prevalence of drop-outs in the district attributed to insufficient quality 
that were to be lower in one standard deviation (i.e. of 2.3% less) appears to correspond 
to a probability of school attendance higher in 9% to 14%. On the same token, a 
prevalence of drop-outs in the district attributed to insufficient security that were to be 
lower in one standard deviation (i.e. of 1.3% less) would, on average, correspond to an 
estimated probability of school attendance higher in 5% to 10%. 
These empirical results while suggesting a possible peace dividend in secondary 
education, a higher preference for school among those that experienced higher levels of 
violence, also confirms much of the theoretical expected results regarding other 
covariates of education demand. The analysis of the covariates suggests some insight on 
                                                                                                                                                                          
‘My first daughter went to Kupang, Indonesia. She didn’t finish secondary school because she 
married. Now she has 5 children. My second son only completed pre-secondary. He didn’t 
follow school because of too much love, so he married already and lives in (…) Soibada’ 
Second man from Laclubar (2012) 
103 Glewwe and Kassouf (2012) had also found positive effects of cash transfer programmes in Brazil in 
stimulating demand for education. 
104 Distance to school was also seen as a barrier to demand in Ethiopia, by Weir (2011) 
105 This result finds resonance in others, like Kingdon and Theopold (2008) on India or Weir (2011) on 
Ethiopia. 
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indirect effects of conflict. In this case, the suggestion is that these may be detrimental. 
As seen above, demand for secondary education appears to significantly increase with 
higher returns to education and perceptions of better school quality, while not being 
significantly reactive to household income. As discussed in section 2, all these 
dimensions are likely to still suffer from ill-effects of conflict, even 5 years after it has 
passed. Particularly in the case of returns to education there seems to be evidence in 
Timor, as estimated in Chapter 1, that this may be the case. If so, these dimensions can 
restrain the improvement in attendance of secondary school, despite household and 
adolescent’s preferences towards it. 
In order to assert whether there may be a measurable and inferable middle-run legacy of 
conflict, a set of robustness tests was performed. The first test sought to test the 
robustness of the estimate of impact of conflict to the introduction of the systemic 
covariates included in the vectors 𝑋1, 𝑋2 and 𝑋3 of the empirical model. This was done 
in a stepwise process and the results presented in Table 61, in the appendix. Looking 
into the first stage, although the distance to the border is shown to be strong, one cannot 
reject the exogeneity of conflict and the IV Probit estimate cannot be used in the 
simplest demand model. The estimate of the IV Probit regression appears not to be very 
robust to the introduction of the second set of covariates, with the instrument appearing 
to be less significant and despite the rejection of exogeneity. However, the Probit 
estimates keep their sign and show relatively similar values for the estimated coefficient 
in all three regression models (columns 1, 3 and 5). Some concern should be put on the 
relative weakness of the IV Probit estimates. Nonetheless, it may result from the fact 
that, by construction, the IV estimates for the conflict indicator, generated in the first 
step, are dependent on the variables and quality of that regression. Bearing this in mind, 
the addition of 𝑋2and 𝑋3 into the empirical model adds sound theoretically established 
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determinants of demand for education, most of them found significant in the IV Probit 
estimation and allowing for IV estimates that show to be robust in the remaining tests. 
Therefore, the IV estimates were still accepted. A second test looked into the 
assumption that school age started when the individual reached the age of 6 years. The 
presumption here is that the individual would have been expected to start school at that 
age. While that is the legal age of first enrolment in primary school, it is not possible to 
know whether that would have been the case. Bearing in mind the indication of late 
entry into school, alternate indicators of conflict were constructed assuming that school 
had started at the age of 7 or 8 and regressions were conducted with the full set of 
covariates of demand for secondary education. The results are presented in Table 62 in 
the appendix. As it can be seen there, although there is a relative (and expectable) 
reduction in the value of the coefficients, they remain positive, sufficiently high and 
statistically significant. The assumptions regarding entry can be differently explored in 
an added robustness test. With school starting at age 7 or 8, the cohort of reference can 
be assumed to be, respectively, between 13 and 19 and between 14 and 20 years old. 
The results of this test are presented in Table 63 in the appendix. Both Probit and IV 
Probit estimates show themselves significant and robust. Nonetheless, as before, there is 
suggestion that the IV Probit estimates are much less efficient. Another test was done on 
the assumption that an extreme shock of violence corresponds to an annual average 
level of killings in the district of birth in excess of 2 standard deviation for the average 
level for all years and districts during the Indonesian occupation (1975-1999). The test 
was done by constructing alternative indicators of conflict with a threshold of 1 or 3 
standard deviations above average and with the regressions being conducted with the 
full set of covariates of demand for secondary education. The results are presented in 
Table 64 in the appendix. Again, the estimates, both of the Probit and the IV Probit 
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regressions appear to be robust, although the latter estimators show themselves to have 
higher standard deviations and, therefore, less efficient. Finally a test was done on the 
assumption that the extreme levels of violence during the conflict were experienced by 
the adolescents in their own districts of birth. That would not be the case for those that 
migrated out of their district of birth before reaching their school age or while of school 
age. In that case, the assumption generates a measurement error as they would have, in 
fact, experienced different levels of violence. The test of this assumption had the 
regressions ran only with the sub-sample of those that did not migrate, with the full set 
of covariates, and are presented in Table 65 in the appendix. Also here both the Probit 
and IV estimates show themselves as robust, keeping the sign, significance and not 
changing the value of the coefficient significantly. Here again, the IV Probit estimators, 
with much higher standard deviations, appear less efficient. Based on the results of 
these estimations and the robustness tests, one can find empirical support to affirm that 
a positive medium-run effect of conflict existed over the demand for secondary 
education in 2004/05, five years after the conflict ended. Considering that much of the 
theoretically established covariates of demand are part of the empirical model, there is a 
possible suggestion that this effect operates via preferences. Another channel can be 
post-conflict aid that is not explicitly controlled in the model, although it would be 
likely to induce effects via the household income, access to school, opportunity costs, 
explicit in the empirical model, or preferences themselves (via “nudging” effects). A 
decomposition of the sample according to gender, in Table 46 (with the first-stage of the 
IV Probit in Table 66 in appendix), and urban/rural residence, in Table 47 (with the first 
stage of the IV Probit in Table 67 in appendix), may allow for some unpicking of the 
effects. 
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A reading of Table 46 shows that the coefficient of the impact of conflict on demand for 
the boys in all regressions is higher than for girls. The difference does not appear 
significant except in the IV regressions. However, in Table 66 it can be seen that the IV 
regression with the subsample of girls does not generate inferable estimates, as the 
instrument isn’t a significant regressor of conflict. On the other hand, the coefficient in 
the regression for boys is not statistically significant. Some statistical weaknesses can 
also be found in the regressions on urban and rural subsamples, as shown in Table 67 
(in the appendix) and Table 47. 
Table 46: Secondary Education Demand – Marginal Effects - Probit and IV Probit Regressions – 
All and decomposition by gender 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Sample Girls Boys 
 Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Explained variable = Probability of adolescent between ages 12 and 18, to have attended secondary school in the 2004/05 school 
year 
Conflict: Shock of 
extreme violence during 
school life 
0.264*** 2.033*** 0.263*** 0.540* 0.275*** 2.079 
(0.038) (0.396) (0.056) (0.291) (0.053) (1.599) 
Female 0.011 0.009 . . . . 
 (0.012) (0.012) . . . . 
Age 0.505*** 0.355*** 0.583*** 0.508*** 0.436*** 0.291** 
 (0.057) (0.065) (0.082) (0.080) (0.077) (0.121) 
Age2 -0.016*** -0.011*** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.008** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
Urban -0.034** -0.057*** -0.043** -0.030 -0.029 -0.058** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023) (0.027) 
Father Attended School 0.036 -0.017 0.053 0.033 0.027 -0.024 
 (0.033) (0.035) (0.039) (0.040) (0.048) (0.062) 
Mother Attended School 0.007 0.022 -0.110* -0.096* 0.067 0.083 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.059) (0.058) (0.049) (0.051) 
Migrated -0.003 -0.320*** -0.074 -0.093 0.044 -0.295 
 (0.029) (0.073) (0.047) (0.062) (0.035) (0.292) 
First Child 0.014 0.021 0.030 0.031 -0.003 0.005 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) 
Adopted 0.002 -0.039 0.013 0.007 -0.024 -0.062 
 (0.037) (0.039) (0.051) (0.052) (0.055) (0.068) 
Niece/Nephew -0.025 -0.036 -0.019 -0.026 -0.033 -0.043 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.036) 
Married -0.759*** -0.585*** -0.539*** -0.542*** (a) (a) 
 (0.118) (0.084) (0.091) (0.078) (a) (a) 
Ln (Household Size) 0.035* 0.025 0.046 0.049 0.017 0.005 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.028) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) 
Share of boys 0-1 0.046 -0.195 -0.165 -0.209 0.302* 0.067 
 (0.134) (0.146) (0.164) (0.165) (0.168) (0.257) 
Share of boys 2-4 -0.060 -0.200* -0.149 -0.233 0.035 -0.075 
 (0.101) (0.108) (0.144) (0.148) (0.133) (0.167) 
Share of boys 5-9 0.033 0.108 0.037 0.058 0.019 0.112 
 (0.072) (0.076) (0.095) (0.096) (0.095) (0.119) 
Share of boys 10-14 -0.054 -0.009 -0.134 -0.128 0.012 0.065 
 (0.070) (0.073) (0.093) (0.093) (0.103) (0.110) 
Share of men above 65 -0.009 -0.063 0.022 -0.030 -0.027 -0.067 
 (0.111) (0.114) (0.143) (0.148) (0.151) (0.159) 
Share of girls 0-1 -0.032 0.192 0.019 0.054 -0.067 0.150 
 (0.140) (0.144) (0.150) (0.157) (0.219) (0.294) 
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Table 46: Secondary Education Demand – Marginal Effects - Probit and IV Probit Regressions – 
All and decomposition by gender (cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Sample Girls Boys 
 Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Explained variable = Probability of adolescent between ages 12 and 18, to have attended secondary school in the 2004/05 school 
year 
Share of girls 2-4 -0.107 -0.290** 0.104 0.058 -0.270 -0.479* 
 (0.124) (0.132) (0.118) (0.122) (0.197) (0.255) 
Share of girls 5-9 -0.067 -0.058 -0.174 -0.205* 0.010 0.053 
 (0.075) (0.079) (0.112) (0.115) (0.097) (0.103) 
Share of girls 10-14 0.119* 0.097 0.046 0.046 0.175* 0.168* 
 (0.066) (0.068) (0.085) (0.086) (0.092) (0.096) 
Share of women above 65 -0.360** -0.089 -0.370** -0.282 -0.415** -0.128 
 (0.143) (0.154) (0.176) (0.189) (0.206) (0.295) 
Completed Years of 
Education 
0.069*** 0.029*** 0.069*** 0.063*** 0.068*** 0.026 
(0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.038) 
E(Returns to Education) 15.777*** 46.796*** 15.632*** 16.414*** 16.704*** 48.525 
 (1.384) (7.975) (2.102) (6.013) (2.062) (32.008) 
Average local wage -0.019 -0.023 0.002 -0.003 -0.057 -0.059 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.034) (0.032) (0.044) (0.047) 
Number of cows owned 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.004** 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Household had a loan 
denied 
0.017 -0.037 -0.010 -0.026 0.028 -0.026 
(0.034) (0.038) (0.037) (0.040) (0.050) (0.065) 
Per capita Monthly 
Household Expenditure 
0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Average local education 
costs 
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Average local subsidies to 
education 
0.004** 0.007*** 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.007** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Average time to secondary 
school 
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000** -0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Insufficient Access -0.696** 0.712 -0.833** -0.770* -0.529 0.798 
 (0.316) (0.456) (0.419) (0.468) (0.435) (1.211) 
Insufficient Quality -3.931** -5.990*** -4.080 -1.405 -4.951** -7.133*** 
 (1.686) (1.581) (2.539) (1.864) (1.986) (2.358) 
Insufficient Security -4.050* -7.816*** -4.564 -2.942 -4.693* -7.998** 
 (2.080) (2.020) (2.894) (2.760) (2.806) (3.377) 
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethno-linguistic fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4099 4099 1997 1997 2096 2096 
Statistics from the underlying regressions 
Pseudo-R2 0.5742 0.5614 0.6241 0.6091 0.5529 0.5405 
Log-likelihood -42225.329 -43496.579 -18667.559 -19416.317 -22038.121 -22646.023 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (a) perfectly predicts failure; Source: author’s calculations on data from TLSLS (2007) and CAVR 
(2006) 
The effect suggested in Table 47 are of a higher impact being felt in urban areas than in 
rural ones where the IV Probit estimate is non-significant. However, within the urban 
subsample the instrument is shown in Table 67 to be weak and exogeneity cannot be 
rejected, rendering invalid an inference based on the IV estimates. It is, therefore, not 
possible to infer significant impacts of conflict within either of the subsamples. The 
difference, much more tenuous, is still apparent in the Probit estimates. It may be the 
case that post-conflict economic development provides a slightly stronger signal on the 
benefits of education to urban dwellers.  
178 
 
Table 47: Secondary Education Demand – Marginal Effects - Probit and IV Probit Regressions – 
All and decomposition by urban/rural 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Sample Urban Rural 
 Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Explained variable = Probability of adolescent between ages 12 and 18, to have attended secondary school in the 2004/05 school 
year 
Conflict: Shock of 
extreme violence 
during school life 
0.264*** 2.033*** 0.291*** 2.692*** 0.256*** -1.064 
(0.038) (0.396) (0.066) (0.741) (0.051) (6.350) 
Female 0.011 0.009 0.034 0.035 0.004 0.006 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.022) (0.022) (0.013) (0.016) 
Age 0.505*** 0.355*** 0.802*** 0.570*** 0.382*** 0.463 
 (0.057) (0.065) (0.102) (0.114) (0.067) (0.395) 
Age2 -0.016*** -0.011*** -0.025*** -0.018*** -0.012*** -0.014 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.013) 
Urban -0.034** -0.057*** . . . . 
 (0.017) (0.017) . . . . 
Father Attended School 0.036 -0.017 0.067** 0.000 0.013 0.035 
 (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.041) (0.049) (0.166) 
Mother Attended School 0.007 0.022 -0.064 -0.050 0.039 0.040 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.053) (0.053) (0.039) (0.054) 
Migrated -0.003 -0.320*** 0.029 -0.372*** 0.012 0.176 
 (0.029) (0.073) (0.040) (0.136) (0.045) (1.156) 
First Child 0.014 0.021 0.028 0.037 0.005 0.001 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.033) (0.034) (0.018) (0.032) 
Adopted 0.002 -0.039 -0.053 -0.118* 0.013 0.046 
 (0.037) (0.039) (0.064) (0.070) (0.041) (0.146) 
Niece/Nephew -0.025 -0.036 -0.109*** -0.134*** 0.027 0.030 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.041) (0.042) (0.028) (0.038) 
Married -0.759*** -0.585*** -0.904*** -0.749*** (a) (a) 
 (0.118) (0.084) (0.162) (0.134) (a) (a) 
Ln (Household Size) 0.035* 0.025 0.091** 0.082** 0.022 0.028 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.036) (0.038) (0.024) (0.043) 
Share of boys 0-1 0.046 -0.195 0.144 -0.168 0.100 0.244 
 (0.134) (0.146) (0.264) (0.284) (0.153) (0.842) 
Share of boys 2-4 -0.060 -0.200* -0.060 -0.246 -0.050 -0.014 
 (0.101) (0.108) (0.174) (0.186) (0.121) (0.395) 
Share of boys 5-9 0.033 0.108 0.088 0.186 0.054 0.020 
 (0.072) (0.076) (0.130) (0.133) (0.085) (0.261) 
Share of boys 10-14 -0.054 -0.009 -0.089 -0.061 -0.019 -0.030 
 (0.070) (0.073) (0.124) (0.124) (0.083) (0.169) 
Share of men above 65 -0.009 -0.063 -0.247 -0.316 0.060 0.049 
 (0.111) (0.114) (0.249) (0.261) (0.121) (0.151) 
Share of girls 0-1 -0.032 0.192 0.125 0.433* -0.110 -0.272 
 (0.140) (0.144) (0.234) (0.253) (0.182) (0.853) 
Share of girls 2-4 -0.107 -0.290** -0.117 -0.313 -0.110 -0.018 
 (0.124) (0.132) (0.292) (0.302) (0.123) (0.552) 
Share of girls 5-9 -0.067 -0.058 -0.245* -0.270* 0.045 0.057 
 (0.075) (0.079) (0.146) (0.152) (0.078) (0.090) 
Share of girls 10-14 0.119* 0.097 0.110 0.090 0.103 0.116 
 (0.066) (0.068) (0.108) (0.113) (0.080) (0.118) 
Share of women above 
65 
-0.360** -0.089 0.195 0.616*** -0.515*** -0.667 
(0.143) (0.154) (0.235) (0.238) (0.143) (0.837) 
Completed Years of 
Education 
0.069*** 0.029*** 0.080*** 0.024 0.065*** 0.096 
(0.003) (0.010) (0.006) (0.018) (0.004) (0.146) 
E(Returns to Education) 15.777*** 46.796*** 16.704*** 60.472*** 15.714*** -14.889 
 (1.384) (7.975) (2.029) (15.029) (2.044) (127.008) 
Average local wage -0.019 -0.023 -0.017 -0.014 -0.017 -0.025 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.040) (0.040) (0.045) (0.044) 
Number of cows owned 0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.004** 0.000 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) 
Household had a loan 
denied 
0.017 -0.037 -0.134** -0.205*** 0.044 0.068 
(0.034) (0.038) (0.057) (0.062) (0.038) (0.167) 
Per capita Monthly 
Household Expenditure 
0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000*** 0.001* 0.001 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Average local education 
costs 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Average local subsidies 
to education 
0.004** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.005* 0.004 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) 
Average time to 
secondary school 
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 47: Secondary Education Demand – Marginal Effects - Probit and IV Probit Regressions – 
All and decomposition by urban/rural (cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Sample Urban Rural 
 Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Explained variable = Probability of adolescent between ages 12 and 18, to have attended secondary school in the 2004/05 school 
year 
Insufficient Access -0.696** 0.712 -5.601* -28.429*** -0.062 2.918 
 (0.316) (0.456) (3.367) (7.245) (0.962) (13.582) 
Insufficient Quality -3.931** -5.990*** 0.461 0.030 -3.052 3.491 
 (1.686) (1.581) (0.928) (1.194) (2.968) (35.482) 
Insufficient security -4.050* -7.816*** -27.220** -100.780*** 40.228 -57.393 
 (2.080) (2.020) (13.324) (26.041) (48.729) (529.116) 
District controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethno-linguistic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4099 4099 2048 2048 2026 2026 
Statistics from the underlying regressions 
Pseudo-R2 0.5742 0.5614 0.5341 0.5222 0.5917 0.5798 
Log-likelihood -42225.329 -43496.579 -15024.990 -15411.018 -25478.264 -26219.685 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (a) perfectly predicts failure; Source: author’s calculations on data from TLSLS (2007) and CAVR 
(2006) 
Addison and Murshed (2005) refer that post-conflict growth is potentially distortionary, 
favouring urban sectors such as infrastructure reconstruction over agriculture. Looking 
at international aid interventions, Chambers (2013, 1987) warns against such an urban 
bias. According to the Timorese Aid Transparency Portal (Ministry of Finance, 2014), a 
significant part of the international aid projects operate in the districts with the four 
main cities, Dili (the capital; with 286 reported projects, out of 346106), Baucau (216 
projects), Ermera (229 projects) and Maliana (211 projects) which seems to confirm this 
bias. This may suggest that post-conflict economic development may have a role in a 
more urban nature of the positive legacy of conflict on preferences for secondary 
education. 
An analysis of the significant channels of indirect impacts of conflict on the demand for 
education shows that returns to education seem to have a positive average effect over 
the secondary school attendance of girls and urban dwellers, but may not have on boys 
and rural dwellers. Conversely, perceptions of access to and quality of education seem 
to affect adolescents differently, along these characteristics. Girls appear more sensitive 
to lack of access to school. Boys, on the other hand, appear sensitive to issues of lack of 
                                                          
106 Most of the projects are multi-district. 
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quality and insecurity. This latter case may have been linked to a higher involvement of 
young men in vigilante groups during the first years of independence, leading to a civic 
strife in 2006 and 2007 and as reported by Scambary (2009), Goldsmith (2009) and 
Muggah et al. (2010). This may have led to a higher rate of school drop-outs among 
boys, as also suggested by Justino et al. (2013). Those living in urban areas appeared to 
be more sensitive to lack of access and security, while lack of quality does not seem to 
be a differentiating factor after splitting the population according to urban/rural location 
of residence. This latter case may occur due to a higher heterogeneity between the two 
typologies than within them, as suggested in the data review in section 4. Given that 
urban adolescents have easier access to school and perceive it to be the case, the 
nationwide estimate is indicative of urban/rural inequalities that should be object of 
further future attention. 
A synthesis of the inferred medium-run effects may be, then, presented: there is a 
suggestion that an eventual peace dividend of increased preferences for education, 
induced either by a resilience effect or by other factors such as post-conflict aid, may 
exist and be more prominent in urban areas; there is as indication that indirect impacts 
through lower returns to education manifest themselves homogenously; finally, the 
results also suggest that indirect impacts through worse factors of school quality were 
differently felt by adolescents of different gender and place of residence requiring a 
more targeted response. 
Some other interesting and intriguing empirical results are also found. In Table 46 it can 
be noticed that girls whose mothers attended school seem to have a lower probability to 
attend secondary school. This may, however, be a result of the very low education of 
their mothers, close to 1 year on average, which may reduce the value that these 
mothers place on the education of their daughters. Marriage affirms itself as a cause of 
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school drop-out for both adolescent girls and boys alike, with certainty of drop-out in 
the case of the TLSLS (2007) sampled married boys of the age between 12 and 18. In 
Table 47, there is suggestion that some of the factors determining demand for secondary 
education are prevalent only in the urban spaces. A migrant adolescent in an urban 
space appears to be less likely to attend secondary school. The same seems to be the 
case for nieces or nephews of the head of household, a result that contradicts an 
indication in many of the reports collected in qualitative interviews. A larger household 
size also seems to benefit the urban dwellers but not those living in rural areas. Only in 
urban spaces does the indicator of credit constraints (denied loans) seem to have a 
bearing on the likelihood of an adolescent attending secondary school. Finally, only in 
these spaces it is clear that local external support to education increases the probability 
of attendance to secondary education. On the other hand, only in rural spaces is the time 
needed to go to school a significant deterrent to demand. These urban/rural differences 
suggest different livelihoods patterns, and challenges met by populations in urban and 
rural areas and recommend targeted policies to be implemented. 
In synthesis, the empirical results suggest a significant richness of insights regarding 
post-conflict demand for secondary education, using the case of Timor in 2003/04, five 
years after its independence fight was won. They suggest diverse patterns of demand 
and its drivers, from adolescent girls to boys, but even more so from rural to urban 
areas. They suggest that covariates such as the expected returns to education and school 
quality, both shown to suffer detrimental impacts from conflict, in other cases and 
settings, but also in Timor (as is the case of returns to education), matter in the decision 
to attend secondary education. Finally, they suggest that beyond all other covariates, a 
possibility of a peace dividend exists, as those that experienced a shock of extreme 
violence appear to be more likely to attend secondary school than other equivalent 
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adolescents that were relatively spared from it. The channel is not completely clear: 
resilience effects may be behind it but also the effects of unobserved factors such as 
post-conflict aid may have their influence. Noticeably, this effect seems more 
significant in urban areas and less so in rural ones, correlating with a reconstruction 
effort that has, so far, shown some urban bias. Future research should seek to deepen the 
understanding of the possible channels through which this indication of resilience 
manifests itself, seek to verify if it manifests in other post-conflict settings, look at 
future surveys, and analyse its persistence. 
6- Conclusion  
Secondary education stands out in the gap between the Millennium Development Goals 
of Universal Primary Education in the “developing world” and the focus on demand for 
higher education in the “developed world”. This gap is being filled, so far, by an 
arguably remedial focus of labour policies and aid on the development of technical and 
vocational training programmes. As such, there is a clear risk of secondary education to 
be largely forgotten by policy and research on development. Yet it is in the progression 
beyond primary school and the achievement of enabling conditions for a “good job” that 
parents and adolescents put their hope, with secondary education being perceived by 
them to be a fundamental step in that direction. 
In a post-conflict setting such as Timor-Leste, the aspirations of young people (the 
majority of the national population) must be heavily weighted, as the risk of a “youth 
bulge” becoming a driver of continued fragility and future violence is evident. 
The present study sought to better understand the factors that determine demand for 
secondary education in a post-conflict setting. It also sought to identify and elucidate the 
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middle-run impacts of conflict: how its adverse effects may persist, diminish over time 
or reverse, some years after the traumatic experiences occurred. 
In the case of Timor, the final experience of violence in 1999 was particularly 
devastating, with extreme levels of killings, destruction of property and forced 
displacement. While the country was able to almost totally overturn the latter two 
effects, though relocation and reconstruction, other effects have persisted. In some 
cases, income levels have not recovered; the quality of schooling has suffered; and the 
expectations of future returns to education have not fully recovered from the conflict 
According to previous research, including on Timor, the effects of conflict on choices 
regarding education (enrolment and attendance) or outcomes (attainment) were 
expected to be negative. However, the empirical results reported in the present study 
suggest that a peace dividend may exist and that those who survived extreme violence 
may in fact manifest a higher preference for secondary education. This result seems to 
be present when tested together with a set of other covariates that economic theory 
affirms to correlate with demand for education. These findings show some robustness, 
suggesting predominance of a resilience effect that shifts preferences towards furthering 
education. 
The causal pathways by which these linkages operate are yet not fully clear. The higher 
preference for secondary education among the youth surveyed may have been induced 
by psychological resilience or by other factors such as the stimulus of post-conflict 
reconstruction aid. Further research should also seek to establish whether the result 
found in this study depends on the typology of conflict (a war of secession that was 
won), the level of education or the cohort experiencing violence. Chapter 2 applied a 
similar empirical strategy to understand conflict’s impacts on demand for primary 
184 
 
education; it found a suggestion of higher attendance of primary education by those 
most affected by the latter stages of the Timorese conflict but those results proved not to 
be robust. The robustness of results presented in the present study may be because the 
adolescents experienced the conflict at an age where they were able to rationalize it, 
along with the dynamics of post-conflict reconstruction. If this is true, when children 
currently of primary school age are old enough to begin secondary education, the link 
between the experience of conflict and higher preference for education may not be 
observed. Such an analysis of the longer-run effects of conflict also warrants further 
research. 
The indication of a higher preference for secondary education among the Timorese 
adolescents that survived the 1999 shock of extreme violence does not vary by gender. 
However, perceptions of school quality appeared to affect attendance levels of 
adolescent girls and boys differently. Girls’ attendance reacted significantly and 
negatively to more difficulties in accessing school. Boys were not significantly affected 
by that but, on the other hand, reacted to the lack of quality of teaching. 
Wider differences are apparent between rural and urban areas, both in terms of the way 
adolescents’ demand for secondary education reacted to extreme conflict as well as to 
other drivers of education. Some factors deserve further attention, such as evidence of a 
relative exclusion of internal migrants from secondary education in urban spaces. Other 
factors indicate different settings of incentives and constraints that warrant further 
research and targeted policy.  One example is the suggestion that external support to 
education is only effective in urban areas. Another is the suggestion that the distance 
from homes to schools only has a detrimental effect in rural areas. 
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A final word should be given to policy. While a peace dividend is suggested, in the form 
of a higher preference for schooling, other covariates of secondary education suggest 
that there is a need for policy efforts to sustain households’ inclination for education. 
Having established in Chapter 1 that returns to education are present only in activities 
related with international aid, there is a risk that household preferences may become 
distorted into this narrow employability sector. This creates a high risk of unmet 
aspirations, which policy should strive to avoid in fragile post-conflict settings such as 
Timor-Leste. Policy should also seek to create more effective incentives to education, 
particularly for rural students, and to improve school quality. The latter is already a 
priority for the Timorese Government (Ministry of Education, 2011). Again, in a post-
conflict ethnically diverse society such as the Timorese is, the signal of lower 
attendance of secondary education by migrant adolescents in urban spaces should be an 
area of policy concern. Policy, however, should not only focus on factors of supply and 
demand in the education sector. It cannot overlook the links between the education 
sector and the whole Timorese economy. Together with the improvement of education, 
there is the need of an economic policy geared to generate employment opportunities 
for qualified workers in the domestic sectors, so as to reinforce the effects of expected 
returns to education on demand.  
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Conclusion 
 
This concluding chapter will revisit the contributions of this thesis to the economics of 
education with regards, in particular, to the effects of conflict on returns to education 
and on demand for primary and secondary education in a post-conflict setting. The first 
three sections will review each chapter. The next sections will then briefly discuss how 
conflict can leave a legacy by influencing economic processes in the medium-run, in the 
light of the Timorese case, and then synthesize findings. Each section will also discuss 
policy implications and possible paths for future research. 
Chapter 1 – Post-conflict returns to education 
The first chapter analysed the effect of the 25 year long violent occupation of Timor-
Leste on returns to education in 2007, a few years after the conflict ended. It looked at 
how conflict impacted upon an important economic signal: the value of education as an 
investment. 
Analysis of the evidence provided two main findings: first, individuals’ experiences of 
violence while they were of school age reduced the returns they could otherwise have 
gained from further years of education. This result supports the hypothesis that those 
who suffered a higher intensity of violence while of school age would have found more 
difficulty in acquiring skills from education and would have become less productive. It 
also indicates that the experience of extreme violence - and the disruption this causes to 
livelihoods and to access to education - can create a scarcity of human resources, thus 
making them more expensive. This effect does not act as a substitute for the previous 
effect; it happens simultaneously with the decreased productivity occurring through the 
first channel. In addition to these variables another dimension of conflict also led to 
187 
 
important effects, namely, that the political conditions under which education occurred 
affected participation in the post-conflict labour market. The evidence, however, also 
raised questions about the process through which this influence occurred. Further 
research is needed on the relations between political control and participation in the 
labour market. In summary, chapter 1 showed that violent conflict led to a scarcer (and 
therefore more expensive) and less qualified labour force in Timor-Leste. This may 
explain why a post-conflict country is likely to have lower returns to education than 
other, comparable, countries and suggests that conflict reduces the economic incentives 
for education. 
Another important finding of chapter 1 is that the difficulty of promoting education in a 
post-conflict country results not only from the experience of conflict, but also from the 
economic post-conflict setting. The Timorese evidence shows that returns to education 
are only significant for those people employed by projects funded by international 
cooperation. This result is not surprising. Wage profiles in the public sector tend to be 
flatter due to equality pressures exerted through the social contract: they will be lower 
than the market level in highly qualified work and higher than the market rate for less 
qualified work. It is, in general, the private sector that generates the income incentives 
for education. However, as the chapter showed, post-conflict countries like Timor-Leste 
tend to have a depressed private sector. This situation creates a distortion in the labour 
market, attracting the most qualified labour away from national organizations and the 
national economy. It also creates an incentive to pursue academic programmes that 
increase employability in international projects, to the detriment of the domestic 
government and private initiative. Lundahl and Sjöholm (2009) suggest there is a risk 
that the public sector could siphon the best human resources out of the private sector. 
The analysis in this thesis suggests that the international aid sector may be exacerbating 
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this risk. This evidence provides lessons for both international development cooperation 
and national governments about the need to analyse and improve hiring and 
remuneration policies, particularly for candidates with higher qualifications. Otherwise, 
they risk contributing to the ‘brain-drain’ dynamic by creating competition between 
international actors and the body that needs to be the ultimate provider of social 
services, the State. In this way remuneration policies can impair the recovery from 
fragility. Further research should consolidate these findings in Timor-Leste and other 
post-conflict settings, as well as where the international aid sector represents a large 
source of demand for qualified labour. 
This portion of the research faced data constraints that impeded the endogeneity of 
education (namely the effects of ability) and the endogeneity of conflict to be corrected. 
As a result, the estimates of returns to education – which are already low - are likely to 
be over-estimated, and the impacts of conflict underestimated. As data quality improves 
in Timor-Leste, it may be possible to seek an empirical correction of these estimates. 
Cognitive and learning tests recently conducted on primary school children might open 
a path for such tests to be incorporated in a future Living Standards Measurement 
Survey (LSMS). The correction of endogeneity in conflict settings poses further 
challenges, as data collection on (and during) conflict is particularly difficult. Some 
scope may come from the introduction of a conflict module in the LSMS, as proposed 
by Brück et al. (2013). 
Chapter 2 –  
On medium-run legacies of conflict upon the demand for primary education  
The second chapter analysed an empirical model of demand for primary education, 
seeking to assess whether inferable evidence of medium-run effects of conflict can be 
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found. Both the qualitative life story interviews and descriptive statistics suggested that 
a child who had experienced higher levels of violence during the Timorese conflict had 
a slightly higher attendance at primary education in the medium-run post-conflict. This 
suggestion of higher attendance at primary school level in Timor-Leste, five years after 
the conflict had ended, is a new result, not suggested by much of the previous literature 
concerning the impacts of conflict on education. As presented in the review, the effects 
of conflict on demand for education in other settings - while it is occurring or in the 
short-run post-conflict stage - appear to be negative. In Timor-Leste, the data suggested 
that another sort of impact could be present, namely, a higher preference for education 
operating as a possible resilience effect. 
The empirical evidence for the full sample appeared to suggest that to be the case. 
However, the empirical results showed not to be robust. While the Probit regressions 
estimated a negative effect arising from the experience of conflict, the analysis 
suggested that endogeneity of conflict could cause these effects to be overestimated. 
When an IV approach was applied, the econometric tests and the coefficients of the 
conflict indicators confirmed this hypothesis. However, these coefficients proved not to 
be robust to the age of entry in school and to the decomposition of the sample, where 
inference from Instrumental Variable estimates was found not to be valid. Similarly, 
they were not robust in relation to the test on the assumptions regarding the location of 
where conflict was experienced. Therefore, although there was an indication of an 
overestimation of negative effects due to endogeneity and an indication of positive 
effects in the full sample, this latter result cannot be confirmed as robust. 
The chapter then discussed other channels through which conflict might impact upon 
demand for primary education. These channels were: first, that conflict might have 
particularly affected household’s income generating capacities and, through it, reduced 
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demand for primary education; second, that conflict might have reduced the quality of 
education in the most-affected districts to such a degree that it had not recovered after 
five years of the post-conflict period, again with detrimental effects on demand for 
primary education. On both accounts, there is evidence that Timor-Leste in 2004/05 had 
yet not fully recovered from the conflict. The results in the chapter established that 
household income and perceived quality are significant drivers of demand for primary 
education and, therefore, possible channels providing legacies of conflict in the 
medium-run. Although evidence in other settings suggests both channels to be affected 
by conflict, further research should evaluate whether, and how, these impacts occurred 
in the medium-run. There is also a need for research examining other potential channels, 
and the development of better approaches to empirically test for their existence. 
The results found in this chapter also suggest the need for further research on the 
relation between expected returns to education and demand for primary education. The 
research suggested that households might face liquidity constraints; future research 
should validate this insight, since this dimension not only affects education, but can 
reinforce poverty traps, as found by Masset (2010). 
The evidence on both income and perceived quality of education suggests that policy 
should focus on addressing these significant channels through which the experience of 
conflict may leave legacies in the medium-run. Policy should focus on the supply side 
of primary education, particularly on the quality of provision, but it should not overlook 
significant signals of demand restrictions, particularly those that are income related. The 
evidence also implies the need of a particular focus on possible discrimination, not only 
gender based but, in an ethnically diverse post-conflict setting such as Timor-Leste, also 
concentrate on migrant children in urban settings, so as to prevent possible sources of 
grievance.  
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Among the avenues of research of medium-run legacies of conflict it is possible to 
examine the impacts of conflict on post-primary education, taking into account that 
adolescents both have more influence upon their educational choices and were older at 
the time of the most extreme violence. This line of investigation was followed with the 
analysis of secondary education in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 3 – A peace dividend for secondary education? 
This chapter examined the factors that determine demand for secondary education in a 
post-conflict setting. It sought to provide insights about an area of needed research, the 
middle-run impacts of conflict and how these effects persist, diminish or are eventually 
reversed. This research examined the area by looking at demand for education at a level 
that has, so far, been under-researched, secondary education. In Timor-Leste, the most 
recent experience of violence was particularly devastating and income levels and quality 
of schooling had not fully recovered five years after its occurrence. As Chapter 1 
argued, the expected returns to education are very likely to have suffered and to have 
not yet fully recovered. However, the results presented in Chapter 3 suggested that some 
sort of peace dividend may exist and that those that survived extreme violence may have 
a higher preference for secondary education. This result is robust when tested alongside 
other theoretically-relevant covariates. It suggests that a resilience effect (or other 
possible channels such as signalling effects from aid-driven reconstruction programmes) 
is creating a greater preference for further education. It also suggests an effect has been 
detected that runs contrary to what previous research, focused on in-conflict or short-run 
post-conflict impacts, has suggested. 
While uncovering this evidence, it now suggests further research should seek to 
establish whether this effect depends on the typology of conflict (for example, a war of 
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secession that was won), the level of education or the cohort experiencing violence. 
Chapter 2 applied a similar empirical strategy to understand the impacts of conflict on 
demand for primary education. The results of this approach suggest there was a higher 
attendance of primary education by those most affected by the latter stages of the 
Timorese conflict; however, those results proved not to be robust. The robustness of 
results presented in Chapter 3 may be because the adolescents experienced the conflict 
at an age where they were able to rationalize it, along with the dynamics of post-conflict 
reconstruction. If this is true, when children currently at primary school age are old 
enough to begin secondary education, the link between the experience of conflict and 
higher preference for education may not be observed. Such an analysis of the longer-run 
effects of conflict also warrants further research. 
The indication of a higher preference for secondary education among the Timorese 
adolescents that survived the 1999 shock of extreme violence does not vary by gender. 
However, perceptions of school quality appeared to affect attendance levels of 
adolescent girls and boys differently. Girls’ attendance reacted significantly, and 
negatively, to the increased difficulties of accessing school. Boys were not significantly 
affected by that aspect but, on the other hand, reacted to the lack of quality teaching. 
There are apparent differences between rural and urban areas, both in terms of the way 
adolescents’ demand for secondary education reacted to extreme conflict as well as to 
other drivers of education. The apparent exclusion of internal migrants from schools in 
urban spaces, already indicated in primary education, deserves further attention 
especially in relation to policy. The findings that external support to education appears 
to be effective only in urban areas, and that being at a distance from school appears to 
have a particularly negative effect but only in rural areas, reinforce the importance of 
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targeting education policies in each different setting. These findings also recommend 
that specific research be conducted in each of the spaces – in urban and rural areas. 
The chapter also considered further policy implications of these findings. While a peace 
dividend is suggested, in the form of a higher preference for schooling, other covariates 
of secondary education suggest that there is a need for policy efforts to sustain 
households’ inclination for education. Having established in Chapter 1 that returns to 
education are present only in activities related with international aid, there is a risk that 
household preferences may become distorted into this narrow employability sector. This 
creates a high risk of unmet aspirations, which policy should strive to avoid in fragile 
post-conflict settings such as Timor-Leste. Policy should also seek to create more 
effective incentives for undertaking education, particularly for rural students, and seek 
to improve school quality. The latter is already a priority for the Timorese Government 
(Ministry of Education, 2011). Again, in a post-conflict ethnically diverse society such 
as the Timorese, the signal of lower attendance of secondary education by migrant 
adolescents in urban spaces should become an important area of policy concern. Policy, 
however, should not only focus on factors of supply and demand in the education sector. 
It cannot overlook the links between the education sector and the whole Timorese 
economy. Together with the improvement of education, there is the need for an 
economic policy geared to generate employment opportunities for qualified workers in 
the domestic sectors, so as to reinforce the effects of expected returns to education on 
demand. 
Overcoming conflict in its multidimensional forms and impacts 
This study assessed the plausibility that the experience of conflict would have an impact 
upon incentives and decisions regarding education in the medium-run post-conflict 
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stage. Building on previous conflict literature, it started by presuming that such impacts 
were likely to exist and sought to measure them. It did so acknowledging that conflict 
can generate diverse forms of violence. 
Using the available datasets, the research sought to measure the effects of experiencing 
different intensities of violence, in the form of killings and disappearances. It found that 
these variations have significant medium-run effects on returns to education and 
demand for primary education (although in this later case, the results were not robust). 
It also found empirical results suggesting that the experience, and survival, of shocks of 
extreme violence may also have induced changes in behaviour that persisted in the 
medium-run. This was evidenced in the case in secondary education. 
It also highlighted the possibility that extreme hunger, resulting from the deliberate 
military tactics of the occupiers, could generate a scarcity of qualified human resources, 
with impacts on the earnings’ structure of a post-conflict labour market. 
This research sought also to construct a dataset of the degrees of political control, to try 
and depict effects of conflict that go beyond those that result from violence. Looking at 
documented reports of the conflict, it classified, for each district and year, the level of 
control sustained by the opposing forces of the Indonesian Army (ABRI) and the 
Timorese Resistance (and its army, FALINTIL). This endeavour, and the results which 
flowed from it, are discussed in the appendix. The dataset was then used in the analysis 
of post-conflict returns to education. These findings suggest that effects of having lived 
under different typologies of political control had an influence on the likelihood of 
participating in the post-conflict formal labour market. 
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The effects of diverse dimensions of conflict on demand for education and expected 
returns to education were researched. Qualitative research tools, particularly life story 
interviews allowed for invaluable insights into the effects of the experience of conflict 
on the perceptions and aspirations of the Timorese; this assisted in the construction of 
empirical models of demand for education. The results, despite the many data 
limitations and methodological constraints, were, in most of the cases, significant and 
robust. 
Due to data constraints, other forms of conflict related violence - such as the destruction 
of assets and forced displacement - could not be analysed, although previous literature 
suggested these factors are likely to influence post-conflict preferences, incentives and 
economic behaviours. 
The analysis in this study had to confront serious data limitations. These are 
characteristic of the quantitative analysis of conflicts and their impacts. The use of 
reported data makes the study more prone to measurement errors, while the possibility 
of endogeneity, even after controlling for structural covariates and time-invariant 
district and ethnic characteristics, makes it particularly challenging to find robust 
results. 
Nonetheless, some robust results were found. They related to different dimensions of 
conflict (such as killings, hunger and political control) and their links with post-conflict 
economic behaviours and indicators (such as demand for primary and secondary 
education, returns to education and participation in the formal labour market). 
This study found evidence that a conflict may still leave a legacy in the medium-run. 
Looking at education in a post-conflict setting, in Timor-Leste, it empirically confirmed 
what was previously only an intuition suggested in the conflict literature, namely, that 
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conflict does reduce returns to education. To do so it proposed a testable theory on the 
channels through which conflict affects returns to education. It then suggested, with 
different degrees of robustness, that, beyond other significant and theoretically 
established covariates of demand for education, the experience of overcoming conflict 
may induce a higher preference for education. This result, found in a country such as 
Timor-Leste that had overcome and won a secession war, may be specific to this 
typology of cases. It may, on the other hand, be a more general medium-run effect 
arising from the acquisition of peace. Further research on other contexts may help to 
validate this result. 
Contributions to a better understanding of post-conflict education in Timor-Leste 
Throughout the research conducted, this thesis established that the experience of 
conflict still exerts medium-run impacts on demand for education and its drivers, 
particularly on economic incentives such as returns to education. 
Through this research, some other insights contribute to a deeper understanding of 
education in a post-conflict setting such as Timor-Leste, five years after independence. 
A first insight comes from the realization that, five years after surviving a conflict, still 
Timor-Leste faces negative impacts of the violence endured over the processes through 
which the labour market values education. Individuals’ experiences of violence while 
they were of school age reduced the returns they could otherwise have gained from 
further years of education. It has established that, via returns to education, a legacy from 
conflict afflicts demand for secondary education. This legacy is derived not only from 
lower returns to education signalled to those that experienced higher levels of violence 
but also from a distortion of the post-conflict labour market towards aid related sources 
of employment. As returns to education were shown to significantly incentivize demand 
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for secondary education, policy should care for its sectorial distribution, seeking to have 
it express more sectorial differences in productivity. This research suggests the need 
evaluate the wage structures of both public and national private sectors to assess the 
reasons why they did not, and may still today fail to, provide significant education 
premiums that stimulate education progression. 
The empirical results uncovered by this research also shed light on important 
characteristics of post-conflict demand for education. Income factors were confirmed in 
their importance as supporters of demand. Low income and liquidity constraints were 
found as significant deterrents of demand for primary education. Similarly, evidence 
was found of positive effects from external support, via subsidies, to secondary 
education, particularly in urban areas. These are indications that education policies in 
post-conflict settings need to pay special attention to household’s budgetary constraints. 
Experienced constraints in the access to education and in its quality were also shown to 
be significant determinants of demand, both of primary and secondary education. 
Inequalities of access were very apparent, with distance from school having a 
particularly negative effect in rural areas. 
Finally, significant evidence of possible gender based discrimination and discrimination 
against migrant children and adolescents may have played a role, undermining equality 
of access to education in both primary and secondary school levels. Finally and 
significantly, the apparent exclusion of internal migrants from schools in urban spaces 
was also signalled both in primary and secondary education. In what is still a violence-
prone environment, policy must look with particular concern to these evidences of 
inequality of opportunity among young Timorese. 
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In synthesis, when addressing the challenges of post-conflict education, a central 
suggestion that can be put forward as a result from this thesis is that the focus cannot be 
placed solely on the supply side of education. The need to focus on quality and ease of 
access was highlighted in both studies of demand and this should, indeed, make policy 
examine the supply side of education. In addition, there is also a need to focus on 
income constraints, costs of education, possible liquidity constraints, and the expected 
returns to education, particularly beyond primary school. These are drivers of the 
demand side of education and cannot be overlooked. In particular, the significance of 
returns to education on attendance of secondary school alerts us to the links between the 
labour market and the education sector. This gives an indication that labour market 
economic policies have an indirect effect on the choices of households regarding their 
investment in human capital. 
The focus on drivers of demand such as income constraints and expected returns to 
education may be particularly important in post-conflict countries. Economic exclusion 
and unmet expectations of future education premiums are potential inducers of conflict 
relapse in post-conflict “youth bulge” societies, as Urdal (2006) and Urdal and 
Hoelscher (2009) suggest. Policies that mitigate inequalities of opportunity in the access 
to education and in the employment of qualified workers are particularly important in an 
ethnically diverse country such as Timor-Leste. There are, therefore, reasons for 
concern over rural and urban inequalities suggested in the research and, particularly on 
the indications of a possible exclusion of migrant children and adolescents from 
education in Timorese urban settings. These issues, taken together with the issue of 
potential poverty traps, should also be of particular concern if we seek to build a more 
effective and inclusive education policy in the current transition stage, “from conflict to 
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development” – a sentiment to which Timor-Leste and other conflict afflicted countries 
aspire. 
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Appendix A -  
A Chronology of Violence and Control during the Indonesian 
Occupation of Timor-Leste 
 
The nature of a conflict is multidimensional in the forms of violence it imposes but also 
in the nature of political control and provision of services it allows. Depending on the 
level of control over the territories, the forces in contention are able and may choose to 
enact particular forms of violence, as discussed by Statys Kalyvas in his “Logic of 
Violence in a Civil War” (Kalyvas, 2006). Contrary to early assertions, though, not 
always is the case that violence is the main driver of behaviour change of economic 
agents, particularly, in the case of interest of this study, regarding education. It may be 
the case that the access to and quality of provision of education in a particular area 
results from who controls an area and how deep is the control. It may be the case that it 
is the rebels that control the area, making choices regarding the provision of public 
services, as discussed by Mampilly (2011), eventually establishing a social contract 
with the residents, as discussed by Arjona (2010). It may be the case, that it is the 
incumbent that controls and is seeking to establish the regular public services. It may be 
that the territory is under dispute, weakening control but also the provision of services. 
In those cases, the violence enacted in such territories is one of the symptoms of 
different types of control. Kalyvas (2006) proposes a nexus between forms of violence 
enacted over people in one territory and typologies of political control over them, that is 
explored in this study to generate indicators of political control, regarding each 
Timorese district and during each year of the Indonesian Occupation. 
This chronology constructed reports the events of violence documented by Taylor 
(1999, 1990) and CAVR (2005) regarding the period of Indonesian Occupation of 
Timor-Leste, object of this thesis. Following the classification of typologies of political 
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control during conflict constructed by Kalyvas (2006), this chronology is used in 
support of the generation of variables indicative of political control during the 
Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste. These indicators of conflict were tested in the 
analyses operated in support of the chapters of the thesis and are used in the Chapter 1 
as significant covariates in the regressions of the first stage selection model of the 
Heckman regression on returns to education. 
In the sections below, a brief conceptual framework will present the typologies of 
conflict and the process of identification of each according to the types of events of 
violence occurred, followed by a brief review of the chronology of events during the 
occupation of Timor-Leste by Indonesia and the attribution, for each year and district, 
of the type of control considered to be the one manifested. Finally, a summary table of 
types of control per district and year, used in support of the empirical analysis of this 
thesis is presented. 
1- Conceptual Framework 
The construction of a grid of political control by district and year requires a translation 
of events of violence, for which there are documented reports, into types of political 
control attributable to the territories. 
In this approach, the study uses the framework of analysis used by Kalyvas (2006) when 
analysing the Greek Civil War, fought from 1946 to 1949 between the Greek 
government army (backed by the United Kingdom and the United States) and the 
Democratic Army of Greece, the military branch of the Greek Communist Party 
(backed by Yugoslavia, Albania, the Soviet Union and Bulgaria). In his study, Kalyvas 
disputes the theory of barbarism behind every form of violence and attributes to it a 
logic rationale. According to his study, violence can be decomposed in two forms: 
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selective (directed to a particular person or small group of perfectly identified people,) 
and indiscriminate (directed to a collective, a group of people where none is specifically 
identified as a target and used, namely, in reprisals, where guilt and punishment is 
assigned by association). 
The aim of violence and it’s use is summarized in this quote from Kalyvas (2006, p. 
142): 
‘Both selective and indiscriminate violence are, in principle, instrumental 
forms of violence aiming to generate collaboration via deterrence. The 
distinction is based on the level at which “guilt” (and hence targeting) is 
determined‘ 
As such, the use of violence should follow rules that Kalyvas summarizes in two 
propositions. In a first proposition, in Kalyvas (2006, p. 132) he states: 
‘The higher the level of control exercised by an actor, the higher the rate of 
collaboration with this actor – and, inversely, the lower the rate of defection.’ 
In the second, Kalyvas (2006, p. 144) states: 
‘Indiscriminate violence is counterproductive to civil war.’ 
A grid of interpretation of effects of violence in civilians’ responses can then be built, 
departing from a situation where the incumbents enact them while the insurgents/rebels 
are able and choose to protect or fail to do so due to  lack of capacity or by choice: 
Table 48: Response function to strategies of violence and protection 
Insurgents 
Incumbents 
Protect Fail to Protect 
Selective Violence Stalemate / Indeterminate Civilians support Incumbents 
Indiscriminate Violence Civilians support Insurgents Civilians support Incumbents 
Based on Kalyvas (2006) 
Building on these propositions and response grid, Kalyvas constructs a typology of 
control that is used in this study to categorize each Timorese district during each year of 
the Indonesian Occupation. Most of the international relations with legitimate Timorese 
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representatives were severed by Indonesia, seeking to stand as the ruler of an integrated 
province named Timor-Timur. All the characteristics of provision of public services by 
the Indonesian regime parallel those of an incumbent, while the nature of action by 
Timorese Resistance soon became parallel to insurgents/rebels. Therefore, for the 
purpose of this analysis and contrary to what international law has established, this 
study attributes an incumbent-like nature to the Indonesian occupiers and an insurgent-
like nature to the Timorese Resistance fighting for independence. Following Kalyvas 
(2006) let control zone 1 be one where the incumbent holds full control, zone 2 be one 
where the control by the incumbent is contested by the insurgents, zone 3 be one where 
both sides contest control and none can claim to hold it even partially, zone 4 be one 
where the control is now held by the insurgents, while contested by the incumbent and 
zone 5 one which is fully controlled by the insurgents. 
Using this typology of zones of control, a set of hypothesis, defined by Kalyvas, tested 
and proved to apply to the Greek civil war case, are here applied to the case of the 
Timorese conflict. In his first hypothesis, Kalyvas (2006, p. 169) states: 
‘Political Actors are likely to gradually move from indiscriminate to selective 
violence.’ 
Hypothesis two, in Kalyvas (2006, p. 204) affirms: 
‘The higher the level of an actor’s control, the less likely it is that this actor 
will resort to violence, selective or indiscriminate. Therefore, no incumbent 
violence is likely in zone 1 and no insurgent violence is likely in zone 5.’ 
In hypotheses three, Kalyvas (2006, p. 204) states: 
‘The lower the level of an actor’s control, the less likely is that this actor will 
resort to selective violence and the more likely that its violence, if any, is 
indiscriminate. Therefore, insurgent violence in zones 1 and 2, if any, is likely 
to be indiscriminate and incumbent violence in zones 4 and 5, if any,  is likely 
to be indiscriminate.’ 
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Hypothesis four (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 204) announces: 
‘Under fragmented control, violence will be exercised primarily by the actor 
enjoying an advantage in terms of control: incumbents in zone 2 and 
insurgents in zone 4.’ 
Finally, in his fifth hypothesis, Kalyvas (2006, p. 204) states: 
‘Parity of control between the actors (zone 3) is likely to produce no selective 
violence by any of the actors.’ 
Using these hypotheses, a grid of interpretation can be constructed, based on the type of 
violence enacted and its perpetrator: 
Table 49: Grid of interpretation 
 
Indiscriminate Violence Selective Violence 
Zone 1 Insurgents - 
Zone 2 Insurgents Incumbent 
Zone 3 Incumbent & Insurgents - 
Zone 4 Incumbent Insurgents 
Zone 5 Incumbent - 
Based on Kalyvas (2006) 
This grid is then used to categorize each district of Timor-Leste, in each year of the 
Indonesian occupation according to the political actor, occupier or Resistance, and the 
level of control it seemingly exerts. The discussion of the chronology of events and 
attribution of control is presented in the next section. 
2- Chronology of events and political control 
Using the conceptual framework presented above, it is possible to try an attribution of 
type of political control over the territory of each Timorese district based on the reports 
of violence documented in Taylor (1999, 1990) and CAVR (2005). As most of them 
refer to the acts of seemingly indiscriminate violence, it is possible to establish a 
distinction between zones 1-2 and zones 4-5. The assertion of full control is derived in 
this study from the absence of reports of violence in the year in question and the 
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previous one. If, for some district there wasn’t any report of violence, then it is assumed 
that the political actor previously holding (disputed) control, would then hold full 
control. The exception to this rule in 1999, when as per the negotiated rules pertaining 
the referendum that were to lead to Timorese independence, the Resistance military 
branch (FALINTIL) was cantoned in Remexio, while all Timorese territory was 
assigned to the military rule and agreed protection of the Indonesian Army (the ABRI). 
In that year, all Timor-Leste is considered to be zone 1. Beyond the summary in this 
section, a full chronology of events and their interpretation for the attribution of a 
classification of zone of control is presented in the last section. 
The starting point, however, is of all Timor-Leste as zone 5. Having been a Portuguese 
colony for nearly 500 years, Timor was in the process of acquiring independence, 
longed demanded by the international community, after the Portuguese democratic 
revolution of the 25th of April 1974. After one of the Timorese parties, FRETILIN 
(Frente Revolucionária de Timor Independente – Revolutionary Front of an Independent 
Timor), won a very short-lived civil war, from August to November 1975 and on the 
28th of November 1975, it proclaimed the independence of Timor-Leste. In a week, 
Indonesia invaded. 
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Figure 14: 1975 - Prior to invasion 
 
Source: Map of Timor-Leste (GERTIL, 2003); identification of districts of attack and attribution of 
control by the author following Kalyvas (2006), CAVR (2005) and Taylor (1999, 1990). 
While only in the first week of December 1975, did the Indonesian military (ABRI) 
officially declared the invasion towards the annexation of Timor-Leste, the first 
operations started with the occupation of Oecussi in September 1975.  
Figure 15: 1975 - Invasion 
 
Source: Map of Timor-Leste (GERTIL, 2003); identification of districts of attack and attribution of 
control by the author following Kalyvas (2006), CAVR (2005) and Taylor (1999, 1990). 
Notably, this was much prior to the orchestrated Balibó Declaration of November 29th 
1975, signed by all the leaders of Timorese parties to the exception of FRETILIN and 
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used by Indonesia to justify the official invasion. In the first year of invasion, the reports 
of attacks relate to the border districts and those with maritime ports in the North of the 
half-island, as summarized in the appendix. These districts were quickly controlled by 
the ABRI, but under contestation by the Timorese Resistance. The remaining districts 
were under Resistance control. 
Figure 16: 1976 
 
Source: Map of Timor-Leste (GERTIL, 2003); identification of districts of attack and attribution of 
control by the author following Kalyvas (2006), CAVR (2005) and Taylor (1999, 1990). 
In 1976, following the events reported, the Indonesian control was spreading through 
the Timorese territory, still stronger in the western districts. At this moment, the ABRI 
already had full control over Oecussi and the Timorese capital of Dili, while the highest 
sub-districts of Hatu-Bulico (district of Ermera), Soibada and Lacló (district of 
Manatuto), Laga (district of Baucau) and Luro and Iliomar (district of Lautem) were 
still Resistance strongholds. 
The territorial distribution of control doesn’t seem to have changed significantly during 
the year of 1977, pushing the ABRI to intensify the violence and the military operations, 
especially in the areas where the Resistance appeared to hold more control. The nature 
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of those attacks demonstrated characteristics of indiscriminate violence suggesting that 
control was still held by Timorese forces in some sub-districts, two years after the 
invasion. It is in this year that the bombings of Mount Matebian, in the sub-district of 
Laga, Baucau,began, which would last until 1979 
Figure 17: 1977 
 
Source: Map of Timor-Leste (GERTIL, 2003); identification of districts of attack and attribution of 
control by the author following Kalyvas (2006), CAVR (2005) and Taylor (1999, 1990). 
In 1978, the ABRI experienced a weakening of their control in the south-west districts. 
In reaction to it and to the unexpected delay in controlling the entire territory, the ABRI 
deployed a different strategy. They initiated an extremely violent encirclement 
operation: conscripting Timorese civilians to build a mobile human fence that would 
“comb” the Timorese forests in search of Resistance militants; displacing villages into 
easier to control compounds. Where possible these operations were supported by naval 
bombardment. 
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Figure 18: 1978 
 
Source: Map of Timor-Leste (GERTIL, 2003); identification of districts of attack and attribution of 
control by the author following Kalyvas (2006), CAVR (2005) and Taylor (1999, 1990). 
The mountains of Mate Bian, Kablaki, Ossoala and Mundo Perdido, where Resistance 
could find more protection became special targets of Indonesian military actions. By the 
end of 1978, Mount Matebian falls into Indonesian control and the Resistance orders the 
surrender of close to 300,000 people. No area would be in their full control any longer. 
According to the Far Eastern Economic Review, there were 165,835 displaced 
Timorese. 
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Figure 19: 1979 
 
Source: Map of Timor-Leste (GERTIL, 2003); identification of districts of attack and attribution of 
control by the author following Kalyvas (2006), CAVR (2005) and Taylor (1999, 1990). 
The year of 1979 is one of few military victories of the ABRI in the east, while the 
violence enacted in the west suggests some loss of control to the Resistance. It is also a 
year of symbolic victories, with the assassination of the then FRETILIN leader of the 
Eastern Region. The International Red Cross announces that the displaced population is 
facing deprivation and Mochtar Kusumaatmadja admits that 120 thousand Timorese had 
been killed since 1975. The year of 1979 marks a change of Resistance’s strategy, as it 
builds contacts with the civilians to create a support clandestine network in areas under 
Indonesian control. 
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Figure 20: 1980 
 
Source: Map of Timor-Leste (GERTIL, 2003); identification of districts of attack and attribution of 
control by the author following Kalyvas (2006), CAVR (2005) and Taylor (1999, 1990). 
The year of 1980 is reported to be one of resurgence from the Resistance, both in the 
east and the north-central regions. 
However while the Resistance meets to reorganizes in 1981 and in reaction to its 
resurgence, the ABRI puts into place Operation Keamanan (fence of legs): a line was 
formed, starting from Tutuala and creating a human fence linking Com, Raça, Lospalos 
and Iliomar; a second line began linking Venilale, Ossu and Viqueque towards the 
northeast; both lines were to converge on Mount Matebian; a final phase tried to force 
FALINTIL soldiers into Lacluta, Viqueque, where a massacre occurred. 
In this year, Indonesia asserted its control in an unprecedented form, controlling almost 
all of the territory by the end of that year. 
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Figure 21: 1981 
 
Source: Map of Timor-Leste (GERTIL, 2003); identification of districts of attack and attribution of 
control by the author following Kalyvas (2006), CAVR (2005) and Taylor (1999, 1990). 
Figure 22: 1982 
 
Source: Map of Timor-Leste (GERTIL, 2003); identification of districts of attack and attribution of 
control by the author following Kalyvas (2006), CAVR (2005) and Taylor (1999, 1990). 
The control reached in 1981 allows Indonesia to invite the Australian Prime Minister to 
visit Timor next year, in 1982. However, the Resistance would enact attacks in various 
districts and in Viqueque an Indonesia sponsored local election could only occur in the 
district capital. 
223 
 
Figure 23: 1983 
 
Source: Map of Timor-Leste (GERTIL, 2003); identification of districts of attack and attribution of 
control by the author following Kalyvas (2006), CAVR (2005) and Taylor (1999, 1990). 
In 1983 a ceasefire would be signed. The documented events suggest that some degree 
of territorial division occurred, with the Resistance recovering some of what it had lost 
in the eastern districts. This is suggested by the fact that, when breaking the ceasefire, 
ABRI launched an attack to this region at the same time that Timorese policemen, of the 
Indonesian HANSIP force defected to FALINTIL (the military branch of the 
Resistance). 
The year of 1984 is one where more contestation by both forces of the control each 
other held in the districts of Timor. While ABRI attacks the Eastern districts, the 
Resistance counter-attacks in the Centre and south-western ones. In the end of that year, 
the head of the Indonesian military in Timor announces that the conflict would still take 
time to resolve.  
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Figure 24: 1984 
 
Source: Map of Timor-Leste (GERTIL, 2003); identification of districts of attack and attribution of 
control by the author following Kalyvas (2006), CAVR (2005) and Taylor (1999, 1990). 
Not much is reported in 1985, suggesting a stabilization of positions between ABRI and 
the Resistance. However, Baucau was deemed “unsafe”, suggesting that the control was 
contested. 
Figure 25: 1985 
 
Source: Map of Timor-Leste (GERTIL, 2003); identification of districts of attack and attribution of 
control by the author following Kalyvas (2006), CAVR (2005) and Taylor (1999, 1990). 
The year of 1986 brings reports of operations by ABRI east of the line Baucau-
Viqueque contesting Resistance’s control of the area. The city of Baucau already hosts a 
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prison for Timorese captured by the ABRI suggesting control of the city. Indonesian 
investments are announced in the Covalima district, again suggesting control is being 
strengthened there. However a letter reports the fights taking place in Suai, the capital of 
that district, suggesting it was contested. 
Figure 26: 1986 
 
Source: Map of Timor-Leste (GERTIL, 2003); identification of districts of attack and attribution of 
control by the author following Kalyvas (2006), CAVR (2005) and Taylor (1999, 1990). 
Although there is a visit of a Canadian Parliamentary delegation to Dili and Lospalos, 
there are no significant references that suggest that the Indonesian military operations of 
1986 led to a significant change in the balance of territorial control in 1987. It was, 
nonetheless, a year with fewer events reported, except for a Resistance incursion in 
Barique, district of Manatuto, in the border of zones of control. 
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Figure 27: 1987 
 
Source: Map of Timor-Leste (GERTIL, 2003); identification of districts of attack and attribution of 
control by the author following Kalyvas (2006), CAVR (2005) and Taylor (1999, 1990). 
In 1988, the events of violence perpetrated by the Resistance in most sub-districts in the 
west ceased to be reported. The assumption is that full control by the Indonesian was 
acquired there. The contestation in the east and southeast continued. 
Figure 28: 1988 
 
Source: Map of Timor-Leste (GERTIL, 2003); identification of districts of attack and attribution of 
control by the author following Kalyvas (2006), CAVR (2005) and Taylor (1999, 1990). 
The year of 1989 showed reports of more contestation by the Resistance of areas under 
Indonesian control, particularly in some cities. There are indications of some weakening 
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of control particularly in cities controlled by the ABRI, in sub-districts where the 
Resistance held more control. 
Figure 29: 1989 
 
Source: Map of Timor-Leste (GERTIL, 2003); identification of districts of attack and attribution of 
control by the author following Kalyvas (2006), CAVR (2005) and Taylor (1999, 1990). 
From 1990 to 1994 a lack of reports suggest, again, a consolidation of positions in each 
area of Timor-Leste. In this period, however, an event showed that even in areas under 
strong Indonesian control, such as the capital, the clandestine movement was building 
pressure on the occupier. During a burial procession of a student activist turned 
demonstration, in the 12th of November 1991, anti-Indonesia banners were used by the 
demonstrators. In response, a massacre of the participants ensued. 
The Santa Cruz Massacre was to become symbolic as it was filmed107 and broadcasted 
throughout the word, shedding away the illusion purported by the Indonesian 
diplomacy, that no violence was being used by their forces and only a few rebels 
opposed Timorese integration. 
                                                          
107 A copy of the footage can be seen online in Stahl (1991) 
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Figure 30: 1990-1994 
 
Source: Map of Timor-Leste (GERTIL, 2003); identification of districts of attack and attribution of 
control by the author following Kalyvas (2006), CAVR (2005) and Taylor (1999, 1990). 
As the international opposition to the Indonesian occupation mounts, the reports shown 
for the period 1995-1996 are more of selective violence, with executions and arrests in 
particular regions. At the same time, the Resistance appears to be pushing west, 
attacking in Manatuto (central region) but also in Ermera and Maliana (western region, 
the later a border district). 
Figure 31: 1995-1996 
 
Source: Map of Timor-Leste (GERTIL, 2003); identification of districts of attack and attribution of 
control by the author following Kalyvas (2006), CAVR (2005) and Taylor (1999, 1990). 
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In 1997, again the actions appear more indiscriminate by the Indonesian army, while in 
areas controlled by the Resistance the attempts to hold election were met by the 
destruction of the polling stations. 
Figure 32: 1997 
 
Source: Map of Timor-Leste (GERTIL, 2003); identification of districts of attack and attribution of 
control by the author following Kalyvas (2006), CAVR (2005) and Taylor (1999, 1990). 
In 1998, demonstrations in Dili congregate people from various districts: Ermera and 
Liquiça from the West, Laga sub-district of Manatuto from the Centre and Baucau from 
the East, suggesting stronger Resistance claims in these territories. On the other hand, in 
preparation of the 1999 referendum, pro-Indonesia militia action began to be reported in 
the district of Manufahi. 
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Figure 33: 1998 
 
Source: Map of Timor-Leste (GERTIL, 2003); identification of districts of attack and attribution of 
control by the author following Kalyvas (2006), CAVR (2005) and Taylor (1999, 1990). 
The year of 1999 is a particular one. Under the referendum negotiations, the Resistance 
accepts to have their forces cantoned in Remexiu, district of Aileu. This puts ABRI in 
full control of the territory and the pro-Indonesia militias loses to enact a full range of 
acts of both selective and indiscriminate violence. These culminated with the arson of 
schools and other public buildings and residential houses, killings and forced 
displacement in the wake of the referendum results and the victory of the pro-
Independence vote. 
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Figure 34: 1999 
 
Source: Map of Timor-Leste (GERTIL, 2003); identification of districts of attack and attribution of 
control by the author following Kalyvas (2006), CAVR (2005) and Taylor (1999, 1990). 
 
3- Grid of attribution of control per year and district 
The sequential reading of the events of occupation, as they were documented by Taylor 
(1999, 1990) and CAVR (2005), through the lens provided by the framework of 
typology of political control proposed by Kalyvas (2006) allows the construction of a 
grid of attribution of control, per year and district. 
In each year, the events reported are used to evaluate if a change in control existed. 
When in a year different events suggest different levels of control, the following rule 
applied: if events in the next year indicate that the level of control suggested by the most 
recent events prevailed, this level of control is accepted; if no event in the next year 
indicate that the later event induced a change of control, the type of control suggested 
by the first events of the year are assumed to be the one that prevailed. 
As it was seen in the discussion above (also see Table 50 below) the attribution shows 
significant heterogeneity between the histories of political control in each district 
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throughout the more general history of Indonesian occupation of the small half-island of 
Timor-Leste.  
Table 50: Attribution of type of control zone in each district and year, during Indonesian occupation 
District 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 
Aileu 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Ainaro 5 4 2 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Baucau 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 4 4 4 2 2 
Bobonaro 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Cova Lima 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 
Dili 2 2 2 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Ermera 4 2 2 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Lautém 5 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
Liquiçá 2 2 2 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Manufahi 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 
Manatuto 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Oecusse 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Viqueque 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
District 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 
Aileu 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Ainaro 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Baucau 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 
Bobonaro 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Cova Lima 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Dili 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Ermera 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Lautém 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 
Liquiçá 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 
Manufahi 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Manatuto 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 
Oecusse 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Viqueque 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 
Source: Attribution of control by the author following Kalyvas (2006), CAVR (2005) and Taylor (1999, 
1990). 
 
As seen in other chapters of the thesis, this heterogeneity correlates with the levels of 
intensity of violence experienced by the Timorese, depending on when and where they 
were living at any given time. A summary of the heterogeneity is presented in Figure 35 
below. 
In the concluding section, a brief discussion is presented on possible application of this 
small dataset in the analysis of conflict in Timor-Leste. 
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Figure 35: Timor-Leste 1975-1999 - Proportion of years under different types of control 
 
Source: Map of Timor-Leste (GERTIL, 2003); identification of districts of attack and attribution of control by 
the author following Kalyvas (2006), CAVR (2005) and Taylor (1999, 1990). 
 
4- Discussion and conclusion  
Following the framework and classification of zones of control proposed by Kalyvas, 
(2006) and historical reports on the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste, a small 
dataset was created. In this dataset, for each Timorese district and each year of the 
Timorese conflict a classification of the level of control held by the contending forces 
was attributed. The attribution respects the following typology: zone 1 if the district was 
fully controlled by Indonesian forces; zone 2 if under a contested control by those 
forces; zone 4 if under a contested control by the Timorese Resistance; zone 5 if fully 
controlled by these forces. 
This territorial status is expected to correlate with particularly different strategies of 
action by both of the contenders, incumbent and insurgents, in this case Indonesia 
(incumbent-like) and the Timorese Resistance (insurgent-like). These encompass 
conditions of provision of public services, starting from security but branching into 
others that include education, as found in other settings by Kalyvas (2006), Mampilly 
234 
 
(2011) and Arjona (2010), seeking to build differently strengthened social contracts. 
That provision is not only sought to be assured by the incumbent, but also by the rebels 
(or insurgents) who seek to provide levels of governance that assure the cooperation or 
co-optation of the civilians in the territories they aim to fully control. Following this 
research, there is an indication that, while the incumbents seek to provide services even 
in areas controlled by the insurgents, the quality of provision is likely to decrease from 
zone 1 to zone 3 (here being the lowest expected) and to possibly increase in zones 4 
and 5 if an agreement exists between the two sides in contention, as found by Mampilly 
(2011). The interviews conducted in Timor suggest a lack of such agreement between 
Indonesia and the Timorese Resistance, as the teaching in Indonesian language was 
perceived as indoctrination, an assessment also confirmed by Millo and Barnett (2004). 
The only type of education the Resistance was able to put into place, described by older 
interviewees was a form of popular education (literally using the bark of trees as 
“backboards” and coal as “chalk”) tantamount to basic literacy training. This strategy of 
popular education is described by Hill (2002). This may determine the quality of 
education beyond effects of violence. As the quality of provision of education by the 
Indonesian incumbent-like actor was to reduce in areas where the Resistance held more 
control (or for longer), the qualifications of most of the residents were less likely to 
reach average levels. This could, in turn, hurt their labour market opportunities. On the 
other hand, a possible “loyalist” effect could become evident, benefiting those that lived 
the longest in districts controlled by the Resistance.108 
The political dimension of the conflict may also affect behaviour of political actors in 
the post-conflict setting, including the new government and international aid agents and 
NGOs. Post-conflict reconstruction projects may target those areas that were known to 
                                                          
108 The empirical research on post-conflict returns to education in this thesis suggests that not to be the 
case. 
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have been under dispute for longer, allowing those residing there to participate in the 
formal post-conflict labour market. 
This discussion supported the empirical testing of the indicators of political control 
generated, in the studies of this thesis. These indicators can also be used, potentially, in 
the analysis of households’ behaviour and collective action during the conflict, using the 
SUSENAS datasets of the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics, and following the insights of 
research such as Gáfaro et al. (2014) on Colombia. This is, however, a subject of future 
research. 
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5- Chronology of events and classification of control following Kalyvas (2006) 
1975 
 
# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
1 1 5 6 6 1975 Indonesian troops enter Oecusse ABRI 
  
Oecusse 
 
2 
 
2 1 6 6 10 1975 Indonesian troops attack Batugade ABRI 
  
Bobonaro Batugade 4 
 
3 1 6 6 10 1975 Batugade falls ABRI 
  
Bobonaro Batugade 2 
 
4 1 6 16 10 1975 Journalists are killed at Balibo ABRI 
  
Bobonaro Balibo 2 
 
5 1 7 26 11 1975 Atabae is taken by the Indonesian troops ABRI 
  
Bobonaro Atabae 2 
 
6 3 60 28 11 1975 Indonesian troops already reported in Timor Leste ABRI 
 
West 
  
4 
 
7 3 60 2 12 1975 
Foreign journalists advised to leave Dili by 
Australian government    
Dili 
 
5 
 
8 3 62 6 12 1975 
Full scale attack upon Dili. Some Fretilin forces 
stayed to defend Dili, controling Taibesi, Lahane, 
Fathada and the foothils of Comoro. 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Dili 
 
4 
 
9 3 62 6 12 1975 Fretilin leadership fled to Aileu Resistance 
  
Aileu 
 
5 
 
10 1 7 7 12 1975 Formal Invasion of East Timor ABRI 
 
- - - - 
 
11 3 65 7 12 1975 
Dili is reported to have fallen. Massacre of 
civilians in Caicoli, Dili 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Dili 
 
2 
 
12 3 65 9 12 1975 
Baucau is occupied. Invasion happened through 
Laga. 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Baucau 
Baucau, 
Laga 
2 
 
13 1 7 25 12 1975 
15 to 20 thousand Indonesian troops estimated in 
Timor Leste 
ABRI 
 
- - - - 
 
14 3 70 31 12 1975 Indonesian troops overrun Aileu. ABRI Resistance 
 
Aileu 
 
2 
 
15 3 70 31 12 1975 
From Baucau, Manatuto is captured and then 
ABRI forces proceed to Soibada 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Manatuto 
Manatuto,  
Laclubar, 
Soibada 
2 
 
16 3 68 - 12 1975 
Fretilin leadership reported to have fled to 
Maubisse 
Resistance 
  
Ainaro Maubisse 5 
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1976 
 
# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
17 1 9 13 1 1976 Dili, Baucau and border region occupied ABRI 
  
Dili, 
Baucau, 
Bobonaro, 
Covalima 
 
2 
 
18 3 68 - 1 1976 Fretilin leadership reported to have fled to Same Resistance 
  
Manufahi Same 5 
 
19 3 70 - 1 1976 
ABRI controled Maubisse and was fighting for 
control of Fleixa Pass 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Ainaro Maubisse 2 
 
20 3 70 - 1 1976 ABRI reached Bobonaro, Atsabe and the Letefoho ABRI Resistance 
 
Bobbonar
o, Ermera 
Bobonaro, 
Atsabe, Lete 
Foho 
2 
 
21 3 70 - 1 1976 
Offensive strikes from Baucau towards Viqueque 
meeting there a force that landed in Uatu-Lari 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Baucau 
Viqueque  
2 
4  
22 3 70 - 1 1976 
Attack on Fretilin forces in the foothills of Mount 
Matebian 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Baucau 
Quelicai 
Baguia 
4 
 
23 3 70 2 2 1976 Parachute attack over Lospalos ABRI Resistance 
 
Lautem Lospalos 4 
 
24 3 70 5 2 1976 
ABRI forces parachuted into Suai and advanced 
east toward Zumalai. 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Covalima 
Suai 
Zumalai 
4 
 
25 1 9 14 2 1976 
Lopes da Cruz claims 60 thousand Timorese have 
been killed since the invasion   
- - - - 
 
26 3 70 23 2 1976 
ABRI reached Ainaro. Already had landed at 
Betano 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Ainaro 
Manufahi 
Ainaro 
Same 
4 
4  
27 3 70 27 3 1976 ABRI reached Ermera ABRI Resistance 
 
Ermera 
 
4 
 
28 1 9 3 4 1976 A revolt by UDT in Dili is suppressed Resistance ABRI 
 
Dili Dili 1 
 
29 1 9 15 5 1976 
A conference of Fretilin is held in the Central 
Region of East Timor 
Resistance 
 
Central 
  
5 
 
30 1 9 15 5 1976 
Attack by Fretilin forces at Baucau. Fretilin forces 
said to be active outside main towns (Dili, Baucau) 
Resistance ABRI 
 
Dili 
Baucau 
Dili 
Baucau 
2 
 
31 3 71 15 5 1976 
Fretilin's National Conference starts in Soibada 
ending in the 2nd of June. 
Resistance 
  
Manatuto Soibada 5 
 
238 
 
 
 
 
# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
32 3 70 - 6 1976 
ABRI attacked Liquiça and Maubara before 
proceeding to Ermera 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Liquiça 
 
Ermera 
Liquiça 
Maubara 
Eremera 
4 
 
33 1 10 26 8 1976 
Increase in the numbers of ABRI military in the 
South   
- - - - 
 
34 1 10 26 8 1976 
Fretilin forces recapture Alas. Heavy attacks in 
Eastern and Southern Sectors 
Resistance ABRI 
 
Manufahi Alas 4 
 
35 3 70 - 8 1976 
ABRI established 4 operational sectors: 
Sector A - Dili and Oecusse 
Sector B - West: Liquiça, Bobonaro, Ermera and 
Covalima 
Sector C - Center: Aileu, Ainaro, Manufahi and 
Manatuto 
Sector D - East: Baucau, Viqueque and Lautem 
ABRI 
 
- - - - 
 
36 3 73 - 8 1976 
Attack by ABRI on Mount Lakirin and Mount 
Fohorua (near Suai) and Lela (a Fretilin base at the 
time) 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Suai 
Suai 
Maukatar 
4 ? 
37 1 10 24 10 1976 Heavy fight in Bobonaro, Suai, Dili and Baucau Resistance ABRI 
 
Bobonaro 
Suai 
Dili 
Baucau 
 
2 
 
38 1 10 11 11 1976 
Indonesian relief worker reports 100.000 people 
killed   
- - - - 
 
39 1 10 22 12 1976 Fretilin recaptures Remexio Resistance ABRI 
 
Aileu Remexio 4 
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# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
40 3 73-74 - 12 1976 
ABRI is reported to have limited control over: 
corridor from Dili to Ainaro and Betano, corridor 
Baucau-Viqueque, corridor Manatuto-Laclubar, 
corridor Lautém-Tutuala, areas reacheable by road 
along the north coast. 
ABRI 
  
Various 
1) Dili, 
Laulara, 
Aileu, 
Maubisse, 
Hatu Bulico, 
Ainaro, Hatu 
Udo 
2) Baucau, 
Fatu Maka, 
Venilale, 
Ossu, 
Viqueque 
3) Manatuto, 
Laclubar 
4) Balibo; 
Atsabe; 
Maubara; 
Liquiça; 
Bazartete; 
Dom Aleixo; 
Vera Cruz; 
Nain Feto; 
Cristo Rei; 
Metinaro; 
Laclo; 
Manatuto; 
Laleia; 
Vemasse; 
Baucau; 
Laga; 
Lautem ; 
Tutuala. 
2 
 
41 3 73-74 - 12 1976 
Large areas of the interior still remained beyond 
ABRI control 
Resistance 
   
Rest of 
Timor 
5 
 
42 3 71 - - 1976 
Fretilin's maize plantations reported at Laclo, 
Manatuto 
Resistance 
  
Manatuto Laclo 5 
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1977 
# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
43 1 13 17 4 1977 
Fretilim forces report heavy Indonesian offensive 
south-west of Baucau, Remexiu and Bobonaro. 
Shelling in the outskirts of Dili 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Various 
1) Fatu 
Maka, 
Vemasse, 
Venilale, 
Ossu, 
Viqueque, 
Lacluta; 
2) Lequidoe, 
Maubisse, 
Hatu Bulico, 
Same, 
Ainaro, Hato 
Udo, 
Zumalai 
4 
 
44 1 14 7 5 1977 Fretilin reports control over 80% of territory 
  
- - - - - 
45 1 14 7 5 1977 
Heavy bomb raids on Bobonaro. Long military 
engagement in Quelicai 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Bobonaro 
Baucau 
Bobonaro 
Quelicai 
4 
 
46 3 75 - 6 1977 
ABRI campaigns intensify, including attacks to 
food sources 
ABRI Resistance - - - - - 
47 3 77 - 8 1977 
ABRI claims control over route between Quelicai 
and Uatu-Carbau 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Baucau 
Viqueque 
Quelicai 
Baguia 
Uatu Carbau 
2 
 
48 1 14 23 9 1977 
East Timorese are reported being emprisoned on 
Atauro Island 
ABRI 
  
Dili Atauro 1 
 
49 1 14 13 11 1977 
Large scale Indonesian offensive in southern 
border region 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Covalima 
Fatumean 
Fato Lulik 
Fohorem 
Tilomar 
4 
 
50 3 75 - - 1977 
Bombardment of Mount Matebian, Ermera and 
Suai starts. This are reported to end only in 1979 
(Matebian) 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Baucau 
 
Ermera 
Suai 
Quelicai 
Baguia 
Ermera 
Suai 
4 
 
51 3 77 - - 1977 
Fretilin executes liurai of Quelicai. Breakaway unit 
in Iliomar was arrested and executed. Meeting of 
Fretilin Central Commettee in Laline, Lacluta, 
district of Viqueque 
Resistance 
  
Baucau 
Lautem 
Viqueque 
Quelicai 
Iliomar 
Lacluta 
4 
4 
5 
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1978 
# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
52 1 17 27 1 1978 Heavy fighting in the south-west border area ABRI Resistance 
 
Covalima 
Fatumean 
Fato Lulik 
Fohorem 
Tilomar 
4 
 
53 1 17 4 3 1978 
Encirclement campain beggins in the south-west of 
island 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Covalima 
Ainaro 
Manufahi 
 
4 
 
54 1 17 26 5 1978 
Indonesian bombing campaign in north-west 
region and south of Dili 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Bobonaro 
Ermera 
Liquiça 
Aileu 
Ainaro 
Manufahi 
 
4 
 
55 1 17 1 6 1978 
Intense fighting in border areas, central northern 
and central-southern sector and eastern region 
ABRI Resistance - - - - - 
56 1 17 2 6 1978 
Attack on Remexio. Encirclement with areal and 
naval bombardment against areas surrounding 
Turiscai, Betano, Laklubar and Soibada 
ABRI Resistance 
  
Remexio 
Turiscai 
Hatu Udo 
Laklubar 
Soibada 
4 
 
57 1 18 18 6 1978 
Advances of Indonesian troops in North-Central 
Sector 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Aileu 
Manatuto  
4 
 
58 1 18 22 6 1978 
Advance of Indonesian troops on Quelicai and 
Maliana. Troops land near Lospalos 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Baucau 
Bobonaro 
Lautem 
Quelicai 
Maliana 
Lospalos 
4 
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# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
59 3 79 - 6 1978 
ABRI starts an attack over the Same-Kablaki-
Fatuberliu area 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Manufahi 
Same 
Fatuberliu 
4 
 
60 3 79 - 6 1978 
ABRI attacks Fretilin strongholds in the Baucau-
Viqueque border, between Mount Ossoala and 
Mount Mundo Perdido, and continued attack on 
the foothils of Mount Matebian 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Baucau 
Viqueque 
Venilale 
Ossu 
4 
 
61 3 79 - 6 1978 
Bombings reported in Kablaki, Dululau and 
Manelau. 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Ainaro Hatu Bulico 4 
 
62 3 79 - 6 1978 Attack in Dolok ABRI Resistance 
    
? 
63 1 18 18 7 1978 Suharto visits Dili and Maliana ABRI 
  
Dili 
Bobonaro 
Dili 
subdistricts 
Maliana 
1 
 
64 1 18 3 8 1978 Indonesian offensives against Lacluta and Iliomar ABRI Resistance 
 
Viqueque 
Lautem 
Lacluta 
Iliomar 
4 
 
65 1 18 30 8 1978 Remexio is taken by Indonesian troops ABRI Resistance 
 
Aileu Remexio 2 
 
66 1 18 5 9 1978 Indonesian attack on Alas ABRI Resistance 
 
Manufahi Alas 4 
 
67 1 18 7 9 1978 
Ambassadors visit Dili, Baucau, Maliana, 
Remexio 
ABRI 
  
Dili 
Aileu 
Bobonaro 
Dili 
subdistricts 
Remexio 
Maliana 
1 
 
68 1 18 21 9 1978 Intense fighting on South coast ABRI Resistance - - - - - 
69 1 18 30 9 1978 
14000 Timorese displaced (living in displacement 
camps)   
- - - - - 
70 1 18 21 10 1978 
Australia Intelligence Service reports that Fretilin 
still controls most of Timor-Leste   
- - - - - 
71 3 81 22 11 1978 Mount Matebian falls into ABRI control ABRI Resistance 
 
Baucau 
Quelicai 
Baguia 
2 
 
72 3 94 7 12 1978 Xanana Gusmão goes to Mehara Resistance 
  
Lautem Tutuala 4 
 
73 1 19 29 12 1978 
According to the Far Eastern Economic Review, 
there are 165.835 displaced Timorese   
- - - - - 
74 3 94 - 12 1978 
There are no longer any "zona libertada" ie, areas 
under full control of Fretilin. At that time, 300.000 
people are said to have surrendered. 
Resistance 
     
Where 
control 
is 5 
turn 
into 4 
75 3 94 - 12 1978 
There is a small Fretilin group regrouped in the 
Legumau northern range east of Baguia 
Resistance 
  
Baucau Baguia 4 
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1979 
# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
76 1 30 - - 1978 
Reports of bombing of Mount Matebian (reports 
produced on 30-12-1980)   
- - - - 
Report
s to 
event 
71 
77 3 81 - 1 1979 
ABRI starts to focus on Fatubesi (Ermera) and 
Mount Kablaki, following the Ainaro-Manufahi 
border and the Dilor river valley. 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Ermera 
Ainaro 
Manufahi 
Hatolia 
Hatu Bulico 
Same 
4 
 
78 3 81 - 1 1979 ABRI operations in Manatuto ABRI Resistance 
 
Manatuto Manatuto 4 
 
79 3 81 - 1 1979 
Units that took Mount Matebian moved from 
Baucau into Lautém. 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Lautém 
 
4 
 
80 3 81 - 2 1979 
Fretilin leader of Eastern region is captured and 
killed. 
ABRI Resistance - - - - ? 
81 1 21 22 3 1979 Fighting in Alas ABRI Resistance 
 
Manufahi Alas 4 
 
82 3 95 - 3 1979 
Xanana's group was attacked by Indonesian 
military near Remexio and had to return to Mehara 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Aileu 
Lautém 
Remexio 
Tutuala 
2 
4  
83 3 95 - 3 1979 
Three Fretilin companies were eliminated near 
Loré, Lautém 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Lautém Iliomar 2 
 
84 3 95 - 3 1979 
Resistance members were reunited, coming form 
Laline, Uaimori, Matebian, Manatuto, Same, 
Ainaro and near Dili. Mau-Hunu reported to be in 
Lospalos 
Resistance 
 
- - - - ? 
85 3 95 - 3 1979 
Contacts established with civilians to create 
clandestine movements in Indonesian controled 
territories. 
Resistance ABRI - - - - 
 
86 1 21 2 4 1979 
International Red Cross concludes that displaced 
in ressetlement camps are facing deprivation   
- - - - 
 
87 1 21 9 4 1979 
14.000 people in Dili apply for repatriation in 
Portugal when that is allowed during 2 days   
- - - - 
 
88 1 22 28 6 1979 
People reported of being dying slowly of famine 
and deprivation in Turiscai, Maubara and Betano 
ABRI Resistance - - - - 
 
89 1 23 22 12 1979 
Mochtar Kusumaatmadja admists that only half of 
the Timorese population is under Indonesian 
control and that 120.000 have been killed since 
1975 
  
- - - - 
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1980 
 
# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
90 1 25 10 3 1980 Resistance reported from the north-central region Resistance 
  
Aileu 
Manatuto 
Subdistricts 
of Aileu 
Laclo, 
Manatuto, 
Laleia 
4 
 
91 1 25 10 5 1980 Reemergence of Fretilin in the East Resistance 
  
Baucau 
Viqueque 
Lautém 
 
4 
Rest of 
country 
are 2 or 
1 
92 1 25 13 5 1980 150 ressetlement camps reported 
  
- - - - 
 
93 1 25 22 5 1980 
Letters describe armed conflict in the Eastern 
region    
Aileu 
Manatuto 
Subdistricts 
of Aileu 
Laclo, 
Manatuto, 
Laleia 
4 
 
94 1 26 17 6 1980 Fretilin forces attack Dili Resistance ABRI 
 
Dili 
 
2 
 
95 3 89 - 6 1980 Attack by Fretilin in Dili Resistance ABRI 
 
Dili 
 
2 
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1981 
 
# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
96 1 29 25 3 1981 
Indonesian exercises held in Baucau, Lospalos and 
Laga 
ABRI 
  
Baucau 
Lautem 
Baucau, 
Laga 
Lospalos 
2 1? 
97 3 96 - 3 1981 
Resistance holds "National Reorganization 
Conference" in Maubai, Lacluta, district of 
Viqueque. 
- Clandestine movement structure created, with 
district level resistance centers (cernak) and small 
village level cells with 4to 7 people (nurep). 
- Military struture divided in 3 regions: eastern 
("funu sei nafatin" - the fight still goes on), center 
("nakroman" - light) and border ("haksolok" - 
happiness). 
Resistance 
  
Viqueque Lacluta 4 5? 
98 1 29 1 6 1981 
Students from  Baucau, Laclo and Manatuto report 
of a new Indonesian offense, Operation Keamanan 
(fence of legs) 
ABRI Resistance - - - - 
 
99 3 91 - - 1981 
Major operations of "fence of legs" in sector D: 
- A line formed, starting from Tutuala and creating 
a human fence linking Com-Raca-Lospalos-
Iliomar 
- A second line began from Venilale-Ossu-
Viqueque towards the northeast 
- The two lines were to converge on Mount 
Matebian 
- A final phase tried to force Fretilin soldiers into 
Lacluta, Viqueque. There a massacre occurred. 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Lautem 
Baucau 
Viqueque 
 
2 
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1982 
 
# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
100 1 33 11 1 1982 
Massacre reported near Lacluta (500 people 
reported killed) 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Viqueque Lacluta 2 
 
101 1 33 - 2 1982 Severe food shortages reported 
  
- - - - 
 
102 1 33 4 3 1982 
ICRC reports 4000 Timorese emprisoned in 
Atauro   
- - - - 
 
103 1 33 5 3 1982 
Visit of Australian Prime Minister to Maliana, 
Ermera, Natarbora, Dilor, Luro, Suai and Atauro 
ABRI ABRI 
 
Bobonaro 
Ermera 
Manatuto 
Lautém 
Cova 
Lima 
Dili 
Maliana 
Ermera 
Barique 
Luro 
Suai 
Atauro 
5 
 
104 1 35 - 6 1982 
Fretilin attacks on Indonesian forces in Suai, 
Lacluta, Lospalos, Uato Lari, Same, Uato Carbau, 
Viqueque, Loro, Bobonaro 
Resistance ABRI 
 
Cova 
Lima 
Lautém 
 
Viqueque 
 
 
 
Manufahi 
Bobonaro 
Suai 
Loro 
Lospalos 
Lacluta 
Uato Lari 
Uato Carbau 
Viqueque 
Same 
Bobonaro 
2 
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# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
105 3 101 - 8 1982 Attack on Indonesian post is Mauchiga, Ainaro Resistance ABRI 
 
Ainaro Ainaro 2 
 
106 1 35 28 10 1982 
Fretilin attacks on the districts of Viqueque and 
Lospalos 
Resistance ABRI 
 
Viqueque 
Lautem  
2 
 
107 1 36 - 11 1982 
Reports of attacks in Outskirts of Dili and battles 
in Same, Ainaro, Lospalos, Ossu, Matebian and 
Viqueque 
Resistance ABRI 
 
Dili 
Manufahi 
Ainaro 
Lautém 
Viqueque 
 
Baucau 
Dili 
Same 
Ainaro 
Lospalos 
Ossu 
Viqueque 
Baguia 
Quelicai 
2 
 
108 3 100 - - 1982 
Indonesian elections in Viqueque subdistrict have 
to be restricted to the town of Viqueque due to 
lack of control in remaining area. 
Resistance ABRI 
 
Viqueque 
 
4 
 
 
1983 
 
# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
109 1 40 27 3 1983 Heavy fighting reported in Lospalos area Resistance ABRI 
 
Lautém Lospalos 3 ? 
110 1 40 30 3 1983 Resistance said to have 4.000 individuals 
  
- - - - - 
111 3 102 - 3 1983 
Meetings of ABRI with Xanana Gusmão in 
Liaruka, Buburaka, Ossu, Viqueque and, after, 
near Larigutu, Veninale, Baucau 
Resistance 
  
Viqueque 
Baucau 
Ossu 
Venilale 
4 
 
112 1 40 25 6 1983 Ceasefire signed 
  
- - - - - 
113 1 41 29 7 1983 
Members of an Australian parlamentary delegation 
are intercepted by Fretilin soldiers on the road 
from Lospalos to Baucau, east of Laba (a 
ressetlement village in Soelai is occupied by 
Fretilin) 
  
- - - - - 
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# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
114 1 41 8 8 1983 Indonesian forces break the ceasefire 
  
- - - - - 
115 1 41 16 8 1983 
Fretilin forces attack the military section of Dili 
airport    
Dili 
 
2 
 
116 1 41 21 8 1983 
200 to 300 people are executed in Kraras near 
Viqueque, after a number of Indonesian soldiers 
were killed by Fretilin and villagers 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Viqueque Lacluta 4 ? 
117 1 81 - 8 1983 
At 15-8-1988 there was knowledge of reports to 7 
people arrested in Aileu for suspicion of having 
suppied information to ICRC 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Aileu Aileu 1 ? 
118 3 100 - 8 1983 
Ceasefire broken in Kraras (Lacluta, Viqueque) 
with an attack by Falintil and Timorese Hansip 
against Indonesian soldiers, killing 12 troops, and 
ensuing massacre pursued by ABRI as reprisal. 
Resistance ABRI 
 
Viqueque Lacluta 4 
Same 
as 
event 
nb. 116 
119 3 105 - 8 1983 
After the ceasefire was broken, ABRI focused 
attacks on the east 
ABRI 
  
Baucau 
Viqueque 
Lautém 
 
4 
 
120 1 41 7 9 1983 State of Emergency declared in East Timor 
  
- - - - - 
121 1 41 14 9 1983 
Indonesia reported to have 30.000 to 50.000 troops 
in East Timor   
- - - - - 
122 1 41 17 9 1983 Curfew reported in Dili 
   
Dili 
 
2 
 
123 1 43 19 10 1983 
500 members of the civil guard (Hansip) defected 
to Fretilin 
Resistance 
 
- - - - - 
124 1 43 29 12 1983 
East Timor is still described as a "continuing 
security problem"   
- - - - - 
125 3 97 - - 1983 
Defection to FALINTIL of several hundered 
Timorese members of Hansip in Viqueque. 
Resistance 
  
Viqueque 
 
4 
 
126 3 100 - - 1983 Ceasefire signed 
  
- - - - 
Same 
as 
event 
nb. 112 
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1984 
 
# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
127 1 45 18 1 1984 
12.000 Indonesian troops advancing from Baucau 
to Viqueque. 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Baucau 
Viqueque 
- 
2 
4  
128 1 45 18 1 1984 
Fretilin's counter-ffensive attacking the central and 
border sectors and the south coast. 
Resistance ABRI 
West 
Central   
2 
 
129 1 45 28 1 1984 
ABRI troops deployed in a line from Baucau to 
Viqueque and pushing eastward 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Baucau 
Viqueque 
Lautém 
 
2 
2 
4 
 
130 1 45 10 2 1984 Reports of bombing of areas in the east ABRI Resistance 
 
Baucau 
Viqueque 
Lautém 
 
4 
 
131 1 45 27 6 1984 Atrocities reported in Remexio ABRI Resistance 
 
Aileu Remexio 4 
 
132 1 51 - 7 1984 
A letter is reported in 12 February 1985 reporting 
Fretilin attacs on Lacluta in the June 1984 
Resistance ABRI 
     
133 1 49 8 11 1984 
Naval bombardment of the South coast of East 
Timor. Fretilin troops moved to this area to avoid 
"fence of legs" 
ABRI Resistance - - - - 
 
134 1 49 17 12 1984 
General Murdani states that the East Timor 
conflict "will take time to resolve"   
- - - - 
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1985 
 
# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
135 1 52 5 3 1985 
A report states that: Indonesia is to establish a 
sugar mill in Lospalos; strong Indonesian military 
presence in Baucau; 3/4 of prisoners in Atauro are 
from Viqueque. 
ABRI 
 
- - - - 
 
136 1 54 10 7 1985 
A journalist is not allowed to visit Baucau because 
it is deemed "unsafe" 
ABRI 
  
Baucau Baucau 2 
 
137 1 55 10 9 1985 
A Fretilin's document is produced on the areas 
controled in de Eastern Sector of the country 
Resistance 
 
- - - - 
 
138 1 57 12 12 1985 
Groups of Indonesian soldiers reported to have 
been ambushed in the Lospalos and Viqueque 
areas 
Resistance ABRI 
 
Lautém 
Viqueque 
Lospalos 
Viqueque 
4 
 
 
1986 
 
# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
139 1 59 20 2 1986 
A letter is received reporting fighting in the central 
and eastern sectors and attempts to capture 
Fretilin's leadership on Matebian 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Baucau 
Quelicai 
Baguia 
2 
 
140 1 60 18 4 1986 
A set of maps is released in Lisbon. They indicate 
that most Indonesian military activity is occuring 
east of a line from Baucau to Viqueque 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Baucau 
Viqueque 
Lautém 
 
4 
 
141 1 62 11 8 1986 
A Indonesian Government document about 
economic matters highlights investments in 
Covalima area. 
ABRI 
  
Cova 
Lima  
1 
 
142 1 63 19 9 1986 
Wave of arrests in the eastern area with arested 
being taken to Baucau 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Baucau Baucau 1 
 
143 1 64 6 11 1986 
New Indonesian offensive, that started in August, 
concentrated in the Eastern zone. Security is 
strenghten in Dili. 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Baucau 
Viqueque 
Lautém 
other than 
Baucau 
subdistrict 
4 
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# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
144 1 65 21 11 1986 
Fretilin military sucesses reported in all areas but 
most notably in Viqueque area. 
Resistance ABRI 
 
Viqueque 
 
4 
 
145 1 65 25 12 1986 
Letters received by refugees describe conflicts 
between Fretilin and ABRI in Viqueque, Suai and 
Lospalos 
Resistance ABRI 
 
Viqueque 
Cova 
Lima 
Lautém 
Viqueque 
Suai 
Lospalos 
4 
 
146 3 109 - - 1986 
Around 1986, OJECTIL (Timor-Leste Catholic 
Youth Organization) was formed by student 
activits based in Externato S. José in Dili. A 
similar movement for students abroad (RENETIL - 
Timor-Leste Student's National Resistance) was 
estableshed in 1988 in Bali. 
Resistance 
 
- - - - 
 
 
1987 
 
# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
147 1 70 2 5 1987 
Governor Carrascalão stressed that unemplyment 
would soon emerge in East Timor since jobs 
would not be availlable to all high schools 
graduates. He proposed: building polytechnic 
schools, building 20 vocational schools, develop a 
"mining sector" for marble. 
  
- - - - 
 
148 1 75 21 11 1987 
A Canadian Parlamentary delegation visits Dili 
and Lospalos 
ABRI 
  
Dili 
Lospalos  
5 
 
149 1 76 22 12 1987 
Reports of a Fretilin attack on Indonesian forces 
near Barique 
Resistance ABRI 
 
Manatuto Barique 2 
 
150 1 76 28 12 1987 
Appeal by Gen. Murdani for those "in the 
mountains" to surrender.   
- - - - 
 
151 1 76 30 12 1987 
Fretilin forces is of 500 men according to Gen 
Murdani.   
- - - - 
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1988 
 
# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
152 1 79 4 1 1988 
A Portuguese flag is hoisted in Dili during the visit 
by Gen. Murdani 
Resistance ABRI 
 
Dili 
 
2 
 
153 1 79 23 1 1988 
Anti-Indonesia pamphlets distributed in public 
buildings in Dili 
Resistance ABRI 
 
Dili 
 
2 
 
154 1 81 18 2 1988 A prison is being contructed in Maliana ABRI 
  
Bobonaro Maliana 1 
 
155 1 81 9 3 1988 
Fretilin infiltrates into Baucau and attacks areas 
near the western border 
Resistance ABRI 
     
156 1 83 14 3 1988 
Fretilin is said to control 1000 villages in the East 
and has 1.500 people in arms. 
Resistance 
 
- - - - 
 
157 1 83 20 3 1988 
In an Interview in Jakarta, TL, Governor Mário 
Carrascalão states that Fretilin forces are in the 
eastern and southeastern areas of TL 
Resistance 
 
Central 
West   
1 or 2 
 
158 1 86 2 7 1988 
Governor states that development strategies 
pursued in East Timor are only providing jobs for 
Indonesians 
  
- - - - 
 
159 1 87 10 8 1988 
A series of attacks by Fretilin forces are reported 
in Natarbora, Viqueque, Laclubar, Remexio and 
outskirts of Baucau 
Resistance ABRI 
 
Manatuto 
 
Viqueque 
Aileu 
Natarbora 
Laclubar 
Viqueque 
Remexio 
2 
 
160 1 87 16 8 1988 
4 members of the european Parliament travel by 
helicopter from Dili to Viqueque and to Baucau 
ABRI 
  
Dili 
Viqueque 
Baucau 
Cities 1 
 
161 1 89 - 8 1988 
Report availlable at 24-12-1988: the president of 
Fretilin was said to have escaped an Indonesian 
military enciclement on the banks of river Galata 
near mount Matebian 
ABRI Resistance - - - - 
 
162 1 87 31 10 1988 
5 girls in agricultural college in Natarbora are 
reported to have been raped and murdered by 
Indonesian soldiers 
ABRI 
 
- - - - 
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# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
163 1 87 5 11 1988 
President Suharto announces that from January 
1989 all districts will be opened to entry by 
Indonesian and foreigners except: Manatuto, 
Baucau, Viqueque and Lospalos 
ABRI 
  
Manatuto 
Baucau 
Viqueque 
Lautem 
rest of 
country 
 
2 
4 
4 
4 
1 
 
164 1 89 30 11 1988 
ABRI operations, since June, in the areas of 
Viqueque, Baucau and Lospalos. 
ABRI 
  
Baucau 
Viqueque 
Lautem 
 
4 
 
165 1 89 30 11 1988 
Approximately 500 students reported to have left 
the areas of Baucau, Ainaro and Natarbora to join 
Fretilin. 
Resistance 
  
Baucau 
Ainaro 
Barique 
 
4 
2 
2 
 
166 1 89 12 12 1988 
During a visit by President Suharto to Dili, 200 
people are arested 
ABRI 
  
Dili 
 
2 
 
 
1989 
# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
167 1 93 10 1 1989 
Attacks by Fretilin in Dili (Lahane and Taibesse). 
Desertions are reported. 
Resistance ABRI 
 
Dili 
 
2 
 
168 1 93 5 2 1989 
In a visit to a orphanage in Venilale, a reporter is 
told that Indonesia soldiers wait there for Fretilin 
members who come in "from outlying areas" to try 
and visit children and relatives 
ABRI Resistance 
 
Baucau Venilale 4 
 
169 1 93/94 7 2 1989 
Armed rebels are reported by the indonesian 
Interior Minister to still "roam the mountainous 
areas" 
Resistance 
 
- - - - 
 
170 1 94 7 3 1989 British MPs are not allowed to visit Baucau. ABRI 
  
Baucau City 2 
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# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
171 1 94 17 3 1989 
A reporter travelling to Viqueque states that 
security is tight and villagers have been ordered to 
build walls arround their settlements 
ABRI 
  
Viqueque City 2 
 
172 2 212 12 10 1989 Pope John Paul II visits Dili ABRI 
  
Dili City 1 
 
 
1990-1994 
 
# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
173 2 213 12 11 1991 St. Cruz Massacre in Dili ABRI 
  
Dili City 1 
 
174 2 214 20 11 1992 Xanana Gusmão is arrested in Lahane, Dili ABRI 
  
Dili City 1 
 
175 2 214 3 4 1993 
Ma'Huno, the new FALINTIL commander is 
captured in Ainaro 
ABRI 
 
- - - - 
 
176 2 215 28 6 1994 
In Remexio, 2 soldiers disrespect a Catholic Mass 
and desecrate the "holy communion" 
ABRI 
  
Aileu Remexio 
  
177 2 215 31 7 1994 
Konis Santan, new Falintil commander offers a 
unilateral ceasefire 
Resistance 
 
- - - - 
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1995-1996 
 
# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
178 2 216 12 1 1995 
Execution of 6 civilians in Liquiça as a reprisal for 
an attack that happened there. 
ABRI 
  
Liquiça 
 
2 
 
179 2 217 27 7 1995 
2 young Timorese men are reported being killed 
by Indonesian soldiers in the village of 
Wailakama, region of Vemasse 
ABRI 
 
- - - - 
 
180 2 217 3 8 1995 
Killings and disapearences are reported in Quelicai 
and Baucau. 
ABRI 
 
- - - - 
 
181 2 217 3 8 1995 
A local Indonesian commander is seriously injured 
in Bucoli. 
Resistance ABRI 
 
Baucau Baucau 2 
 
182 2 217 8 9 1995 
Disturbances reported in Dili, Maliana, Viqueque, 
Ermera and Manatuto 
Resistance ABRI 
  
Dili 
Maliana 
Viqueque 
Ermera 
Manatuto 
2 
 
183 2 217 8 9 1995 
Soldiers enter a Catholic church in Maliana and 
insult the priest 
ABRI 
   
Maliana 2 
 
184 2 217 8 9 1995 Youth in Dili burns largest market Resistance 
   
Dili 2 
 
185 2 219 15 11 1996 
ABRI reported to have killed 10 people from the 
village of Waihulae and 4 from the nearby village 
of Samalari, near Viqueque 
ABRI Resistance 
  
Viqueque 4 
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1997 
# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
186 2 220 29 5 1997 
Polling stations are atacked on elections for the 
Indonesian Parliament in Baucau, Quelicai, 
Viqueque, Ossu. Booths are also burnt down in 
Ermera and Bobonaro and hit by grenades in 
Liquiça 
Resistance ABRI 
  
Baucau 
Quelicai 
Viqueque 
Ossu 
Ermera 
Bobonaro 
Liquiça 
2 
 
187 2 220 7 6 1997 Market in Dili is burnt down. Resistance 
   
Dili 2 
 
188 2 220 11 6 1997 Indonesian army kills 12 civilian in Baucau ABRI Resistance 
  
Baucau 2 
 
189 2 220 14 11 1997 
Students are injured (8 seriously) and arrested in 
Dili after peacefull comemoration of St. Cruz 
Massacre 
ABRI Resistance 
  
Dili 2 
 
1998 
# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
190 2 223 12 10 1998 
Demonstrations in Dili, with people for Ermera 
and Liquiça and in Baucau with people from 
Baguia, Laga, Quelicai, Venilale and Vemasse. 
Resistance 
   
Dili 
Ermera 
Liquiça 
Baucau 
Laga 
Quelicai 
Venilale 
Vemasse 
2 
 
191 2 223 24 10 1998 
Attack by Indonesian army to villages in the 
district of Alas 
ABRI 
   
Alas 4 
 
192 3 127 13 11 1998 
First attack by paramilitary militias: militia 
"Ablai" + ABRI attack catholic church of Alas in 
retaliation for Fretilin attack in Alas (Manufahi) 
ABRI Resistance 
  
Alas 2 
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1999 
# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
193 3 131 - 1 1999 
Mahidi militia (Mati hindup dengen Indonesia) 
based in Cassa, Ainaro and leaded by the son of a 
local liurai attacks Suai church 
ABRI Resistance 
  
Ainaro 
Suai 
1 
 
194 2 224 24 2 1999 
Pro-integration militias fire on pro-independence 
demonstrators in Dili 
ABRI Resistance 
  
Dili 1 
 
195 2 224 8 3 1999 
1600 refugess are reported to have fled the village 
of Sare near Hatolia, Ermera, after attacks by 
milita on the town of Guiso, near Maubara 
ABRI Resistance 
   
1 
 
196 2 224 16 3 1999 
Milita group Besi Mera Puthi attacks Carmelite 
Convent in Maubara. 
ABRI 
    
1 
 
197 2 224 4 4 1999 
Militia groups attack the village of Dato, three 
kilometers west of Liquiça 
ABRI 
    
1 
 
198 2 224 6 4 1999 Militia attacks Liquiça church ABRI 
    
1 
 
199 2 225 9 5 1999 Militia spark riots in Dili ABRI 
    
1 
 
200 2 225 28 5 1999 
Reports of Military control returning to Oecusse, 
Liquiça, Ainaro and Ermera 
ABRI 
    
1 
 
201 2 226 10 6 1999 
Reports of Indonesian troops in Liquiça forcing 
people to vote in the 7/7 Indonesian Elections 
ABRI 
    
1 
 
202 2 226 7 7 1999 
A convoy fo humanitarian aid in ermera is 
attacked by the Besi Merah Putih militia. A 
UNAMET convoy is attacked in Liquiça 
ABRI 
    
1 
 
203 2 226 28 8 1999 UN officials are threatened by milita in Maliana ABRI 
    
1 
 
204 2 226 29 8 1999 
CNRT HQ in Pante-Makasar (Oecusse) is attacked 
by militia. CNRT offices in Dili and Lospalos are 
also destroyed 
ABRI 
    
1 
 
205 2 226 1 9 1999 
Attacks on pro-independence supporters reported 
in Gleno, Ermera, aileu, Oecusse, Maliana and Dili 
ABRI 
    
1 
 
206 2 226 3 9 1999 UN staff abandons Maliana ABRI 
    
1 
 
207 2 226 4 9 1999 Referendum 
     
1 
 
208 2 226 4 9 1999 Millitia attack in Maliana ABRI 
    
1 
 
209 2 226 5 9 1999 Millitia attack in Dili ABRI 
    
1 
 
210 2 226 8 9 1999 Millitia attack in Suai ABRI 
    
1 
 
211 2 226 10 9 1999 Millitia attack in Dili ABRI 
    
1 
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# Ref Pg D M Y Event Attacker Defender Region District Subdistrict 
Control 
zone 
Obs. 
Information obtained from documental sources Researcher’s Interpretation 
212 2 226 19 9 1999 First UN troops leave Darwin to protect Timor UN 
    
1 
 
213 2 226 20 9 1999 
First UN troops / peacekeeping forces arrive to 
Dili 
UN 
    
1 
 
214 2 226 20 9 1999 New militia coalition established at Balibó ABRI 
    
1 
 
215 2 226 23 9 1999 
Leader of Aitarak militia calls for militia to be 
allowed control over area west of Dili 
ABRI 
    
1 
 
216 2 226 28 9 1999 
Catholic workers killed by paramilitary in the road 
to Lospalos 
ABRI 
    
1 
 
217 * 226 - - 1999 
FALINTIL forces are stationed at Remexio, 
following referendum agreement 
Resistance 
    
1 
 
218 3 88 - - - 
Population in Dili rose from 28.000 in 1975 to 
67.039 in 1980.        
 
Legend: 
Ref: (1) Taylor (1990); (2) Taylor (1999); (3) CAVR (2005) 
Control zone: (1) Full control by Indonesian Army (ABRI); (2) Disputed control, under ABRI; (3) Contested control109; (4) Disputed 
control, under the Timorese Resistance; (5) Full control by the Timorese Resistance (FRETILIN/FALINTIL) 
 
 
                                                          
109 In this analysis no rationale was found to assume at any time that a particular sub-district was completely contested, i.e., under neither the control of ABRI or the 
Timorese Resistance, even if disputed. 
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Appendix B - Chapter 2 
Table 51: Primary Education Demand - Standard Models with Conflict 1: Average killings during life of the child – 
Instrumental Variable – First Stage 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Individual, HH and local + Education as 
Investment 
Standard Model 
 b/se b/se b/se 
Constant -30.466*** -30.830*** -32.184*** 
 (2.378) (2.468) (2.595) 
Distance to border (instrument) -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Female 0.006 0.006 0.016 
 (0.140) (0.140) (0.141) 
Age 7.984*** 8.220*** 8.223*** 
 (0.199) (0.211) (0.211) 
Age2 -0.360*** -0.371*** -0.371*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Urban -0.086 -0.050 -0.154 
 (0.096) (0.096) (0.154) 
Father Attended School 0.111 0.131 0.035 
 (0.249) (0.253) (0.258) 
Mother Attended School -0.398 -0.393 -0.462 
 (0.384) (0.385) (0.383) 
Migrated 1.295** 1.299** 1.196** 
 (0.539) (0.530) (0.518) 
First Child -0.080 -0.051 -0.070 
 (0.155) (0.155) (0.155) 
Adopted -0.436 -0.402 -0.425 
 (0.450) (0.448) (0.434) 
Niece/Nephew 0.139 0.157 0.107 
 (0.248) (0.246) (0.244) 
Ln (Household Size) -0.024 -0.008 0.192 
 (0.160) (0.158) (0.204) 
Share of boys 0-1 -0.653 -0.742 -0.424 
 (0.935) (0.930) (0.947) 
Share of boys 2-4 0.413 0.442 0.764 
 (0.686) (0.686) (0.702) 
Share of boys 5-9 1.770*** 1.808*** 1.966*** 
 (0.484) (0.488) (0.496) 
Share of boys 10-14 -0.484 -0.451 -0.265 
 (0.527) (0.527) (0.543) 
Share of men above 65 1.113 1.053 1.316 
 (1.232) (1.224) (1.237) 
Share of girls 0-1 2.167** 2.090** 2.381** 
 (1.023) (1.024) (1.037) 
Share of girls 2-4 -0.398 -0.497 -0.371 
 (0.687) (0.684) (0.686) 
Share of girls 5-9 1.281*** 1.313*** 1.451*** 
 (0.490) (0.488) (0.493) 
Share of girls 10-14 -0.282 -0.185 -0.083 
 (0.514) (0.512) (0.513) 
Share of women above 65 1.167 1.142 1.152 
 (1.050) (1.038) (1.015) 
Completed Years of Education by 2004/05  -0.094*** -0.121*** 
 (0.033) (0.036) 
E(Returns to Education)  -51.444*** -52.405*** 
  (10.704) (10.451) 
Average local wage  -0.064 -0.209 
  (0.252) (0.264) 
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Table 51: Primary Education Demand - Standard Models with Conflict 1: Average killings during life of the child – 
Instrumental Variable – First Stage (cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Individual, HH and local + Education as 
Investment 
Standard Model 
 b/se b/se b/se 
Number of cows owned  0.002 -0.006 
  (0.022) (0.021) 
Household had a loan denied  -0.077 0.049 
  (0.239) (0.251) 
E (Per capita Monthly Household Income)   0.027* 
   (0.015) 
Average local education costs   -0.001 
   (0.004) 
Average local subsidies to education   0.001 
   (0.010) 
Average time to primary school   -0.003 
   (0.004) 
Insufficient Access   0.084 
   (4.127) 
Insufficient Quality   8.981 
   (15.877) 
Insufficient Security   9.925 
   (16.963) 
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Ethno-linguistic fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 6032 6032 6023 
Pseudo R2 0.724 0.726 0.726 
Log-Likelihood -15480.825 -15456.778 -15433.084 
Sargan test    
F-Statistic 29.48 25.43 24.49 
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Wooldridge Test of Endogeneity – Significance of Residual in regression with conflict variable and residual 
Residual -0.186*** -0.204*** -0.191*** 
Std. Dev. (0.056) (0.064) (0.071) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 52: Primary Education Demand - Conflict 1: Average killings during life of the child - Robustness to age of entry in 
school – cohort 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Baseline model 
Cohort 6-14 years old 
Cohort 7-14 years old Cohort 8-14 years old 
 Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Conflict 1: Average killings 
during life 
-0.023*** 0.166** -0.010 0.126* 0.016 0.063 
(0.007) (0.071) (0.008) (0.066) (0.016) (0.061) 
N 6022 6022 5256 5256 4450 4450 
Log-Likelihood -121425.64 -121698.40 -112748.88 -112789.51 -94630.62 -94656.07 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 53: Primary Education Demand - Conflict 1: Average killings during life of the child - Decomposition by Gender – 
First Stage 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Sample Girls Boys 
 b/se b/se b/se 
Constant -32.184*** -25.697*** -31.278*** 
 (2.595) (1.758) (3.207) 
Distance to border (instrument) -0.033*** -0.031** -0.033*** 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.008) 
Female 0.016 0.000 0.000 
 (0.141) (.) (.) 
Age 8.223*** 7.976*** 8.685*** 
 (0.211) (0.276) (0.283) 
Age2 -0.371*** -0.358*** -0.391*** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) 
Urban -0.154 -0.060 -0.264 
 (0.154) (0.228) (0.243) 
Father Attended School 0.035 0.047 -0.065 
 (0.258) (0.364) (0.373) 
Mother Attended School -0.462 -0.384 -0.386 
 (0.383) (0.543) (0.529) 
Migrated 1.196** 1.791*** 0.741 
 (0.518) (0.690) (0.653) 
First Child -0.070 -0.069 -0.023 
 (0.155) (0.189) (0.234) 
Adopted -0.425 -0.862 -0.166 
 (0.434) (0.713) (0.415) 
Niece/Nephew 0.107 0.020 0.041 
 (0.244) (0.327) (0.412) 
Ln (Household Size) 0.192 0.208 0.236 
 (0.204) (0.290) (0.308) 
Share of boys 0-1 -0.424 -0.177 -0.148 
 (0.947) (1.243) (1.632) 
Share of boys 2-4 0.764 1.714* -0.398 
 (0.702) (0.951) (1.113) 
Share of boys 5-9 1.966*** -0.215 3.351*** 
 (0.496) (0.727) (0.715) 
Share of boys 10-14 -0.265 0.757 -0.870 
 (0.543) (0.870) (0.826) 
Share of men above 65 1.316 0.632 1.599 
 (1.237) (1.780) (1.641) 
Share of girls 0-1 2.381** 0.271 4.690*** 
 (1.037) (1.430) (1.772) 
Share of girls 2-4 -0.371 -1.124 0.129 
 (0.686) (1.049) (1.047) 
Share of girls 5-9 1.451*** 1.482** 0.671 
 (0.493) (0.605) (0.892) 
Share of girls 10-14 -0.083 -0.779 1.305 
 (0.513) (0.737) (0.871) 
Share of women above 65 1.152 2.664** -0.508 
 (1.015) (1.273) (1.428) 
Completed Years of Education by 2004/05 -0.121*** -0.095** -0.135** 
(0.036) (0.045) (0.056) 
E(Returns to Education) -52.405*** -37.339*** -69.774*** 
 (10.451) (13.382) (12.764) 
Average local wage -0.209 0.003 -0.263 
 (0.264) (0.430) (0.487) 
Number of cows owned -0.006 -0.016 0.014 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.051) 
Household had a loan denied 0.049 -0.155 0.216 
 (0.251) (0.282) (0.337) 
E (Per capita Monthly Household Income) 0.027* 0.009 0.044* 
 (0.015) (0.020) (0.023) 
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Table 53: Primary Education Demand - Conflict 1: Average killings during life of the child - Decomposition by Gender – 
First Stage (cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Sample Girls Boys 
 b/se b/se b/se 
Average local education costs -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) 
Average local subsidies to education 0.001 0.008 0.003 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.018) 
Average time to primary school -0.003 0.003 -0.008 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
Insufficient Access 0.084 -3.225 2.964 
 (4.127) (6.644) (6.955) 
Insufficient Quality 8.981 12.821 11.439 
 (15.877) (23.387) (26.342) 
Insufficient Security 9.925 34.020 -10.466 
 (16.963) (24.714) (27.939) 
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Ethno-linguistic fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 6023 2941 3082 
Pseudo R2 0.726 0.740 0.724 
Log-Likelihood -15433.084 -7399.078 -7971.518 
Sargan test    
F-Statistic 24.49 5.47 18.39 
P-Value 0.0000 0.0195 0.0000 
Wooldridge Test of Endogeneity – Significance of Residual in regression with conflict variable and residual 
Residual -0.191*** -0.556 -0.619 
Std. Dev. (0.071) (0.482) (0.903) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 54: Primary Education Demand - Conflict 1: Average killings during life of the child - Decomposition Urban / Rural – 
First Stage 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Sample Urban Rural 
 b/se b/se b/se 
Constant -32.184*** -23.473*** -35.910*** 
 (2.595) (3.195) (1.814) 
Distance to border (instrument) -0.033*** -0.036*** -0.025*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) 
Female 0.016 0.293* -0.089 
 (0.141) (0.155) (0.181) 
Age 8.223*** 7.619*** 8.442*** 
 (0.211) (0.228) (0.275) 
Age2 -0.371*** -0.344*** -0.381*** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) 
Urban -0.154 0.000 0.000 
 (0.154) (.) (.) 
Father Attended School 0.035 0.173 -0.001 
 (0.258) (0.387) (0.363) 
Mother Attended School -0.462 0.240 -0.865* 
 (0.383) (0.571) (0.523) 
Migrated 1.196** 1.074* 1.342* 
 (0.518) (0.613) (0.812) 
First Child -0.070 -0.268 -0.026 
 (0.155) (0.184) (0.199) 
Adopted -0.425 0.025 -0.470 
 (0.434) (0.723) (0.513) 
Niece/Nephew 0.107 -0.303 0.367 
 (0.244) (0.401) (0.293) 
Ln (Household Size) 0.192 -0.061 0.288 
 (0.204) (0.274) (0.266) 
Share of boys 0-1 -0.424 -0.435 -0.522 
 (0.947) (1.086) (1.168) 
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Table 54: Primary Education Demand - Conflict 1: Average killings during life of the child - Decomposition Urban / Rural – 
First Stage (cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Sample Urban Rural 
 b/se b/se b/se 
Share of boys 2-4 0.764 0.017 1.152 
 (0.702) (1.029) (0.881) 
Share of boys 5-9 1.966*** 1.995** 2.040*** 
 (0.496) (0.806) (0.601) 
Share of boys 10-14 -0.265 -0.694 0.028 
 (0.543) (0.807) (0.663) 
Share of men above 65 1.316 -2.954* 2.297 
 (1.237) (1.672) (1.460) 
Share of girls 0-1 2.381** 2.646** 2.173* 
 (1.037) (1.271) (1.290) 
Share of girls 2-4 -0.371 0.318 -0.495 
 (0.686) (1.042) (0.849) 
Share of girls 5-9 1.451*** 0.479 1.809*** 
 (0.493) (0.666) (0.619) 
Share of girls 10-14 -0.083 -0.202 0.033 
 (0.513) (0.828) (0.615) 
Share of women above 65 1.152 0.567 1.086 
 (1.015) (1.837) (1.106) 
Completed Years of Education by 2004/05 -0.121*** -0.072 -0.131*** 
(0.036) (0.048) (0.046) 
E(Returns to Education) -52.405*** -68.158*** -51.228*** 
 (10.451) (18.895) (11.312) 
Average local wage -0.209 0.100 -0.332 
 (0.264) (0.291) (0.396) 
Number of cows owned -0.006 -0.020 -0.001 
 (0.021) (0.031) (0.024) 
Household had a loan denied 0.049 -0.949** 0.512* 
 (0.251) (0.370) (0.292) 
E (Per capita Monthly Household Income) 0.027* -0.002 0.036* 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.019) 
Average local education costs -0.001 0.007 -0.007 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 
Average local subsidies to education 0.001 -0.033** 0.024* 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) 
Average time to primary school -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Insufficient Access 0.084 0.000 0.000 
 (4.127) (.) (.) 
Insufficient Quality 8.981 0.000 0.000 
 (15.877) (.) (.) 
Insufficient Security 9.925 0.000 0.000 
 (16.963) (.) (.) 
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Ethno-linguistic fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 6023 2787 3236 
Pseudo R2 0.726 0.685 0.737 
Log-Likelihood -15433.084 -6667.849 -8418.779 
Sargan test    
F-Statistic 24.49 19.34 58.86 
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Wooldridge Test of Endogeneity – Significance of Residual in regression with conflict variable and residual 
Residual -0.191*** -0.193* -0.154 
Std. Dev. (0.071) (0.113) (0.218) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 55: Primary Education Demand - Standard Models with Conflict 2: Extreme Killings Shock – Instrumental Variable 
– First Stage 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Individual, HH and local + Education as 
Investment 
Standard Model 
 b/se b/se b/se 
Constant -0.895*** -0.936*** -1.068*** 
 (0.132) (0.135) (0.149) 
Distance to border (instrument) -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female 0.008 0.008 0.009 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Age 0.284*** 0.309*** 0.309*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
Age2 -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Urban -0.011 -0.007 -0.015 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) 
Father Attended School -0.015 -0.013 -0.021 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Mother Attended School -0.004 -0.002 -0.007 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) 
Migrated 0.179*** 0.180*** 0.170*** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
First Child -0.003 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Adopted -0.046 -0.042 -0.045 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) 
Niece/Nephew 0.026 0.030 0.025 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Ln (Household Size) -0.012 -0.010 0.004 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) 
Share of boys 0-1 -0.013 -0.025 0.002 
 (0.067) (0.066) (0.067) 
Share of boys 2-4 0.009 0.009 0.039 
 (0.053) (0.052) (0.054) 
Share of boys 5-9 0.084** 0.088** 0.101*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) 
Share of boys 10-14 0.038 0.039 0.056 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) 
Share of men above 65 0.026 0.019 0.037 
 (0.094) (0.092) (0.093) 
Share of girls 0-1 0.198*** 0.189*** 0.220*** 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.074) 
Share of girls 2-4 -0.031 -0.041 -0.029 
 (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) 
Share of girls 5-9 0.049 0.051 0.065* 
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) 
Share of girls 10-14 0.040 0.050 0.058 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Share of women above 65 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 
 (0.066) (0.067) (0.066) 
Completed Years of Education by 2004/05  -0.010*** -0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
E(Returns to Education)  -5.474*** -5.544*** 
  (1.003) (0.985) 
Average local wage  0.004 -0.006 
  (0.028) (0.029) 
Number of cows owned  -0.001 -0.002 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
Household had a loan denied  -0.024 -0.016 
  (0.019) (0.020) 
E (Per capita Monthly Household Income)   0.002* 
   (0.001) 
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Table 55: Primary Education Demand - Standard Models with Conflict 2: Extreme Killings Shock – Instrumental Variable 
– First Stage (cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Individual, HH and local + Education as 
Investment 
Standard Model 
 b/se b/se b/se 
Average local education costs   0.000 
   (0.000) 
Average local subsidies to education   -0.001 
   (0.001) 
Average time to primary school   -0.000 
   (0.000) 
Insufficient Access   -0.110 
   (0.216) 
Insufficient Quality   0.999 
   (1.193) 
Insufficient Security   0.757 
   (1.384) 
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Ethno-linguistic fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 6032 6032 6023 
Pseudo R2 0.737 0.742 0.743 
Log-Likelihood 564.423 621.381 625.365 
Sargan test    
F-Statistic 75.07 64.51 58.93 
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Wooldridge Test of Endogeneity – Significance of Residual in regression with conflict variable and residual 
Residual -5.234*** -5.050 -4.765*** 
Std. Dev. (1.632) (5.571) (1.834) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 56: Primary Education Demand - Conflict 2: Shock of extreme violence during life - Robustness to age of entry in 
school – cohort 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Baseline model 
Cohort 6-14 years old 
Cohort 7-14 years old Cohort 8-14 years old 
 Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Conflict 2: Shock of extreme 
violence during life 
-0.402*** 4.260** -0.186 22.268 -0.233 1.443 
(0.112) (1.831) (0.125) (17.946) (0.242) (1.396) 
N 6022 6022 5256 5256 4450 4450 
Log-Likelihood -121308.848 -121698.394 -112727.728 -112789.508 -94633.188 -94656.066 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
  
266 
 
 
 
 
Table 57:  Primary Education Demand - Conflict 2: Shock of extreme violence during life – Decomposition by Gender – 
First Stage 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Sample Girls Boys 
 b/se b/se b/se 
Constant -1.068*** -0.829*** -1.100*** 
 (0.149) (0.133) (0.186) 
Distance to border (instrument) -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female 0.009 0.000 0.000 
 (0.009) (.) (.) 
Age 0.309*** 0.288*** 0.339*** 
 (0.016) (0.022) (0.022) 
Age2 -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.015*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Urban -0.015 -0.011 -0.020 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) 
Father Attended School -0.021 -0.021 -0.029 
 (0.020) (0.032) (0.022) 
Mother Attended School -0.007 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.028) (0.041) (0.031) 
Migrated 0.170*** 0.238*** 0.115** 
 (0.047) (0.074) (0.051) 
First Child -0.001 -0.013 0.012 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.016) 
Adopted -0.045 -0.083 -0.020 
 (0.036) (0.061) (0.034) 
Niece/Nephew 0.025 0.006 0.039 
 (0.020) (0.028) (0.031) 
Ln (Household Size) 0.004 0.013 0.004 
 (0.014) (0.022) (0.021) 
Share of boys 0-1 0.002 0.013 0.014 
 (0.067) (0.097) (0.107) 
Share of boys 2-4 0.039 0.128* -0.060 
 (0.054) (0.075) (0.079) 
Share of boys 5-9 0.101*** 0.033 0.160*** 
 (0.038) (0.057) (0.051) 
Share of boys 10-14 0.056 0.040 0.044 
 (0.041) (0.065) (0.059) 
Share of men above 65 0.037 -0.020 0.075 
 (0.093) (0.132) (0.120) 
Share of girls 0-1 0.220*** 0.077 0.373*** 
 (0.074) (0.106) (0.112) 
Share of girls 2-4 -0.029 -0.052 -0.021 
 (0.050) (0.081) (0.072) 
Share of girls 5-9 0.065* 0.058 0.043 
 (0.037) (0.047) (0.061) 
Share of girls 10-14 0.058 0.050 0.108* 
 (0.040) (0.057) (0.058) 
Share of women above 65 0.001 0.120 -0.119 
 (0.066) (0.084) (0.094) 
Completed Years of Education by 2004/05 -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.014*** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
E(Returns to Education) -5.544*** -4.830*** -6.395*** 
 (0.985) (1.374) (1.240) 
Average local wage -0.006 -0.010 0.008 
 (0.029) (0.046) (0.044) 
Number of cows owned -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Household had a loan denied -0.016 -0.010 -0.019 
 (0.020) (0.030) (0.026) 
E (Per capita Monthly Household Income) 0.002* 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
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Table 57:  Primary Education Demand - Conflict 2: Shock of extreme violence during life – Decomposition by Gender – 
First Stage (cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Sample Girls Boys 
 b/se b/se b/se 
Average local education costs 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Average local subsidies to education -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Average time to primary school -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Insufficient Access -0.110 -0.200 -0.045 
 (0.216) (0.344) (0.341) 
Insufficient Quality 0.999 1.359 0.913 
 (1.193) (1.769) (1.862) 
Insufficient Security 0.757 3.015 -1.748 
 (1.384) (2.046) (2.177) 
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Ethno-linguistic fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 6023 2941 3082 
Pseudo R2 0.743 0.749 0.746 
Log-Likelihood 625.365 369.365 312.917 
Sargan test    
F-Statistic 58.93 41.90 42.86 
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Woodridge Test of Endogeneity – Significance of Residual in regression with conflict variable and residual 
Residual -4.765*** -6.473 -13.829 
Std. Dev. (1.834) (5.530) (20.431) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 58: Primary Education Demand - Conflict 2: Shock of extreme violence during life - Decomposition Urban / Rural – 
First Stage 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Sample Urban Rural 
 b/se b/se b/se 
Constant -1.068*** -0.298 -1.401*** 
 (0.149) (0.216) (0.128) 
Distance to border (instrument) -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female 0.009 0.033** -0.002 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) 
Age 0.309*** 0.192*** 0.347*** 
 (0.016) (0.023) (0.020) 
Age2 -0.014*** -0.008*** -0.015*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Urban -0.015 0.000 0.000 
 (0.011) (.) (.) 
Father Attended School -0.021 -0.008 -0.026 
 (0.020) (0.035) (0.025) 
Mother Attended School -0.007 0.035 -0.034 
 (0.028) (0.046) (0.032) 
Migrated 0.170*** 0.312*** -0.008 
 (0.047) (0.060) (0.051) 
First Child -0.001 0.004 -0.008 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.013) 
Adopted -0.045 -0.020 -0.063 
 (0.036) (0.066) (0.041) 
Niece/Nephew 0.025 -0.033 0.045** 
 (0.020) (0.038) (0.022) 
Ln (Household Size) 0.004 0.005 0.004 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.018) 
Share of boys 0-1 0.002 -0.022 0.065 
 (0.067) (0.092) (0.080) 
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Table 58: Primary Education Demand - Conflict 2: Shock of extreme violence during life - Decomposition Urban / Rural – 
First Stage (cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Sample Urban Rural 
 b/se b/se b/se 
Share of boys 2-4 0.039 -0.042 0.106* 
 (0.054) (0.087) (0.064) 
Share of boys 5-9 0.101*** 0.066 0.120*** 
 (0.038) (0.070) (0.044) 
Share of boys 10-14 0.056 0.039 0.071 
 (0.041) (0.072) (0.047) 
Share of men above 65 0.037 -0.255* 0.160 
 (0.093) (0.142) (0.105) 
Share of girls 0-1 0.220*** 0.211** 0.204** 
 (0.074) (0.105) (0.086) 
Share of girls 2-4 -0.029 0.027 -0.033 
 (0.050) (0.081) (0.060) 
Share of girls 5-9 0.065* -0.047 0.103** 
 (0.037) (0.058) (0.044) 
Share of girls 10-14 0.058 0.075 0.063 
 (0.040) (0.076) (0.044) 
Share of women above 65 0.001 0.007 0.030 
 (0.066) (0.124) (0.069) 
Completed Years of Education by 2004/05 -0.012*** -0.011** -0.010*** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
E(Returns to Education) -5.544*** -5.040*** -5.761*** 
 (0.985) (1.685) (1.140) 
Average local wage -0.006 0.007 -0.001 
 (0.029) (0.033) (0.041) 
Number of cows owned -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Household had a loan denied -0.016 -0.095** 0.025 
 (0.020) (0.038) (0.019) 
E (Per capita Monthly Household Income) 0.002* 0.001 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Average local education costs 0.000 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Average local subsidies to education -0.001 -0.003** 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Average time to primary school -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Insufficient Access -0.110 0.000 0.000 
 (0.216) (.) (.) 
Insufficient Quality 0.999 0.000 0.000 
 (1.193) (.) (.) 
Insufficient Security 0.757 0.000 0.000 
 (1.384) (.) (.) 
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Ethno-linguistic fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 6023 2787 3236 
Pseudo R2 0.743 0.658 0.766 
Log-Likelihood 625.365 490.922 349.792 
Sargan test    
F-Statistic 58.93 22.16 155.77 
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Woodridge Test of Endogeneity – Significance of Residual in regression with conflict variable and residual 
Residual -4.765*** -3.801 -11.493 
Std. Dev. (1.834) (2.313) (10.392) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
269 
 
 
 
 
Table 59: Variables 
Variable Source Description 
Attending School in 2004/05 TL-LSMS 2006 Binomial variable with 1 = reported to have attended school in the year 2004/05 
Female TL-LSMS 2006 Binomial variable with 1 = individual is a female 
Age TL-LSMS 2006 Individual's age 
Age2 TL-LSMS 2006 Square of the individual's age 
Urban TL-LSMS 2006 Binomial variable with 1 = household resides in an urban area 
Father attended School TL-LSMS 2006 Binomial variable with 1 = reported that father ever attended school 
Mother attended School TL-LSMS 2006 Binomial variable with 1 = reported that mother ever attended school 
Migrated TL-LSMS 2006 Binomial variable with 1 = residing in a district other than the one of birth 
First child TL-LSMS 2006 Binomial variable with 1 = is the oldest child in the household 
Adopted TL-LSMS 2006 Binomial variable with 1 = status in the household is "adopted" 
Niece/Nephew TL-LSMS 2006 Binomial variable with 1 = relation to household head is "niece" or "nephew" 
Married TL-LSMS 2006 Binomial variable with 1 = is married 
Ln (Household Size) TL-LSMS 2006 Logarithm of the number of members of the individual's household of residence 
Share of boys 0-1 TL-LSMS 2006 Share of boys aged 0-1 in the household 
Share of boys 2-4 TL-LSMS 2006 Share of boys aged 2-4 in the household 
Share of boys 5-9 TL-LSMS 2006 Share of boys aged 5-9 in the household 
Share of boys 10-14 TL-LSMS 2006 Share of boys aged 10-14 in the household 
Share of men above 65 TL-LSMS 2006 Share of men aged above 65 in the household 
Share of girls 0-1 TL-LSMS 2006 Share of girls aged 0-1 in the household 
Share of girls 2-4 TL-LSMS 2006 Share of girls aged 2-4 in the household 
Share of girls 5-9 TL-LSMS 2006 Share of girls aged 5-9 in the household 
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Variable Source Description 
Share of girls 10-14 TL-LSMS 2006 Share of girls aged 10-14 in the household 
Share of women above 65 TL-LSMS 2006 Share of women aged above 65 in the household 
Completed Years of Education TL-LSMS 2006 Equivalent number of years of schooling to the last completed level of education 
E(Returns to Education) TL-LSMS 2006(*) Returns to education, calculated following Chapter 1 and using the survey data. The estimation uses a mincerian model, accounting for 
selection bias through the Heckman method. Using the model with the best fit, the estimated coefficients of the following correlates are used: 
completed years of education, dummy variable indicating having an NGO as employer, dummy variable indicating working in a rural public 
works project, yearly average number of civilians killed during school years of individual, number of years of extreme hunger experienced by 
individual while in school age. Estimates were produced using individual’s own statistics. Values of dummy variables were equal to 1 if the 
individuals worked for the respective employer or substituted by the national probability of an individual working for the respective employer 
if they didn’t. 
Average local wage TL-LSMS 2006(*) Average hourly wage, calculated at the cluster/village level 
Number of Cows Owned TL-LSMS 2006 Number of cows owned by the household (proxy of credit worthiness) 
Household had a loan denied TL-LSMS 2006 Binomial variable with 1 = household had a loan denied in 2005 
E (Per capita Monthly Household Income) TL-LSMS 2006(*) Estimated in a 2SLS Instrumental Variables approach (first step) using the remaining variables in the empirical model and the following 
instruments, representative of productive assets and wealth: years of education of the household head, controls for type of dwelling owned 
(bamboo house, semi-permanent, traditional house, small house in compound of main house, permanent house, emergency/tent, other), area 
of owned plot, value of owned plot, area of plots partly owned, variables indicative of the number of units of livestock owned (buffalos, bali 
cows, cows, horses, pigs, goats, sheep, chicken or ducks) and total value of the livestock.  
Average local education costs TL-LSMS 2006 (*) Average expenditure on education, calculated at the cluster/village level 
Average local subsidies to education TL-LSMS 2006 (*) Average external support received by the households, calculated at the cluster/village level 
Average time to primary school TL-LSMS 2006 (*) Average of reported time to nearest primary school, calculated at the cluster/village level 
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Variable Source Description 
Average time to secondary school TL-LSMS 2006 (*) Average of reported time to nearest secondary school, calculated at the cluster/village level 
Insufficient Access TL-LSMS 2006(*) Percentage of children and youngsters, at the district level, that stated not to have attended school due to the school being too expensive, too 
far away, not fit for their eventual disabilities or due to language barriers 
Insufficient Quality TL-LSMS 2006(*) Percentage of children and youngsters, at the district level, that stated not to have attended school due to lack of teacher, no supplies or 
dysfunctional school 
Insufficient Security TL-LSMS 2006(*) Percentage of children and youngsters, at the district level, that stated not to have attended school due to harassment, stated insecurity or the 
fact that the children's household was displaced 
Conflict 1: Average killings during life CAVR (2006) (*) Average number of people reported to have been killed or disappeared in the individual's district of birth during her life 
Conflict 2: Shock of extreme violence during life CAVR (2006) (*) Binomial variable indicating whether the individual experienced a shock of extreme violence during her lifetime (corresponding to the 1999 
post-referendum violence), equivalent to a number of killings in the district equal or above the yearly average of killings in each district and 
year of occupation in 2 standard deviations 
Distance to border Author’s calculations 
from Google Maps 
Distance of district capital to border (by road) 
District fixed effects TL-LSMS 2006 Control variables for the Timorese districts  
Ethno-linguistic fixed effects TL-LSMS 2006 Control variables for the Timorese ethno-linguistic groups 
(*) Values calculated by the author, from the referred dataset. 
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Appendix C - Chapter 3 
Table 60: Secondary Education Demand - Heckman Probit Regression - Second Stage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Probit IV Probit 
Heckman IV 
Probit 
Marginal Effects 
 
Probit IV Probit 
Heckman IV 
Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Explained variable = Probability of adolescent between ages 12 and 18, to have attended secondary school in the 2004/05 school 
year 
Constant -45.756*** -22.282*** -6.717    
 (7.081) (6.793) (4.786)    
Conflict: Shock of 
extreme violence during 
school life 
7.061*** 26.398*** 1.282* 0.800*** 3.899*** 0.073* 
(1.063) (10.117) (0.715) (0.093) (1.366) (0.040) 
Female 0.329** 0.256** 0.119 0.037** 0.038* 0.007 
 (0.138) (0.127) (0.106) (0.016) (0.019) (0.006) 
Age 6.034*** 3.021*** 1.263** 0.683*** 0.446*** 0.072** 
 (0.878) (0.885) (0.608) (0.109) (0.137) (0.034) 
Age2 -0.181*** -0.087*** -0.043** -0.020*** -0.013*** -0.002** 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.019) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) 
Urban -0.821*** -1.109*** -0.315** -0.093*** -0.164*** -0.018** 
 (0.243) (0.247) (0.142) (0.027) (0.033) (0.008) 
Father Attended School 0.028 -0.759* -0.003 0.003 -0.112* -0.000 
 (0.508) (0.456) (0.313) (0.058) (0.066) (0.018) 
Mother Attended School 0.448 0.775* 0.715 0.051 0.114* 0.041 
 (0.498) (0.452) (0.436) (0.057) (0.067) (0.025) 
Migrated -0.360 -3.580** 0.290 -0.041 -0.529*** 0.017 
 (0.377) (1.398) (0.339) (0.043) (0.190) (0.019) 
First Child 0.419** 0.396** 0.224 0.047** 0.059** 0.013 
 (0.187) (0.182) (0.139) (0.021) (0.026) (0.008) 
Adopted -0.245 -0.744 0.390 -0.028 -0.110 0.022 
 (0.919) (0.800) (0.564) (0.104) (0.117) (0.032) 
Niece/Nephew -0.114 -0.181 0.023 -0.013 -0.027 0.001 
 (0.224) (0.237) (0.211) (0.025) (0.035) (0.012) 
Married -5.300*** -4.323*** -2.194** -0.600*** -0.638*** -0.125** 
 (0.660) (0.550) (0.918) (0.070) (0.081) (0.052) 
Ln (Household Size) 0.917*** 0.656*** 0.521** 0.104*** 0.097*** 0.030*** 
 (0.227) (0.214) (0.203) (0.027) (0.032) (0.011) 
Share of boys 0-1 2.961 0.043 1.889 0.335 0.006 0.108 
 (2.008) (2.176) (1.412) (0.232) (0.321) (0.081) 
Share of boys 2-4 -3.002** -4.722*** -2.311** -0.340** -0.697*** -0.132** 
 (1.285) (1.365) (1.108) (0.149) (0.193) (0.064) 
Share of boys 5-9 -0.607 0.600 -0.517 -0.069 0.089 -0.029 
 (1.004) (0.964) (0.760) (0.115) (0.141) (0.043) 
Share of boys 10-14 -0.954 0.289 0.108 -0.108 0.043 0.006 
 (0.797) (0.711) (0.615) (0.090) (0.105) (0.035) 
Share of men above 65 -0.684 -1.055 -1.048 -0.077 -0.156 -0.060 
 (1.415) (1.293) (1.084) (0.159) (0.190) (0.062) 
Share of girls 0-1 0.596 3.555* -0.233 0.068 0.525** -0.013 
 (1.633) (1.866) (1.196) (0.185) (0.266) (0.068) 
Share of girls 2-4 -1.812 -4.058*** -1.052 -0.205 -0.599*** -0.060 
 (1.714) (1.441) (1.111) (0.193) (0.207) (0.064) 
Share of girls 5-9 -1.561 -0.747 -0.525 -0.177 -0.110 -0.030 
 (0.954) (0.910) (0.840) (0.108) (0.133) (0.048) 
Share of girls 10-14 0.553 0.332 -0.014 0.063 0.049 -0.001 
 (0.843) (0.756) (0.666) (0.095) (0.112) (0.038) 
Share of women above 65 -1.355 1.987 -0.906 -0.153 0.293 -0.052 
 (1.105) (1.789) (0.921) (0.125) (0.258) (0.052) 
Completed Years of 
Education 
-0.712*** -1.036*** -0.343*** -0.081*** -0.153*** -0.020*** 
(0.090) (0.284) (0.055) (0.008) (0.037) (0.002) 
E(Returns to Education) 497.255*** 711.700*** 119.932*** 56.315*** 105.105*** 6.838*** 
 (65.788) (235.455) (23.938) (5.273) (31.243) (1.315) 
Average local wage 0.108 -0.055 -0.103 0.012 -0.008 -0.006 
 (0.511) (0.397) (0.307) (0.058) (0.059) (0.018) 
Number of cows owned 0.025 -0.008 0.028 0.003 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.016) (0.031) (0.020) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) 
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Table 60: Secondary Education Demand - Heckman Probit Regression - Second Stage (cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Probit IV Probit Heckman IV 
Probit 
ME Probit ME IV Probit ME Heckman 
IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Household had a loan 
denied 
(a) (a) 7.209*** (a) (a) 0.411*** 
 (a) (a) (0.313) (a) (a) (0.035) 
Per capita Monthly 
Household Expenditure 
0.011* 0.013** 0.005 0.001* 0.002** 0.000 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Average local education 
costs 
0.002 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Average local subsidies to 
education 
0.009 0.029 -0.004 0.001 0.004 -0.000 
(0.017) (0.021) (0.018) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
Average time to secondary 
school 
-0.006*** -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Insufficient Access -1.627 16.878* 9.969** -0.184 2.493* 0.568** 
 (7.172) (9.138) (4.547) (0.811) (1.291) (0.262) 
Insufficient Quality -71.553*** -97.086*** -10.274*** -8.104*** -14.338*** -0.586*** 
 (25.475) (20.843) (3.688) (2.973) (3.035) (0.209) 
Insufficient Security -25.298 -67.262*** 1.053 -2.865 -9.933*** 0.060 
 (29.362) (25.367) (8.959) (3.335) (3.710) (0.511) 
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethno-linguistic fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1368 1368 4091 1368 1368 4091 
N – uncensored - - 1396 - - 1396 
Pseudo R2 0.5722 0.4405 - - - - 
Log-likelihood -10639.567 -13916.608 -84604.710 - - - 
Exogeneity test (H0: 
athrho=0) 
      
 c   1.640 - - - 
p-value   (0.200) - - - 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Source: author’s calculations on data from TLSLS (2007) and CAVR (2006) (a) perfectly predicts 
success. 
Table 61: Secondary Education Demand – robustness to introduction of variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Socio-economic + Education as Investment Standard Model 
 Probit  IV Probit Probit  IV Probit Probit  IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
First stage 
Explained variable = Shock of extreme violence during school life 
Distance to border 
(instrument) 
 -0.001**  -0.001*  -0.001** 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Sargan test       
F-Statistic  4.87  3.73  4.93 
P-Value  0.0274  0.0537  0.0266 
Wooldridge Test of Endogeneity – Significance of Residual in regression with conflict variable and residual 
Residual  -1.338  -13.723***  95.304*** 
Std. Dev.  (1.788)  (2.442)  (19.869) 
Second Stage 
Explained variable = Probability of adolescent, between ages 12 and 18, to have attended secondary school in the 2004/05 school 
year 
Conflict: Shock of 
extreme violence during 
school life 
0.678*** 0.745*** 1.839*** -12.391*** 1.815*** 13.559*** 
(0.136) (0.142) (0.280) (3.383) (0.275) (2.771) 
N 4099 4099 4099 4099 4099 4099 
Log-Likelihood -73418.114 -73643.023 -43872.768 -45004.380 -42225.329 -43496.579 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: author’s calculations on data from TLSLS (2007) and CAVR (2006) 
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Table 62: Secondary Education Demand - robustness to age of start 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Baseline. Start school at 7 Start school at 8 
 Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Conflict: Shock of 
extreme violence during 
school life 
1.815*** 13.559*** 0.824*** 8.770*** 0.401*** 7.549*** 
(0.275) (2.771) (0.197) (1.792) (0.155) (1.543) 
N 4099 4099 4099 4099 4099 4099 
Log-Likelihood -42225.329 -43496.579 -42967.404 -43496.579 -43321.988 -43496.580 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Note: Coefficients of the conflict variables were estimated with the remaining covariates of the 
study’s standard models. Source: author’s calculations on data from TLSLS (2007) and CAVR (2006) 
Table 63:  Secondary Education Demand - Robustness to age of entry in secondary school – cohort 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Baseline model 
Cohort 12-18 years old 
Cohort 13-19 years old Cohort 14-20 years old 
 Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Conflict: Shock of extreme 
violence during school life  
1.815*** 13.559*** 1.632*** 10.381*** 1.344*** 14.436*** 
(0.275) (2.771) (0.266) (2.294) (0.329) (1.984) 
N 4099 4099 3926 3926 3814 3814 
Log-Likelihood -42225.329 -43496.579 -52346.802 -53785.647 -59625.977 -60733.376 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 . Note: Coefficients of the conflict variables were estimated with the remaining covariates of 
the study’s standard models. Source: author’s calculations on data from TLSLS (2007) and CAVR (2006) 
 
Table 64: Secondary Education Demand - robustness threshold of extreme violence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Threshold = +1 Standard Dev. Baseline Threshold = +3 Standard Dev. 
 Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Conflict: Shock of 
extreme violence during 
school life 
0.742*** 5.455*** 1.815*** 13.559*** 1.815*** 13.559*** 
(0.191) (1.115) (0.275) (2.771) (0.275) (2.771) 
N 4099 4099 4099 4099 4099 4099 
Log-Likelihood -43077.004 -43496.579 -42225.329 -43496.579 -42225.329 -43496.579 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Note: Coefficients of the conflict variables were estimated with the remaining covariates of the 
study’s standard models. Source: author’s calculations on data from TLSLS (2007) and CAVR (2006) 
Table 65: Secondary Education Demand - robustness to migration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Baseline model Non-Migrants 
 Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Conflict: Shock of extreme 
violence during school life 
1.815*** 13.559*** 2.028*** 19.028* 
(0.275) (2.771) (0.344) (11.182) 
N 4099 4099 3887 3887 
Log-Likelihood -42225.329 -43496.579 -39192.727 -40285.606 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Note: Coefficients of the conflict variables were estimated with the remaining covariates of the 
study’s standard models. Source: author’s calculations on data from TLSLS (2007) and CAVR (2006) 
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Table 66: Secondary Education Demand - decomposition by gender – First Stage 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Sample Girls Boys 
 b/se b/se b/se 
Constant -0.251 -0.193 -0.280 
 (0.359) (0.635) (0.414) 
Distance to border (instrument) -0.001** -0.000 -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.008) (.) (.) 
Age 0.061 0.033 0.080 
 (0.043) (0.072) (0.053) 
Age2 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Urban 0.012 0.034* -0.005 
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.016) 
Father Attended School 0.025 0.031 0.030 
 (0.026) (0.037) (0.028) 
Mother Attended School -0.006 0.029 -0.026 
 (0.027) (0.041) (0.033) 
Migrated 0.183*** 0.221*** 0.134*** 
 (0.045) (0.052) (0.046) 
First Child -0.004 0.009 -0.015 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.015) 
Adopted 0.022 0.008 0.028 
 (0.021) (0.044) (0.043) 
Niece/Nephew 0.004 0.027 -0.016 
 (0.021) (0.026) (0.027) 
Married -0.032 -0.067 0.394* 
 (0.058) (0.048) (0.216) 
Ln (Household Size) 0.006 0.020 -0.007 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.019) 
Share of boys 0-1 0.129 0.002 0.192 
 (0.141) (0.155) (0.167) 
Share of boys 2-4 0.058 -0.111 0.180** 
 (0.070) (0.104) (0.088) 
Share of boys 5-9 -0.038 -0.056 -0.002 
 (0.049) (0.075) (0.062) 
Share of boys 10-14 -0.023 -0.035 -0.028 
 (0.038) (0.064) (0.052) 
Share of men above 65 0.013 -0.033 0.071 
 (0.069) (0.087) (0.096) 
Share of girls 0-1 -0.129 0.039 -0.284** 
 (0.105) (0.146) (0.143) 
Share of girls 2-4 0.086 0.160 -0.012 
 (0.091) (0.115) (0.117) 
Share of girls 5-9 -0.005 -0.131** 0.117* 
 (0.047) (0.065) (0.066) 
Share of girls 10-14 0.012 -0.042 0.093 
 (0.046) (0.058) (0.071) 
Share of women above 65 -0.129 -0.137 -0.110 
 (0.088) (0.113) (0.099) 
Completed Years of Education by 2004/05 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
E(Returns to Education) -19.997*** -21.388*** -18.878*** 
 (1.705) (3.257) (1.793) 
Average local wage 0.001 -0.019 0.021 
 (0.027) (0.044) (0.034) 
Number of cows owned 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Household had a loan denied 0.025 0.024 0.028 
 (0.021) (0.026) (0.029) 
Per capita Monthly Household Income -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Average local education costs 0.000 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Average local subsidies to education -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Average time to primary school 0.000 0.000* 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 66: Secondary Education Demand - decomposition by gender – First Stage (cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Sample Girls Boys 
 b/se b/se b/se 
Insufficient Access -0.656** -0.517 -0.907** 
 (0.256) (0.335) (0.362) 
Insufficient Quality 1.040 0.154 1.624 
 (1.335) (2.086) (2.052) 
Insufficient Security 1.445 -3.466 6.658*** 
 (1.709) (2.582) (2.392) 
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Ethno-linguistic fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 4102 2001 2101 
Pseudo R2 0.749 0.752 0.761 
Log-Likelihood 924.334 477.481 510.181 
Sargan test    
F-Statistic 4.93 0.03 20.36 
P-Value 0.0266 0.8646 0.0000 
Wooldridge Test of Endogeneity – Significance of Residual in regression with conflict variable and residual 
Residual 95.304*** 51.845*** 522.059* 
Std. Dev. (19.869) (10.188) (268.681) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 67: Secondary Education Demand - decomposition Urban / Rural – First Stage 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Sample Urban Rural 
 b/se b/se b/se 
Constant -0.251 0.822* -0.427 
 (0.359) (0.496) (0.456) 
Distance to border (instrument) -0.001** -0.000 -0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Female 0.001 0.015 -0.003 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.010) 
Age 0.061 -0.063 0.136*** 
 (0.043) (0.060) (0.051) 
Age2 -0.002 0.002 -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Urban 0.012 0.000 0.000 
 (0.012) (.) (.) 
Father Attended School 0.025 0.029 0.018 
 (0.026) (0.035) (0.034) 
Mother Attended School -0.006 -0.036 0.011 
 (0.027) (0.045) (0.035) 
Migrated 0.183*** 0.317*** -0.134** 
 (0.045) (0.036) (0.056) 
First Child -0.004 -0.020 -0.003 
 (0.010) (0.019) (0.012) 
Adopted 0.022 -0.018 0.023 
 (0.021) (0.050) (0.021) 
Niece/Nephew 0.004 -0.013 -0.006 
 (0.021) (0.033) (0.023) 
Married -0.032 -0.037 -0.055 
 (0.058) (0.158) (0.047) 
Ln (Household Size) 0.006 0.009 0.005 
 (0.015) (0.022) (0.020) 
Share of boys 0-1 0.129 0.174 0.224 
 (0.141) (0.184) (0.140) 
Share of boys 2-4 0.058 -0.034 0.109 
 (0.070) (0.117) (0.081) 
Share of boys 5-9 -0.038 -0.097 -0.022 
 (0.049) (0.082) (0.056) 
Share of boys 10-14 -0.023 -0.026 -0.005 
 (0.038) (0.060) (0.047) 
Share of men above 65 0.013 -0.051 0.038 
 (0.069) (0.095) (0.081) 
  
277 
 
 
 
 
Table 67: Secondary Education Demand - decomposition Urban / Rural – First Stage (cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Sample Urban Rural 
 b/se b/se b/se 
Share of girls 0-1 -0.129 -0.264** -0.062 
 (0.105) (0.134) (0.131) 
Share of girls 2-4 0.086 0.084 0.118 
 (0.091) (0.185) (0.090) 
Share of girls 5-9 -0.005 -0.087 0.027 
 (0.047) (0.075) (0.058) 
Share of girls 10-14 0.012 0.088 0.008 
 (0.046) (0.072) (0.055) 
Share of women above 65 -0.129 0.080 -0.124 
 (0.088) (0.160) (0.081) 
Completed Years of Education by 2004/05 0.023*** 0.015*** 0.026*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
E(Returns to Education) -19.997*** -20.137*** -19.594*** 
 (1.705) (2.297) (1.966) 
Average local wage 0.001 0.044* -0.038 
 (0.027) (0.024) (0.048) 
Number of cows owned 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Household had a loan denied 0.025 0.044 0.027 
 (0.021) (0.034) (0.027) 
Per capita Monthly Household Income -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Average local education costs 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Average local subsidies to education -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Average time to primary school 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Insufficient Access -0.656** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.256) (.) (.) 
Insufficient Quality 1.040 0.000 0.000 
 (1.335) (.) (.) 
Insufficient Security 1.445 0.000 0.000 
 (1.709) (.) (.) 
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Ethno-linguistic fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 4102 2049 2053 
Pseudo R2 0.749 0.677 0.787 
Log-Likelihood 924.334 466.722 555.115 
Sargan test    
F-Statistic 4.93 1.31 5.40 
P-Value 0.0266 0.2530 0.0203 
Wooldridge Test of Endogeneity – Significance of Residual in regression with conflict variable and residual 
Residual 95.304*** -1.667 74.982*** 
Std. Dev. (19.869) (7.550) (15.722) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
278 
 
 
 
 
Table 68: Variables 
Variable Source Description 
Attending School in 2004/05 TL-LSMS 2006 Binomial variable with 1 = reported to have attended school in the year 2004/05 
Female TL-LSMS 2006 Binomial variable with 1 = individual is a female 
Age TL-LSMS 2006 Individual's age 
Age2 TL-LSMS 2006 Square of the individual's age 
Urban TL-LSMS 2006 Binomial variable with 1 = household resides in an urban area 
Father attended School TL-LSMS 2006 Binomial variable with 1 = reported that father ever attended school 
Mother attended School TL-LSMS 2006 Binomial variable with 1 = reported that mother ever attended school 
Migrated TL-LSMS 2006 Binomial variable with 1 = residing in a district other than the one of birth 
First child TL-LSMS 2006 Binomial variable with 1 = is the oldest child in the household 
Adopted TL-LSMS 2006 Binomial variable with 1 = status in the household is "adopted" 
Niece/Nephew TL-LSMS 2006 Binomial variable with 1 = relation to household head is "niece" or "nephew" 
Married TL-LSMS 2006 Binomial variable with 1 = is married 
Ln (Household Size) TL-LSMS 2006 Logarithm of the number of members of the individual's household of residence 
Share of boys 0-1 TL-LSMS 2006 Share of boys aged 0-1 in the household 
Share of boys 2-4 TL-LSMS 2006 Share of boys aged 2-4 in the household 
Share of boys 5-9 TL-LSMS 2006 Share of boys aged 5-9 in the household 
Share of boys 10-14 TL-LSMS 2006 Share of boys aged 10-14 in the household 
Share of men above 65 TL-LSMS 2006 Share of men aged above 65 in the household 
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Variable Source Description 
Share of girls 0-1 TL-LSMS 2006 Share of girls aged 0-1 in the household 
Share of girls 2-4 TL-LSMS 2006 Share of girls aged 2-4 in the household 
Share of girls 5-9 TL-LSMS 2006 Share of girls aged 5-9 in the household 
Share of girls 10-14 TL-LSMS 2006 Share of girls aged 10-14 in the household 
Share of women above 65 TL-LSMS 2006 Share of women aged above 65 in the household 
Completed Years of Education TL-LSMS 2006 Equivalent number of years of schooling to the last completed level of education 
E(Returns to Education) TL-LSMS 2006(*) Returns to education, calculated following Chapter 1 and using the survey data.. The estimation uses a mincerian model, 
accounting for selection bias through the Heckman method. Using the model with the best fit, the estimated coefficients 
of the following correlates are used: completed years of education, dummy variable indicating having an NGO as 
employer, dummy variable indicating working in a rural public works project, yearly average number of civilians killed 
during school years of individual, number of years of extreme hunger experienced by individual while in school age. 
Estimates were produced using individual’s own statistics. Values of dummy variables were equal to 1 if the individuals 
worked for the respective employer or substituted by the national probability of an individual working for the respective 
employer if they didn’t. 
Average local wage TL-LSMS 2006(*) Average hourly wage, calculated at the cluster/village level 
Number of Cows Owned TL-LSMS 2006 Number of cows owned by the household (proxy of credit worthiness) 
Household had a loan denied TL-LSMS 2006 Binomial variable with 1 = household had a loan denied in 2005 
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Variable Source Description 
Per capita Monthly Household Expenditure TL-LSMS 2006(*) Sum of all expenditure items in the survey, in monthly terms and divided by the number of members of the household. 
E (Per capita Monthly Household Income) TL-LSMS 2006(*) Estimated in a 2SLS Instrumental Variables approach (first step) using the remaining variables in the empirical model and 
the following instruments, representative of productive assets and wealth: years of education of the household head, 
controls for type of dwelling owned (bamboo house, semi-permanent, traditional house, small house in compound of main 
house, permanent house, emergency/tent, other), area of owned plot, value of owned plot, area of plots partly owned, 
variables indicative of the number of units of livestock owned (buffalos, bali cows, cows, horses, pigs, goats, sheep, 
chicken or ducks) and total value of the livestock.  
Average local education costs TL-LSMS 2006 (*) Average expenditure in education, calculated at the cluster/village level 
Average local subsidies to education TL-LSMS 2006 (*) Average external support received by the households, calculated at the cluster/village level 
Average time to primary school TL-LSMS 2006 (*) Average of reported time to nearest primary school, calculated at the cluster/village level 
Average time to secondary school TL-LSMS 2006 (*) Average of reported time to nearest secondary school, calculated at the cluster/village level 
Insufficient Access TL-LSMS 2006(*) Percentage of children and youngsters, at the district level, that stated not to have attended school due to the school being 
too expensive, too far away, not fit for their eventual disabilities or due to language barriers 
Insufficient Quality TL-LSMS 2006(*) Percentage of children and youngsters, at the district level, that stated not to have attended school due to lack of teacher, 
no supplies or dysfunctional school 
Insufficient Security TL-LSMS 2006(*) Percentage of children and youngsters, at the district level, that stated not to have attended school due to harassment, 
stated insecurity or the fact that the children's household was displaced 
Conflict: Shock of extreme violence during 
school life 
CAVR (2006) (*) Binomial variable indicating whether the individual experienced a shock of extreme violence while of school age and during 
the Indonesian occupation, equivalent to having lived through a year when the number of killings in the district was equal or 
above the yearly average of killings in each district and year of occupation in 2 standard deviations. 
Distance to border Author’s calculations 
from Google Maps 
Distance of district capital to border (by road) 
District fixed effects TL-LSMS 2006 Control variables for the Timorese districts  
Ethno-linguistic fixed effects TL-LSMS 2006 Control variables for the Timorese ethno-linguistic groups 
(*) Values calculated by the author, from the referred dataset. 
 
